World perspectives of the War of the Pacific

Despite the War of the Pacific being a war where minor world powers faced against each other, heavy economic involvement from Europe and the actions taken by nearby nations took important roles during the war. Very few nations truly remained neutral during the conflict.

South America

Brazil was worried that Argentina might enter an alliance against it with Peru and Bolivia, but Peru, in order to PReVENT Brazil from seeking an allience with Chile, assured the Brazilian government that the defensive alliance that it would sign with Argentina would be aimed only at stopping Chilean territorial aspirations in Peru and Bolivia. During the conflict Brazil remained neutral, but, after the Chilean invasion of Lima, rejected to join a diplomatic mission with Argentina that would attempt to finish the war. According to the Instituto Iberoamérica y el Mundo, Brazil purposely waited for the defeats of its neighbors Peru and Bolivia, and saw the rise of Chilean power as a benefit to its conflict with Argentina. Colombia declared neutrality on May 20, 1879, and attempted to serve as a mediator to the conflict at various points during the war, but its lack of authority over the heavy international commerce in the isthmus of Panama allowed Peru to pass armaments and ammunition through the isthmus without the Colombian government finding out. When the war ended, Colombia saw Chilean naval power in the Pacific Ocean as a threat and proclaimed that its "insane ambitions" should not be accepted by any American nation. In Ecuador, despite the Ecuadorian–Peruvian war of 1858, public opinion was split between Peruvian supporters in Guayaquil and Chilean supporters in Quito. According to the Ecuadorian online newspaper Hoy, Ecuador declined an alliance proposed by Chile that would provide the Andean nation with 3,000 Chilean troops that would secure the Peruvian provinces of Túmbez, Jaén, and Maynas for Ecuador. At the end of the War of the Pacific, the Venezuelan Congress made a resolution in which they lamented the "terrible catastrophy of the Pacific" and protested against the "iniquitous and scandalous usurpations" of Chile.

Argentina

In 1873 and 1879, Argentina had begun talks with Perú and Bolivia in order to join the alliance, since it had a territorial dispute with Chile regarding the region of Patagonia, On September 24, 1873, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies had approved the (secret) law, but the Argentine Senate postponed the matter to 1874.See http://www.argentina-rree.com/6/6-066.htm "Sarmiento y Tejedor proponen al Congreso la adhesión al tratado secreto peruano-boliviano del 6 de febrero de 1873":

el 24 de septiembre el presidente Sarmiento firmara el pedido de autorización al Congreso para la adhesión al tratado de alianza peruano-boliviano. El asunto fue aprobado en la Cámara de Diputados por 48 a 18 votos…

El tratamiento del tema en el Senado sufrió sucesivos aplazamientos hasta finalmente quedar para las sesiones ordinarias del año siguiente

According to Peruvian accounts, prior to the Chilean declaration of war, the Argentine President asked to Peruvian minister in Buenos Aires if Peru could be prepared to render assistance to Argentina in the event of a diplomatic break with Chile. At the time, the Peruvian minister had not received instructions of any kind.See La actitud de la Argentina. Jorge Basadre:

el 26 me pidió una conferencia S. E. el Presidente y habiendo tenido lugar comprendí que su objeto había sido conocer la actitud que adoptaríamos en la cuestión que se ventilaba entre Chile y Bolivia y quizás aun si estaríamos dispuestos al fin a prestar auxilio a la Argentina en caso de un rompimiento con Chile. En esa conferencia me dijo que tenía noticia de que la mediación del Perú no sería admitida. Como ya no había recibido instrucciones de ninguna clase, bien a mi pesar tuve que eludir la respuesta que él esperaba, perdiendo de nuevo la oportunidad que se me presentaba para conseguir la alianza, sin solicitarla, lo que a mi juicio habría sido muy fácil entonces..."

(Translation:

On 26 asked me a conference the President and having been understood that its purpose had been to know the attitude taken in the matter was ventilated between Chile and Bolivia, and perhaps even be prepared to render assistance to Argentina in the event of a break with Chile. At that conference told me that he had news that the mediation of Peru would not be admitted. As I had not received instructions of any kind, I had to evade the answer he expected, again losing the opportunity that I had to get the alliance, without asking

According to Argentine sources, prior to the Argentine declaration of neutrality, Peruvians offered to Argentina an access to the Pacific Ocean through the Bolivian territories in order to join the conflict against the Chilean government. However, the offer was so vague in its formulation, that the Argentine foreign minister and the representative in Bolivia thought it did not deserve consideration.See La misión Balmaceda: asegurar la neutralidad argentina en la guerra del Pacífico:

…[Peru] había instruido inicialmente a su ministro en Buenos Aires, Aníbal Víctor de la Torre, a ofrecer a la Argentina los territorios bolivianos situados entre los 24º y 27º de latitud en la costa oeste, a cambio del ingreso argentino en el conflicto contra el gobierno de Chile...Además, el canciller Montes de Oca creyó que el plan era "tan vago en la formulación que del mismo se hacía en la correspondencia de Uriburu que no merecía consideración"

(Translation:

…[Peru] had given instructions to his minister in Buenos Aires, Aníbal Víctor de la Torre, to offer to Argentina the Bolivian territories located between the 24°S and 27°S of the west coasts, in exchange of Argentine participation in the conflict against the government Chile...In addition, Foreign Minister Montes de Oca believed the plan was "so vague in the formulation, that did not deserve consideration according to Uriburu correspondence"

On May 20, 1879 the Argentine Foreign Minister Montes de Oca declared the neutrality of Argentina.See http://www.argentina-rree.com/6/6-081.htm "La misión Balmaceda: asegurar la neutralidad argentina en la guerra del Pacífico":

Paradójicamente, una semana después, el ministro de relaciones exteriores Montes de Oca proclamó oficialmente la neutralidad argentina…

However, despite its neutrality in the Pacific war, the Argentine authorities did not fail to play an important role in the delicate balance of forces in the Southern Cone, and particularly relevant in relation to the "minor" nations in terms of power in the sub-region. When war broke out Argentina sent a naval squadron to Rio Negro menacing Chilean dominion over the Straits of Magellan. Thus, the Argentine Foreign Ministry launched a series of diplomatic actions aimed at preventing that Chile could gain big profits, especially land, at the expense of the defeated countries, Peru and Bolivia.

On the basis of that attitude Argentina was under the fear that after the victory over Peru and Bolivia, Chile could seek to expand on Argentine territory. The prevailing perception among men in the Argentine government during the 1870s and 1880s, for their inferior status of military forces in comparison with those of Chile helped to exacerbate the fear. John Crow, in his book The Epic of Latin America, argues that the Chilean naval superiority was the main factor preventing Argentina from taking part in the war. Another author, Richard O. Perry said that Argentina expected Chile to win the war, but remain so weak afterwards that it would not be able to refute Argentine claims on Patagonia. Another reason by which Argentina did not enter the war was the belief that the Araucanized natives that ravaged Argentinas southern frontier would side the Chileans and that any conflict would be therefore fought in the vicinities of Buenos Aires.1

Brazil

When the Argentinean congress met in secrecy, the Brazilian government was worried that they were plotting against it. The matter turned even worse when a possible alliance treaty with Peru and Bolivia was found to be a point of discussion. Fearing a possible Brazilian alliance with Chile, Peru eventually lessened Brazilian fears when they explained that the treaty being discussed would be a defensive alliance treaty that would be aimed at stopping Chilean territorial aspirations on Bolivia and Peru. During the War of the Pacific, the failure of the Lackawanna Conference in Arica made the Argentine government propose the government in Brazil a diplomatic union that would aim at helping the belligerent nations reach an accord to end the war. However, Brazil postponed the question until after the Chilean invasion of Lima, and at that point claimed that any attempt at negotiation from the part of Brazil and Argentina would be futile.

Colombia

On May 20, 1879, Colombia declared neutrality and asked to receive more information regarding the origins of the war. Colombia did not agree with the war, and on April 15 and 24 proposed to serve as a peace mediator between Chile and Bolivia. On June 20, 1879, Colombia declared that the Isthmus of Panama would be neutral for all sides of the conflict. However, as the Peruvian consulate in explained, it was nearly impossible for Colombia to guarantee such a neutrality from the Isthmus due to the large amounts of international commerce that went on in that region. During the war, Peru managed to buy armaments and ammunitions from Europe and the United States. These materials were later carried through the isthmus of Panama, which at that point was a province of Colombia. According to Chilean historian Diego Barros Arana, Peruvian agents had bought the governor of Panama in order for the materials to pass through without the central government of Colombia knowing about it. After the War of the Pacific was over, Colombia feared that the balance of power in South America was having major changes with the defeat of Peru, and they also feared Chilean control of the Pacific Ocean from the Strait of Magellan to the Isthmus of Panama (As neither Colombia or Ecuador had a strong enough navy to protect their Pacific coasts). In order to protect itself from the expansionistic ambitions of other countries, Colombia increased its military strength and improved the foreign relations with its neighboring countries. Colombia saw Chile as a threat and proclaimed that its "insane ambitions" should not be accepted by any American nation.

Ecuador

Despite the Ecuadorian–Peruvian war of 1858, public opinion in Ecuador was divided during the War of the Pacific between the views of Guayaquil, the nation's most important port, and Quito, the capital. In Guayaquil, the views were favorable for Peru and, in Quito, the views were favorable towards Chile. According to the Ecuadorian online newspaper Hoy.com.ec, during the war, Chile proposed an alliance to Ecuador in exchange for 3,000 Chilean troops that would give Ecuador the Peruvian provinces of Túmbez, Jaén, and Maynas.

Venezuela

At the end of the War of the Pacific, the Venezuelan Congress made a resolution in which they lamented the "terrible catastrophe of the Pacific" and protested against the "iniquitous and scandalous usurpations" of Chile.

Europe

Great Britain, France, and Italy composed the European diplomatic delegation that attempted to negotiate a peace settlement between the warring nations in South America. Italy played a minor role in comparisson to France and Great Britain, and although the Italian government began to favor Chile after the United States got involved in the peace negotiations, Italian immigrants in Peru complained about the [...] and plunder of their property by Chilean troops to the Italian government which eventually sent three warships to help protect its citizens. Italy's greatest contribution to the war would be through its immigrants, who would serve as medics and firemen in Peru, but a great rift took place between the Chilean and Italian governments when 11 Italian firemen, who were attempting to put out fires and help wounded Peruvian soldiers, were killed by Chilean troops after the Battle of Chorrillos. Italian immigrants in Chile would face further hostility after the Chilean army reported that as many as 700 Italians had fought alongside Peruvians in the Battle of San Juan and Miraflores, which was a claim that was, according to Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre, false and, according Italian historian Tomas Caivano, a cover-up for the [...] of Italians by Chilean troops. In France, many of its capitalists, including French president Jules Grévy, had invested much money in Peru through Peruvian government bonds. The French government, who had close ties with the Dreyfus house in Peru, was worried that Peru would not be able to repay its international debt without its saltpeter companies. Prior to the Chilean occupation of Lima, the French Vice-Admiral Abel-Nicolas Bergasse Dupetit Thouars claims to have held a vision of Saint Rose of Lima in which she told him to save Lima from destruction, which was a deed Dupetit Thouars managed to do when he led the other neutral parties in the diplomatic mission of protecting Lima from an major destructions.

France

French capitalists had lent large sums of money to the Peruvian government, and various French citizens held Peruvian bonds. Paris, therefore, was distressed upon learning that the Chileans had captured Tarapacá's salitreras, which constituted Peru's only means of repaying its international debt.

The French government had very close ties with Dreyfus house. The French President of the time, Jules Grévy, was a good friend of Auguste Dreyfus, whom was Dreyfus house's attorney. Grévy himself had considerable amounts of money in Peruvian investments, for which later, Le Figaro once named him as "The guano man".

Prior to the Chilean occupation of Lima, the French vice-admiral Abel-Nicolas Bergasse Dupetit Thouars claims to have held a vision of Saint Rose of Lima in which she told him to save Lima from destruction. Dupetit Thouars, along with the rest of the neutral fleet composed of English, French, and Italian ships, managed to prevent the Chilean invading army from causing any major destructions to the city of Lima.

Great Britain

After the begin of war the government of Great Britain declared its neutrality and refused to allow Peru, Bolivia, and Chile to take delivery of military or naval material on British soil. In the book Influencia británica en el salitre, Chilean historian Alejandro Soto argues that although throughout the war Great Britain presented itself as a neutral viewer of the matter, in reality Great Britain had great influence and domination over Chilean saltpeter, nitrate, and iodine companies in the region. At first, the British positioned its saltpeter production in the zone as a small commercial venture, but soon the investments began to serve as a guarantee for the payment of Chile's external debt, in which large amounts of British capital were stocked. Between 1860 and 1870, Great Britain financed Chile a loan of £1,000 pounds. British saltpeter production in the region increased from 13.5% on 1879 to 55% by 1901. In order to protect its interests, Great Britain intervened in Chilean internal and external matters, which influenced the country at various points throughout its history.

During the War of the Pacific, Chile was backed morally and financially by the British Empire. During the Chilean invasion of the Atacama Desert, British businessman John Thomas North provided support for the Chilean army during its occupation of Antofagasta and Iquique. North, taking advantage of the chaos caused by the war, was able acquire the Peruvian certificates of the saltpeter companies that operated within its territories, and was later given by the Chilean government a monopoly of the saltpeter production in the region, which North later used to finance investments in Europe and Egypt.

In the early years of the war (1879–1881), Chile acquired a series of ships from the British shipyard company Yarrow Poplar. Also, Chilean soldiers were said to be equipped with English uniforms and rifles. Throughout the conflict, Britain had seven battleships stationed at the front of Peruvian and Chilean coasts, which were a menace for Peru.

However, while Peru was attempting to buy armament for the war, Britain sent a series of diplomatic missions across Europe in order to prevent Peruvians from acquiring weaponry. In the Ottoman Empire, Peru sought to acquire the battleship Fehlz-Bolend by using a Greek banker as an intermediary, but a British sailor working for the Turkish government warned the Chilean delegation in London of the event, which resulted in the cancellation of the buy. Britain also thwarted Peru's acquisition of German warships Sócrates and Diógenes, both which were stopped at the English port of Southampton after Chilean agents warned the British government of the Peruvian acquisitions of the ships.

During a speech made to the Commission of Foreign Relations assembled in the United States congress, secretary of state James G. Blaine stated: "It is a complete mistake to see this as a Chilean war against Peru. [Rather] it is a British war against Peru using Chile as its instrument." The allegations were never proven, but it resulted in the United States favoring a foreign policy that backed Peru.

Italy

Italy played a minor role in attempting to negotiate a peace settlement between Chile and Peru. Despite it having some economic and cultural ties in South America, Italy mainly went along with the rest of the European powers and, in order to oppose the United States influence in Peru, the government of Italy began to favor Chile. However, Italian government officials living in Peru would often attempt to use their homes and government buildings as havens for refugees from Italy and Peru. Even at these neutral points, Chile would send in troops looking for Peruvian soldiers, would plunder Italian and Peruvian property, and would kill Italian citizens who were unable to reach buildings or ships hoisting the Italian flag. Such was the problem that the Italian government eventually sent three warships to the zone.

Italy would take part in the defense of Lima, which prevented any major destructions to city by the Chilean troops. Though most Italians would remain neutral throughout the conflict, only some joined the Peruvian army, but the greatest role of Italians during the conflict was to be their jobs as medics and firemen. During the Battle of Chorrillos, 11 Italian firemen who were helping put out fires and attempting to help the wounded Peruvian troops were ordered to be killed by the Chilean troops. Chile would later claim that as many as 700 Italians had fought alongside Peruvians in the Battle of San Juan and Miraflores, and anti-Italian actions soon took place in Santiago, Chile. Nonetheless, Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre presented an official document from the Italian community that denies these claims and, according to Italian historian Tomas Caivano, these claims made by Chile were lies that were meant to cover-up the [...] of Italian citizens and the taking of Italian property by Chilean troops; adding to this that it was difficult for Italians to enter the Peruvian army.

United States

The United States tried to bring an early end to the war, mainly because of American financial interests in Peru, but also because the nation worried that Great Britain would take economic control of the region through Chile. Nonetheless, the American Pacific Squadron, containing only a few obsolete wooden vessels, was not taken seriously by the Chileans who owned two new, state-of-the-art, British-built armored warships. Chile instead asked that the United States remain neutral, and the United States, unable to match Chilean naval power, backed down. Under the belief that Great Britain was supplying Chile with money, materials, and weapons in an attempt to take commercial control of the region, United States Secretary of State James G. Blaine (who had taken office on March 1881) sent a diplomatic team that would resolve the conflict and leave Peru's territorial control over its regions in the Atacama desert intact.

Blaine had been warned about the rise of Britain's power in this region by the previous U.S. minister to Peru, Isaac Christiancy. Nonetheless, after a series of accusations, James G. Blaine was denounced at home as a bellicose meddler and corrupt practitioner of "guano diplomacy", who sought to make a financial [...] by supporting the specious claims of unscrupulous entrepreneurs and hustler to guano deposits in Peru. Charges for which he was later invistegated.

Peace negotiations failed when a stipulation required Chile to return the conquered lands. Chileans suspected the new American initiative was tainted with a pro-Peruvian bias. As a result, relations between Chile and the United States turned for the worse. Ironically, in 1866 a younger Blaine working as a representative in the United States House of Representatives had publicly denounced Spain's attack on Valparaíso, Chile.

After the assassination of United States president James A. Garfield, vice-president Chester A. Arthur took over the presidency and replaced James G. Blaine with Frederick T. Frelinghuysen. The new secretary of state also attempted to find a solution to the ongoing war between Chile and Peru, but claimed that the United States would not proceed to intervene in the matter unless a European power became involved in the conflict. Moreover, Frelinghuysen warned Peru that the United States would not support Peruvian resistance against Chilean demands. Nonetheless, after the occupation of Lima, Peruvian resistance continued for three more years, with encouragement from the United States. During the presidency of Benjamin Harrison, James G. Blaine would return to the office of secretary of state only to face more problems with Chile after the massacre of several American sailors in the Chilean port of Valparaíso.

Role of Great Britain

After the begin of war the government of Great Britain declared its neutrality and refused to allow Peru, Bolivia, and Chile to take delivery of military or naval material on English soil. In the book Influencia británica en el salitre, Chilean historian Alejandro Soto argues that although throughout the war Great Britain presented itself as a neutral viewer of the matter, in reality Great Britain had great influence and domination over Chilean saltpeter, nitrate, and iodine companies in the region. At first, the British positioned its saltpeter production in the zone as a small commercial venture, but soon the investments began to serve as a guarantee for the payment of Chile's external debt, in which large amounts of British capital were stocked. Between 1860 and 1870, Great Britain financed Chile a loan of £1,000 pounds. British saltpeter production in the region increased from 13.5% on 1879 to 55% by 1901. In order to protect its interests, Great Britain intervened in Chilean internal and external matters, which influenced the country at various points throughout its history.

During the War of the Pacific, Chile was backed morally and financially by the British Empire. During the Chilean invasion of the Atacama desert, British businessman John Thomas North provided support for the Chilean army during its occupation of Antofagasta and Iquique. North, taking advantage of the chaos caused by the war, was able acquire the Peruvian certificates of the saltpeter companies that operated within its territories, and was later given by the Chilean government a monopoly of the saltpeter production in the region, which North later used to finance investments in Europe and Egypt.

In the early years of the war (1879–1881), Chile acquired a series of ships from the British shipyard company Yarrow Poplar. Also, Chilean soldiers were said to be equipped with English uniforms and rifles. Throughout the conflict, Britain had seven battleships stationed at the front of Peruvian and Chilean coasts, which were a menace for Peru.

However, while Peru was attempting to buy armament for the war, Britain sent a series of diplomatic missions across Europe in order to prevent Peruvians from acquiring weaponry. In the Ottoman Empire, Peru sought to acquire the battleship Fehlz-Bolend by using a Greek banker as an intermediary, but a British sailor working for the Turkish government warned the Chilean delegation in London of the event, which resulted in the cancellation of the buy. Britain also thwarted Peru's acquisition of German warships Sócrates and Diógenes, both which were stopped at the English port of Southampton after Chilean agents warned the British government of the Peruvian acquisitions of the ships.

Role of the United States

The United States tried to bring an early end to the war, mainly because of American financial interests in Peru, but also because the nation worried that Great Britain would take economic control of the region through Chile.

American economic interests groups including W. R. Grace and Company founded by later New York City mayor, William Russell Grace tried to protect their investments in Peru. Even before the declarations of war Grace was committed to help Peru buy arms and munitions from abroad. Many of the arms sent to Peru were smuggled as "agricultural machinery" in order to avoid detection by Chilean forces and neutral nations. Grace also ordered a boat built by Nat Herreschoff for $18,500 and sent it to Peru, in addition to access to U.S. technology such as the torpedo. American combat involvement is exemplified by, Stephen Chester, whom launched a torpedo against a small Chilean ship from the Huascar.

The United States attempted to mediate six times on behalf of Peru and Bolivia. . Nonetheless, the American Pacific Squadron, containing only a few obsolete wooden vessels, was not taken seriously by the Chileans who owned two new, state-of-the-art, British-built armored warships. Chile instead asked that the United States remain neutral, and the United States, unable to match Chilean naval power, backed down.

Under the belief that Great Britain was supplying Chile with money, materials, and weapons in an attempt to take commercial control of the region, United States Secretary of State James G. Blaine (who had taken office on March 1881) sent a diplomatic team that would resolve the conflict and leave Peru's territorial control over its regions in the Atacama desert intact.

Blaine had been warned about the rise of Britain's power in this region by the previous U.S. minister to Peru, Isaac Christiancy. Nonetheless, after a series of accusations, James G. Blaine was denounced at home as a bellicose meddler and corrupt practitioner of "guano diplomacy", who sought to make a financial [...] by supporting the specious claims of unscrupulous entrepreneurs and hustler to guano deposits in Peru. He later came under investigation for these charges.

Peace negotiations failed when a stipulation required Chile to return the conquered lands. Chileans, suspected the new American initiative was tainted with a pro-Peruvian bias. As a result, relations between Chile and the United States turned for the worse. Ironically, in 1866 a younger Blaine working as a representative in the United States House of Representatives had publicly denounced Spain's attack on Valparaíso, Chile.

After the assassination of United States president James A. Garfield, vice-president Chester A. Arthur took over the presidency and replaced James G. Blaine with Frederick T. Frelinghuysen. The new secretary of state also attempted to find a solution to the ongoing war between Chile and Peru, but claimed that the United States would not proceed to intervene in the matter unless a European power became involved in the conflict. Moreover, Frelinghuysen warned Peru that the United States would not support Peruvian resistance against Chilean demands. Nonetheless, after the occupation of Lima, Peruvian resistance continued for three more years, with encouragement from the United States. During the presidency of Benjamin Harrison, James G. Blaine would return to the office of secretary of state only to face more problems with Chile after the massacre of several American sailors in the Chilean port of Valparaíso.