CIA activities in Asia and the Pacific

This article deals with activities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in the Asia/Pacific geopolitical area.

In this region we include East Asia, Central Asia (except Afghanistan), Southeast Asia (but not South Asia and Southwest Asia), and Oceania.

East Asia includes China, Japan, Korea and the Philippines.

Central Asia includes Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Southeast Asia includes Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. We include Myanmar (Burma) in South Asia.

Oceania includes Australia, New Guinea, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea.

For Afghanistan, Myanmar/Burma, South Asia and Southwest Asia, see CIA Activities by Region: Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia.

East Asia

China

China 1952

In operation HTLINGUAL CIA began to intercept mail from the U.S. to China.

China 1962

As of the time of the study , the IC believed China had no current capabilities with missiles, had mined and concentrated a substantial quantity of uranium, although there was no hard evidence that weapons-grade uranium or plutonium was being made. The NIE predicted the Chinese could explode a plutonium bomb by 1963, with an accelerated program, otherwise several years later. The assumption was that uranium enrichment would be to the level needed for plutonium breeding, not HEU. Tension between the PRC and USSR was such that it was not estimated the PRC would get Soviet help on nuclear weapons development.

A facility at Lachou was judged incomplete, and it was unclear if it was a gaseous diffusion plant for producing weapons-grade uranium. If so, it could not be ready before 1966. It was estimated that a plutonium-producing reactor could be ready by 1962. The editors at the National Security Archive made reasonable inferences, in spite of excisions from the document, that the CIA had made considerable ProgresS that the Agency had made in using sophisticated collection methods--satellite photography and U-2 flights by Chinese Nationalist pilots… CIA did not know that the installation at Lanzhou was in fact a gaseous diffusion plant that would soon be ready for operations.

China 1964

The first Chinese nuclear test was in 1964.

Japan

Japan 1950s-1960s

CIA gave money to support the Liberal Democratic Party during the fifties and sixties , supporting Nobusuke Kishi and Okinori Kaya.

Korea

Korea 1945

With budgets cut after WWII, Korea was considered an incidental priority for US intelligence. When most US forces left Korea, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur his intelligence officer, Charles Willoughby, to establish a secret intelligence office in Seoul. Known as the Korean Liaison Office (KLO), its responsibility was to monitor troop movements in the North and the activities of Communist guerrillas operating in the South. During WWII, MacArthur had objected to working with the OSS, the predecessor of the CIA, and his setting up his own intelligence continued the trend.

"By late 1949, the KLO was reporting that the Communist guerrillas represented a serious threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK)... Willoughby also claimed that the KLO had 16 agents operating in the North. KLO officers in Seoul, however, expressed suspicion regarding the loyalty and reporting of these agents. Separate from Willoughby's command, then-Capt. John Singlaub had established an Army intelligence outpost in Manchuria, just across the border from Korea. Over the course of several years, he trained and dispatched dozens of former Korean POWs, who had been in Japanese Army units, into the North. Their instructions were to join the Communist Korean military and government, and to obtain information on the Communists’ plans and intentions.

"These and other collection capabilities contributed to CIA analytic reports, starting in 1948, regarding the Communist threat on the peninsula. The first report, in a Weekly Summary dated 20 February, identifies the Soviet Union as the controlling hand behind all North Korean political and military planning." CIA did not have its own HUMINT agents until 1952, and was, at this time, purely an analytic agency.

"In the 16 July 1949 Weekly Summary, the Agency describes North Korea as a Soviet puppet regime. On 29 October, a Weekly Summary states that a North Korean attack on the South is possible as early as 1949, and cites reports of road improvements towards the border and troop movements there.

"These reports establish the dominant theme in intelligence analysis from Washington that accounts for the failure to predict the North Korean attack—that the Soviets controlled North Korean decisionmaking. The Washington focus on the Soviet Union as “the” Communist state had become the accepted perception within US Government’s political and military leadership circles. Any scholarly counterbalances to this view, either questioning the absolute authority of Moscow over other Communist states or noting that cultural, historic, or nationalistic factors might come into play, fell victim to the political atmosphere.

"...Accusations of McCarthyism silenced any debate regarding the worldwide Communist conspiracy. In addition, the Chinese Communists’ rise to internal power created a domestic political dispute over who had “lost” China. The result was a silencing of American scholars on China who might have persuaded the country’s leadership that China would never accept Soviet control of its national interests.

See SIGINT indications of the Korean war. Korean coverage was incidental to Soviet and Chinese interests in the Korean Peninsula. Was there early warning of the Korean War? Perhaps, but hindsight is a wonderful thing. As with the retrospective analysis of SIGINT communications intelligence immediately after Pearl Harbor, certain traffic, if not a smoking gun, would have been suggestive, to an astute analyst trusted by the high command. Before the invasion, targeting was against Chinese and Soviet targets with incidental mention of Korea.

Korea 1950

In April 1950, the Army Security Agency, a SIGINT agency operating before the creation of NSA, undertook a limited "search and development" study of DPRK traffic. CIA received its reports. Two positions the second case, as revealed in COMINT, large shipments of bandages and medicines went from the USSR to North Korea and Manchuria, starting in February 1950. These two actions made sense only in hindsight, after the invasion of South Korea occurred in June 1950.

By the spring of 1950, North Korea’s preparations for war had become...recognizable. Monthly CIA reports describe the military buildup of DPRK forces, but also discount the possibility of an actual invasion. It was believed that DPRK forces could not mount a successful attack without Soviet assistance, and such assistance would indicate a worldwide Communist offensive. There were no indications in Europe that such an offensive was in preparation.

Some North Korean communications were intercepted between May 1949 and April 1950 because the operators were using Soviet communications procedures. Coverage was dropped once analysts confirmed the non-Soviet origin of the material.

On 10 May, the South Korean Defense Ministry publicly warned at a press conference that DPRK troops were massing at the border and there was danger of an invasion...Throughout June, intelligence reports from South Korea and the CIA provide clear descriptions of DPRK preparations for war. These reports noted the removal of civilians from the border area, the restriction of all transport capabilities for military use only, and the movements of infantry and armor units to the border area. Also, following classic Communist political tactics, the DPRK began an international propaganda campaign against the ROK police state.

On 6 June, CIA reported another interesting international development: all East Asian senior Soviet diplomats were recalled to Moscow for consultations. The CIA believed the purpose of the recall was to develop a new plan to counter anti-Communist efforts in the region.

On 20 June 1950, the CIA published a report, based primarily on human assets, concluding that the DPRK had the capability to invade the South at any time. President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, and Secretary of Defense Johnson all received copies of this report.

On 25 June, the Army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) invaded across the 38th parallel. This was a surprise to US intelligence. ...CIA intelligence reports during the first month of the conflict continued to echo the theme of Soviet control of the DPRK, but they also began to address the potential for Chinese intervention. ...the CIA Daily Summary of 26 June reported that the Agency agreed with the US Embassy in Moscow that the North Korean offensive was a “...clear-cut Soviet challenge to the United States…” On 30 June 1950, [as] President Truman authorized the use of US ground forces in Korea, CIA Intelligence Memorandum 301, Estimate of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities for Military Aggression, stated that the Soviets had large numbers of Chinese troops, which could be used in Korea to make US involvement costly and difficult. This warning was followed on 8 July by CIA Intelligence Memorandum 302, which stated that the Soviets were responsible for the invasion, and they could use Chinese forces to intervene if DPRK forces could not stand up to UN forces.

When the Korean War broke out in 1950, United States Army Special Forces were not yet operational. Paramilitary functions in Korea suffered from bureaucratic infighting between the Army's G-2 intelligence division, and CIA. A heavily redacted history of CIA operations in Korea indicate that the agency used US Far East Air Force resources, eventually designated "Flight B" of the Fifth Air Force. This unit provided air support for both military and CIA special operations. When CIA guerillas were attacked in 1951-1952, the air unit had to adapt frequently changing schedules. According to the CIA history, "The US Air Force-CIA relationship during the war was particularly profitable, close, and cordial." Unconventional warfare, but not HUMINT, worked smoothly with the Army. Korea had been divided into CIA and Army regions, with the CIA in the extreme northeast, and the Army in the West.

Initially, the North Koreans drove South Korean and US troops back, quickly capturing Seoul. The United Nations defending forces were able to consolidate and hold the area around the port of Pusan.

..the perception existed that only the Soviets could order an invasion by a “client state” and that such an act would be a prelude to a world war. Washington was confident that the Soviets were not ready to take such a step..." is clearly stated in a 19 June CIA paper on DRPK military capabilities. The paper said that “The DPRK is a firmly controlled Soviet satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence.”

This assistance would not be forthcoming because the Soviets did not want general war. The Department of State and the military intelligence organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force concurred.

"...General MacArthur and his staff refused to believe that any Asians would risk facing certain defeat by threatening American interests. This belief caused them to ignore warnings of the DPRK military buildup and mobilization near the border, clearly the “force protection” intelligence that should have been most alerting to military minds. It was a strong and perhaps arrogantly held belief, which did not weaken even in the face of DPRK military successes against US troops in the summer of 1950.

On 28 July, the CIA Weekly Summary stated that 40,000 to 50,000 ethnic Korean soldiers from PLA units might soon reinforce DPRK forces." Again, the tactical warning of a Chinese force were rejected based on a strategic assessment of Soviet intentions

On 8 September, the CIA issued Intelligence Memorandum 324, Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, which assumed that the Chinese were already providing covert assistance to the DPRK, including some replacements for combat troops. ... The memorandum ... noted that reports of Chinese troop buildups in the Manchurian border area made intervention well within Chinese capabilities. ... but again insisted the Soviets were not willing to risk general war.

In September, the UN counterattacked with a surprise amphibious landing in the Battle of Inchon, quickly driving the North Koreans back. "On 12 October, CIA Office of Records and Estimates Paper 58-50, entitled Critical Situations in The Far East—Threat of Full Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea, concluded that, “While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950.

"...On 13 and 14 October, the 38th, 39th, and 40th Chinese Field Armies entered Korea. The intelligence leadership in both Washington and Tokyo did not alert either President Truman or MacArthur, who were about to meet on Wake Island to discuss the conduct of the war.U S military and civilian leaders were again caught by surprise, and another costly price was paid in American casualties.

CIA reporting from Tokyo, based on information obtained from a former Chinese Nationalist officer sent into Manchuria to contact former colleagues now in the PLA, stated that the PLA had over 300,000 troops in the border area. And, on 15 October, a CIA-led irregular ROK force operating on the west coast near the Yalu river reported that Chinese troops were moving into Korea.

All this information subsequently turned out to be accurate. At that meeting, on 15 October, MacArthur told Truman there was little chance of a large-scale Chinese intervention. And, he noted, should it occur, his air power would destroy any Chinese forces that appeared.

The next day, the CIA Daily Summary reported that the US Embassy in The Hague had been advised that Chinese troops had moved into Korea. At this point, the analytic perspective of the Agency shifted somewhat... The Agency also abandoned the position that the Chinese had the capability to intervene but would not do so, and began to accept that the Chinese had entered Korea. But it held firm to its view that China had no intention of entering the war in any large-scale fashion.

Philippines

During WWII, a number of Americans who would later be involved in forming United States Army Special Forces and other special operations activities were stay-behind guerillas in the Phillipines, including Wendell Fertig, Russell Volckmann, and Donald Blackburn.

Phillipines 1948

CIA funded an counter-insurgency war against the Hukbalahap. United States Air Force Colonel Edward Lansdale, seconded to the CIA, led the effort, befriending then Defense Minister, and later Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay. The insurgency was defeated.

Phillipines 1958

See Indonesia 1958 for Filipino support to an abortive coup in Indonesia.

Central Asia

The nations of Central Asia are a conglomeration of nations located in the "centralized" locale of the Asian hemisphere, landlocked on one side with the western-most Asian Turkic regions, demarcation in the Eastern/South-Eastern Indian mountainous regions, and finally the northern Russia. Majority of these nations have spheres of influence included from all of these borders, as they are mostly comprised of countries influenced by Soviet Russia.

Kazakhstan

Mongolia

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan 2000

The United States and Uzbekistan ran joint covert operations aimed at countering Afghanistan's ruling Taliban regime and its [...] allies since well over a year before the Sept. 11 attacks, according to officials from both nations.

Uzbekistan 2001

In an attempt to deal with the lack of linguists, the CIA, FBI and the American military are turning to the internet.

Even though Osama bin Laden has operated from Afghanistan since 1996, US intelligence organisations are badly hampered by a lack of local language experts.

Subscribers to internet servers in Central Asia and Afghanistan have received email adverts for American citizens who can speak Farsi, Pashto, Dari, Turkmen and Uzbek, all languages of Afghanistan and Central Asia. Other languages needed are Urdu, spoken in Pakistan, and Arabic. Even though Osama bin Laden has operated from Afghanistan since 1996, US intelligence organisations are badly hampered by a lack of local language experts." US citizenship required for secret security clearances, positions are also available for non-US citizens," reads an email from Worldwide Language Resources.

Another US-based organisation, All World Language Consultants, wants Uzbek linguists who "must have been granted or be able to obtain a minimum of a Department of Defence security clearance with no felony record".

Some 3,000 Uzbeks belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan fight for the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Southeast Asia

It been alleged that the CIA was involved in the opium/[...] trade in Asia during the Vietnam War and later, which was the focus of Alfred W. McCoy's book, The Politics of [...]: CIA Complicity in the Global [...] Trade, an earlier edition of which had already been subjected to attempted suppression by the CIA. The CIA's air cargo operation, Air America, has also been accused of transporting drugs.

Regional issues

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) consists of five countries of the region: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. Other groupings include the Five Powers Defense Arrangement (FPDA) of Australia, Great Britain, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia, which includes three members of the UKUSA alliance with strong national SIGINT organizations. See about intelligence-sharing alliances. With respect to the US, these are most likely to work with the US Pacific Command PACOM (military) intelligence and the NSA, but there may well be cooperation with the CIA and US international law enforcement on transnational issues.

All ASEAN countries have concerns with Islamic [...], and most are also concerned with piracy . Formed in 1967, ASEAN the countries also shared several decades of concern over Communist threats. Their cooperation improved over time, although there still was support from outside powers.

For some years, the ASEAN countries have held annual intelligence summits. It is unclear, however, if intelligence ties preceded or followed the development of military relationships.

The Five Powers Defence Arrangement (FPDA) of Australia, Great Britain, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia, three powers of which have strong SIGINT capabilities under the UKUSA Agreement and domestically, while the other two are ASEAN members, giving an overlap of interests. John Moore, then Minister for Defence of Australia said, "As an established multilateral security framework, the FPDA has a unique role in Asia. It is of strategic benefit to all member nations and, in Australia's view, to the wider Asia-Pacific region."

US relations to an ASEAN or other group may be more domestically acceptable, in countries suspicious of the US, than bilateral arrangements. There are obvious reasons for regional nations wanting US intelligence support, including SIGINT . Nevertheless, the eagerness of the US to help against Islamic groups strikes at local sensitivities. Given Singapore's small size but potent military, it made basing arrangements in Singapore, in Malaysia and the Philippines. Thailand and Malaysia have a good record working together against the Communist Party of Malaysia. There is a joint training/couterterrorism center with the US in Malaysia. also|hierarchy]].''

Multilateral SIGINT

Many organizations, national or not, areresponsible for communications security as well as SIGINT; the organization makes codes and ciphers that it hopes opponents cannot break. There is a synergy between the two components; there is a saying among cryptologists that no one is qualified to create a cipher unless they have successfully cryptanalyzed a cipher of equivalent complexity.

ASEAN and Related Groups

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) consists of five countries of the region: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. All have concerns with Islamic [...], and most are also concerned with piracy. Formed in 1967, the countries also shared several decades of concern over Communist threats. Their cooperation improved over time, although there still was support from outside powers. .

Other sources include the Five Powers Defense Arrangement (FPDA) of Australia, Great Britain, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia, which includes three members of the UKUSA alliance with strong national SIGINT organizations and well-established relationships with the US Intelligence Community. John Moore, then Minister for Defence of Australia said, "As an established multilateral security framework, the FPDA has a unique role in Asia. It is of strategic benefit to all member nations and, in Australia's view, to the wider Asia-Pacific region."

Cambodia

Cambodia 1954

The National Intelligence Estimate projected relatively little Communist activity in Cambodia as Viet Minh withdraw. With outside help, the Cambodians should be able to build a security apparatus.<ref name=NIE 63-5-54>

Cambodia 1967

President Richard M. Nixon asked Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger to explore two potential CIA actions in Cambodia:

:#Creating covert paramilitary harassing operations directed against North Vietnamese Regular Forces in the sanctuary areas just over the Cambodian border

:#CIA capability for eliminating or reducing the arms traffic through Cambodia to communist forces in South Vietnam.

After discussion in the 303 Committee, which was then the approval group for US covert actions, the committee endorsed the first, although the CIA recommended against it for two reasons. They believed it would take effort away from operations in South Vietnam, and also would have questionable effectiveness but high cost against the large North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia.

As far as the second, CIA has identified a number of Cambodian army officers who are actively involved in supporting communist forces in South Vietnam, but does not now have direct, secure and controlled access to any of these officers. They doubt any of the officers involved in the arms traffic would be now susceptible to bribery both because of the profits accruing to them from such operations as well as the personal political risks entailed in a relationship involving the United States. Further, they pointed out that if recent U.S. diplomatic approaches to Cambodia result in the formal resumption of full diplomatic relations, CIA will gain an operating base for improved intelligence collection and covert action. With such a base, they would have a better chance to convince Prince Sihanouk that it is in his best interest to make an honest effort to reduce or halt the arms traffic.

Kissinger recommended continuing to monitor rather than taking action. There is no record on file of a Presidential decision on these matters..

Cambodia 1970

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in his 1973 book, claimed that CIA engineers his ouster in March of 1970.

CIA analysts do not find evidence of a North Vietnamese headquarters in Cambodia. U.S. President Richard Nixon authorizes a ground invasion to locate and destroy a North Vietnamese headquarters in Cambodia should one exist.

Cambodia 1972

Senator Clifford P. Case sponsors a law effective December 1972 [...] off funds for CIA and private military company operations in Cambodia.

Cambodia 1978

Blum also claims that the CIA supplied arms directly to Khmer Rouge forces and also funneled more than $20 million/year of "non-lethal" aid to a coalition which included the Khmer Rouge, without Congressional approval.

Indonesia

Over several decades, the CIA was involved in numerous attempts to reduce Communist activity in Indonesia. A coup in 1958 failed to affect the rule of President Sukarno, but after a purge of Communists in 1965, Indonesian military officers General Abdul Haris Nasution (Indonesians often use only a single name) and Maj. Gen. Suharto led their forces to liquidate the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and eventually oust President Sukarno. Suharto's pivotal role led to his assumption of the Indonesian presidency in 1967.

In 1998, the US declassified a number of records about the various covert actions.

Indonesia 1958

During an unguarded conversation in Washington before 1958, the Indonesian military attache mentioned to Americans that there were many prominent and strong people in Indonesia who would be ready to rise against Sukarno if they were given a little support and encouragement from the United States. One of those U.S friends was a CIA staffer who reported the words to Frank Wisner, then the Deputy Director of Plans.

The attache returned to Indonesia with CIA personnel under military cover. They learned enough about the potential strength of this opposition to encourage the CIA to set in motion its biggest operation up to that date. Those personnel contacted Filipino military men, especially a Colonel Valeriano, with whom the CIA had worked in Ramon Magsaysay's counterinsurgency against the Hukbalahap leftist rebels.

CIA and Filipino counterinsurgents had, by early 1958, set up special operations training bases, apparently with United States Army Special Forces trainers, and made clandestine air bases on Palawan and Mindanao available to Indonesian rebels.

On Feb. 9, 1958, rebel Colonel Maluddin Simbolon issued an ultimatum in the name of a provincial government, the Central Sumatran Revolutionary Council, calling for the formation of a new central government. Sukarno refused and called upon his loyal army commander, General Abdul Haris Nasution, to destroy the rebel forces. By Feb. 21 loyal forces had been airlifted to Sumatra and had begun the attack. The rebel headquarters was in the southern coastal city of Padang. Rebel strongholds stretched all the way to Medan, near the northern end of the island and not far from Malaysia.

CIA supported the Indonesian rebellion from the main Far East base in Naha, Okinawa, under Ted Shannon. Another support faciity was on Taiwan, where B-26 bombers were prepared to ferry them to the Phillipine bases that would support the Indonesian rebels. CIA, drawing on US Marine and Army stocks, provided 42,000 rifles.

Armed Indonesians returned to Sumatra by airdrop from the Phillipines, and by landings from US submarines. In May of 1958 an B-26 operated by CIA proprietary Civil Air Transport was shot down during a bombing and strafing mission and the resulting publicity ended the attempt.

Indonesia 1964

An Office of Current Intelligence (i.e., not intelligence community wide, but a status report) memorandum observed early "stirrings of an anti-Communist movement in Indonesia". The opponents cite an ideology called "Sukarnoism." "The movement is ostensibly dedicated to the defense of the President's almost mystical Five Principles (Pantjasila), but its main purpose appears to be that of combating PKI (i.e., Indonesian Communist Party) influence in the government and throughout the country. Sukarno appears to have given it "indirect approval…but it could collapse overnight" if he moves to suppress it.

The US became aware of the movement during Sukarno's absence on a foreign tour from 17 September to 5 November, when articles berating the PKI appeared in the Djakarta press. The PKI responded. Just before and after Sukarno's return, the anti-PKI rhetoric subsided, almost as if the Sukarnoists feared retribution from the President. The only government move against the group, however, was the banning of a single Sukarnoist newspaper soon after the President's return. In the absence of further repressive action, the group seems to have taken on new courage, and its leaders are trying to organize and expand the forces involved.

The Sukarnoists are led by Minister of Trade Adam Malik, but Chaerul Saleh, third deputy prime minister and concurrently minister of development, is also deeply involved. Malik, who is a former Indonesian ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Saleh are ideologically attuned to the "right wing" of the Murba (Proletarian) Party, usually described as the national Communist Party of Indonesia. With Indonesia having moved a considerable distance to the left under Sukarno, Malik and Saleh represent a "moderate" position, and their activities are arousing the hopeful interest of individuals who stand further to the right.

Part of their platform is treating Malaysia as a bitter enemy. They they also attacked Communist Party Chairman Aidit for a statement he allegedly made disavowing the need for Pantjasila, to which all recognized political parties are obliged to subscribe--"once the revolution is won." Although this particular line of attack has been abandoned, the Sukarnoists continue to warn against those who are not true "Pantjasilaists."

Malik told US Ambassador Jones on 19 November that his movement has the support of the Muslim party, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU); the right wing of the National Party; and lower levels of the bureaucracy and political parties. Youth groups have organized a "Sukarnoist Student Movement"; Several non-Communist labor federations reportedly have banded together in an "undercover body" to support Sukarnoism, but the labor groups feel they must keep their organization secret to avoid attack by the PKI. Malik feels that for the time being the movement must remain a loose coalition. Whether the Sukarnoists have the extensive support they claim cannot be verified. For the most part only the statements of Djakarta politicians are available. There is a large but disparate body of non-Communist opinion in Indonesia, however, which would rally if given a safe opportunity.

Army leaders aligned the Sukarnoists. Minister of Information Achmadi, who earlier had opposed it, reportedly told Sukarnoist supporters in North Sumatra to ignore attacks and to spread the doctrine but to preserve national unity. Even First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, who has tried to curry favor with the PKI for the past year and a half, reportedly received a Sukarnoist delegation, was "very friendly," and gave "valuable advice." Parliament, scheduled to open on 3 December, has postponed its next session until the second quarter of 1965. The change may have been arranged to avoid an early showdown between the PKI and the Sukarnoists.

The PKI, with its allies in the left wing of the National Party, was defensive. It labeled Sukarnoism a disguise for "Communist phobia"--a favorite term of Sukarno's--and stressed that the anti-PKI campaign developed behind Sukarno's back while he was out of the country. It charges that Sukarnoism is an attempt to displace NASAKOM, Sukarno's term for the cooperation of nationalist, religious, and Communist elements.

Prospects of the Sukarnoists seem to depend largely on Sukarno. who is known for his political balancing. The successful development of Sukarnoism may be of interest to him. He could be willing to overlook for a time the fact that there are elements within Sukarnoist ranks whom he distrusts and whom he has considered expelling from the recognized political scene. A major factor in Sukarno's permissive attitude toward the new anti-PKI group may be his hope that he can use it in maneuvering to schedule new talks on the Malaysia issue, and he may even believe he can use it to get economic assistance from the West.

Sukarnoist spokesmen urged the US Embassy to take steps to encourage UK-Indonesian or Indonesian-Malaysian talks, to avoid aggression against Malaysia, possibly to hide Indonesian economic problems. Sukarnoists seemed to be trying to change the Malaysian confrontation from a politico-military to a politico-economic one, as a means of pressing national economic development. Although the Sukarnoists are not necessarily being directed by Sukarno to approach the Americans, their needs and strategy for the moment coincide with his.

Indonesia 1965

An action proposal was approved in March, with an intermediate intelligence memorandum in July, and a SNIE, on the situation regarding Indonesia and Malaysia, in September. The US did not anticipate the intensity with which the Indonesian military later purged the PKI.

In the March action proposal, covert action personnel, since summer 1964, worked with the Department of State in planning political action in Indonesia aimed to support the Indonesian opponents of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), as well as the PRC. It emphasizes traditional Indonesian mistrust of China. This program has been coordinated in the Department of State with the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs and with the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia.

It will involve liaison to, and financial support, of anti-Communist groups. It will also involve black propaganda and political action. One goal is to encourage coordination and common ground for the existing anti-Communist elements in Indonesia. The program is consistent with U.S. policy which seeks a stable, non-Communist Indonesia.

Objectives

:#Portray the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as an increasingly ambitious, dangerous opponent of Sukarno and legitimate nationalism and instrument of Chinese neo-imperialism.

:#Provide covert assistance to individuals and organizations capable of and prepared to take obstructive action against the PKI.

:#Encourage the growth of an ideological common denominator, within the framework of Sukarno's enunciated concepts, which will serve to unite non-Communist elements and create cleavage between the PKI and the balance of the Indonesian society.

:#Develop black and grey propaganda themes and mechanisms for use within Indonesia and via appropriate media assets outside of Indonesia in support of the objectives of this program.

:#Identify and cultivate potential leaders within Indonesia for the purpose of ensuring an orderly non-Communist succession upon Sukarno's death or removal from office.

:#Identify, assess and monitor the activities of anti-regime elements for the purpose of influencing them to support a non-Communist successor regime.

Risks involved Sukarno learning of the program and suspect that it is intended to weaken his control, causing deterioration of US-Indonesian relations. If the anti-PKI activity is too strong, it could invite repression of the Indonesian anticommunist groups by Sukarno.

Recommendation and approval

The 303 Committee approved this paper on March 4. [text not declassified] of the CIA took the opportunity to urge "a larger political design or master plan to arrest the Indonesian march into the Chinese camp" based on the Maphilindo concept. He argued a major effort was required to PReVENT the United States from being excluded from Indonesia, suggesting that the loss of a nation of 105 million to the "Communist camp" would make a victory in Vietnam of little meaning. McGeorge Bundy stated that as a major political problem, Indonesia was receiving attention, but it "could not be settled in the 303 forum." <ref name="FRUS-XXVI-110>

In the July 1965 estimate, the most important point was the sharply accelerated growth of the Communist Party (PKI) role in government, which is expected to continue while Sukarno is in control. He has a vocal campaign to destroy Malaysia, although little chance of success, which he recognizes. Frustration has led him to denounce and harass the entire Western presence in Southeast Asia, and indeed in the Afro-Asian world. No break of diplomatic relations with the US is expected, but certainly continued hostility, as well as warmer relations with Peking. Since his military wants Soviet arms, he will maintain reasonably friendly relations with Moscow. Should Sukarno die or become incapacitated, he would be likely to be replaced by a non-Communist coalition. The military would exercise greater control, but it is not estimated they would risk a civil war to reduce Communist influence. The PKI is probably too entrenched to be denied a role in a coalition. Friction with Malaysia will intensify, but is unlikely to break up the Malayan federation. Malaysia is both totally dependent on the UK and the Commonwealth, has a foreign policy allied with them, but also is adequately defended by forces committed by the UK, Australia and New Zealand. Malaysia will still seek US defense commitment.

In the September estimate, problem was posed: "estimate the chances and implications of a Communist takeover in Indonesia within the next 2-3 years".

In the discussion, the fundamental point is that Sukarno is "is the unchallenged leader of Indonesia and will almost certainly remain so until death or infirmity removes him from the scene." He is developing in Indonesia an authoritarian government of the "national-front" type on which the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) exerts the strongest influence, though under his own continued domination. He plays one group against another, but the current reality is that the PKI, with 3 million members, is the strongest political entity in Indonesia. Sukarno's personal policies and those of the PKI are in harmony with the Communist states of Asia.

He will be cautious about giving the PKI more official power, but, if he lives, the IC sees Indonesia becoming a de facto Communist state, although Sukarno may not proclaim it as such. Should he die or become incapacitated, the PKI might be slowed although it would still have an important role. The longer he lives, the stronger the PKI position.

Indonesia is now presenting some of the problems, to the US, that an avowed Communist state would cause: confronting Malaysia and subverting the Phillipines. This NIE does not suggest any probable successor government will change radically from this position.

While Indonesia's limited military capability and its strategic vulnerability would make it only a potential threat to sea and air lanes, it still would strengthen Peking, while undermining Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam, and presenting a more immediate threat to Malaysia and the Phillipines, as well as to Singapore. The Australians would be concerned about East New Guinea and teir lines of communications.

A Communist Indonesia, still with an independent party, would become a point of rivalry in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The longer-term impact would depend on the continuing independence of the PKI, and how focused it is on consolidating its control and fixing the Indonesian economy. During such a time, it might actually be a liability to China and the Soviet Union.

Indonesia 1998

DCI George Tenet said declassification of nine operations constitute a secret history of American power as used against foreign governments by three Presidents. They include efforts to shore up the non-Communist left in France and Italy in the late 1940's and early 1950's, guerrilla operations in North and South Korea in the Korean War, efforts including political propaganda and bombing missions in Indonesia in the 1950's, paramilitary activities in Laos and Tibet in the first years of the American involvement in Vietnam and assassination plots in the Congo and the Dominican Republic in the early 1960's.

Laos

Laos 1959

As the Laotian government did not want it known that it was being assisted by the US in the Laotian Civil War against the Pathet Lao, CIA established a unit from United States Army Special Forces, who arrived on a CIA proprietary airline, wearing civilian clothes and having no obvious US connection. These soldiers led Meo tribesmen against Communist forces. The covert program was called Operation Hotfoot. At the US Embassy, BG John Heintges was called the head of the "Program Evaluation Office."

Laos 1961

The covert advisory group was acknowledged, and called the White Star organization, commanded by Arthur D. Simons In addition to operating against the Pathet Lao, the White Star teams harrassed the North Vietnamese on the Ho Chi Minh trail, which had been formed in May 1959 under the North Vietnamese Army's 559th Transportation Group, whose unit number reflected its creation date. Many of the White Star personnel would move into the Studies and Observation Group, which operated from South Vietnam but ran cross-border operations into North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

Laos 1964

The problem addressed by the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) of May 25 was to determine if there was a set of actions that would cause the Democratic (i.e., North) Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to reduce activities in the Republic (i.e., South) of Vietnam (RVN), and to respect the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos. It assumed primarily air and naval action, without attacks on population centers or the use of nuclear weapons. The DRV, China, and USSR would be told that US intentions were limited.

It was projected that the DRV would wait on military action while stirring diplomatic opinion against the US. In the absence of US forces in Laos, however, it was judged capable of taking control of the country. While the DRV could resist a RVN ground attack, its air defenses were primitive and it would be unlikely to accept Chinese assistance, other than perhaps antiaircraft guns but not fighters. The estimate did suggest that a campaign against the North would have to be quick and intense, not the gradual escalation that actually was used.

Laos 2007

There are conflicting reports on whether or not repatriation has been agreed for Hmong tribesmen who aided the CIA in 1962-1975. See Thailand 2007 for an agreement, without an implementation date, apparently reached on December 9, 2007.

Singapore

Singapore 1961

In 1961, the CIA attempts to infiltrate the Singapore Secret Police. They were discovered, and attempt to bribe the then prime minister Lee Kuan Yew to cover up the story. His complaint eventually leads to the Secretary of State Dean Rusk apologizing for the CIA.

Thailand

Thailand 2007

"Lao and Thai authorities have agreed to proceed with plans to repatriate Hmong refugees in Ban Huay Nam Khao, regardless of their claimed CIA links and without monitoring by third parties."

Vietnam

There are 174 National Intelligence Estimates dealing with Vietnam, issued by the CIA after coordination with the Intelligence Community. They may be searched at http://www.dni.gov/nic/foia_vietnam_content.html

Vietnam 1945-1947

Even before the CIA was formed, a team from OSS, and its successors that became the CIA, under MAJ Archimedes L.A. Patti was in French Indochina, assessing the situation, and discussing alternatives with parties of all sides, including Ho Chi Minh

Vietnam 1954

The initial CIA team in Saigon was the Saigon Military Mission, headed by United States Air Force Colonel Edward Lansdale, who arrived on 1 June 1954. His diplomatic cover job was Assistant Air Attache. The broad mission for the team was to undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage political-psychological warfare.

Working in close cooperation with the U.S. Information Agency, a new psychological warfare campaign was devised for the Vietnamese Army and for the government in Hanoi. Shortly after, a refresher course in combat psywar was constructed and Vietnamese Army personnel were rushed through it.

The second SMM member, MAJ Lucien Conein, arrived on July 1. A paramilitary specialist, well-known to the French for his help with French-operated maquis in Tonkin against the Japanese in 1945, he was the one American guerrilla fighter who had not been a member of the Patti Mission. In August, he went to Hanoi with the assignment of developing a paramilitary organization in the north... A second paramilitary team for the south was formed, with Army LT Edward Williams doing double duty as the only experienced counter-espionage officer, working with revolutionary political groups.

Working with available data, the CIA produced a National Intelligence Estimate in August. It began by stating that the Communist signing of the Geneva agreements had legitimized them, and they will immediately move to control the North while planning the long-term control of the country.

While the Diem government is in official control of the South, certain pro-French elements may be planning to overthrow it. Viet Minh elements will stay in the south and create an underground, discredit the government, and undermine French-Vietnamese relations. <ref name=NIE 63-5-54>NIE 63-5-54

On October 26, 1954, Landsdale lured two key personnel in a planned coup against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem out of the country. Lansdale invited Hinh and staff to visit the Philippines.

US personnel dealing with the Government of Vietnam had difficulty in understanding the politics. The diplomats were not getting clear information in 1954 and early 1955, but the CIA station "had and has no mandate or mission to perform systematic intelligence and espionage in friendly countries, and so lacks the resources to gather and evaluate the large amounts of information required on political forces, corruption, connections, and so on."

Vietnam 1955

By 31 January 1955, a paramilitary group had cached its supplies in Haiphong, having had them shipped by Civil Air Transport, a CIA proprietary airline belonging to the Directorate of Support.

Vietnam 1961

In April 1961, Lansdale who has been designated Operations Officer for a interagency Task Force responsible for political, military, economic, psychological, and covert character, was to go to Vietnam in April. Changes in policy, however, transferred these responsibilities to the military and diplomats, and Lansdale was no longer involved with Vietnam.

CIA begins to sponsor and train the Civilian Irregular Defense Group in the South Central Highlands.

Vietnam 1963

It is alleged that CIA smuggled opium from Western Vietnam to the U.S.

Vietnam 1964

A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) issued in May postulated that a short but intense air and naval campaign against the DRV would deter an invasion of the South, although not stop activities there. It also estimated that this would be a strong morale boost to the RVN. The campaign described, however, was different than the actual gradual attacks that resulted from the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August.

In October, another, less optimistic SNIE was issued, limited to the South. It said the situation was deteriorating, and a coup could occur at any time. The Prime Minister of the country, General Nguyen Khanh, stayed in power by placating various groups, while exhibiting little leadership of the country or the military. Defeatism was spreading from Saigon to the countryside, and was aggravated by a Montagnard revolt on September 20. No clear leadership was emerging.

The Viet Cong, however, were not seen to be planning an immediate takeover, but are concentrating on psychological operations to increase unrest.<ref name=SNIE 53-2-64>

Vietnam 1965

A Special National Intelligence Estimate, was done to assess the reactions, in various parts of the world, to an escalation of US attacks on North Vietnam. This estimate is especially significant in the conflict between the White House and the military & intelligence community. This entry has subsections so it will cross-reference with those other regional parts. The assumptions made about the course of action, to which reactions are estimated, were:

:#US decides to increase its forces in South Vietnam to about 175,000 by 1 November:

:#call up about 225,000 reserves

:#to extend tours of duty at the rate of 20,000 a month

:#increase the regular strength of the armed services by 400,000 over the next year

:#double draft calls.

We further assume

: (a) that the increase in forces would be accompanied by statements reiterating our objectives and our readiness for unconditional discussions,; (b) that US forces would be deployed so that no major grouping threatened or appeared to threaten the 17th Parallel, and; (c) that we might either continue present policy with regard to air strikes or extend these strikes in North Vietnam to include attacks on land (but not sea) lines of communication from South Chin2 and military targets in the HHA.

The general response was predicted to be "Communists and non-Communists alike would see in the increased US military involvement in Vietnam a strong indication that the US saw little hope of early negotiations. This would be particularly true if, at the same time, the US extended its air operations in North Vietnam.

Vietnam 1965: Viet Cong and DRV Reactions

At present the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese (DRV) leaders appear confident that their course in South Vietnam promises ultimate and possibly early success without important concessions on their part. They seem to believe that they can achieve a series of local military successes which, sooner or later, will bring victory through a combination of a deteriorating South Vietnamese army (ARVN) morale and effectiveness, a collapse of anti-Communist government in Saigon, and an exhaustion of the US will to persist.

"We do not believe that inauguration of the US actions here assumed would basically alter these expectations. The VC and the DRV ... probably believe that the VC, with increased North Vietnamese assistance, can find ways to offset the effect of larger US forces. Nor do we think that the extension of air attacks to military targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong area [HHA] would significantly injure the VC ability to persevere in the South or persuade the Hanoi Government that the price of persisting was unacceptably high. The Air Force dissented with this paragraph, saying We believe that inauguration of the US actions here assumed, which emphasize US willingness and determination to become more deeply involved in combat operations in the South and eliminate the concept of an area 'sanctuary' in North Vietnam, has a reasonable chance of basically altering the Communists' short-term expectations. While the VC and the DRV probably have come to expect some additional US commitments, and they probably believe that the VC, with increased DRV assistance, can ...offset the effect of larger US forces, such confidence could be quite quickly undermined by effectively expanded US combat operations. Extension of air attacks to military targets in the HHA would pose the added threat that urban/industrial targets might be next. The selective and limited nature of US bombing target selections to date may have led Hanoi seriously to underestimate the extent of US determination to exert the power necessary to force discontinuance of DRV support for the VC. US military actions resulting from the assumed program could well persuade the Hanoi Government that the price of persisting was becoming unacceptably high.

Returning to the main estimate, the next conclusion was "If the extension of air attacks were to include sustained interdiction of land lines of communication leading from South China, these actions would obviously make the delivery of... aid more difficult and costly, and would have a serious impact on the limited industrial sector of the DRV [Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam] general economy. It would still not have a critical impact on the Communist determination to persevere and would not, at least for the short term, seriously impair VC capabilities in South Vietnam.

If, in addition, POL [petroleum, oil and lubricants] targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area were destroyed by air attacks, the DRV's ability to provide transportation for the general economy would be severely reduced. It would also complicate their military logistics... The VC also depend on supplies from the North to maintain their present level of large-scale operations. The accumulated strains of a prolonged curtailment of supplies received from North Vietnam would...inhibit and might even prevent an increase in large-scale VC military activity, though they would probably not force any significant reduction in VC [...] tactics of harassment and sabotage. ... But the final decision on whether to seek negotiations would depend to a great extent on political developments in the Indochina area and elsewhere, and on the actual course of combat in South Vietnam. The State Department and the Army dissented with this paragraph, sayingDepartment of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believe that in spite of greater damage and harassment caused by sustained air attack on lines of communication (LOC) and other targets, the capacities of DRV and Laos LOC are sufficient to permit support of the war in South Vietnam at the scale envisaged in this estimate. Other significant factors supporting this position are the impossibility of doing irreparable damage to LOC capacity; demonstrated Communist logistic resourcefulness and ability to move large amounts of war material long distances over difficult terrain by primitive means; and the difficulty of detecting, let alone stopping, sea infiltration.

"In response...the Communists would almost certainly undertake measures to increase their own strength in South Vietnam for a higher level of struggle. They are already augmenting VC units and dispatching additional PAVN forces to South Vietnam; the assumed US actions would probably result in a speeding up of this process. By the end of 1965, the total of PAVN regulars in organized units in South Vietnam could reach 20,000 to 30,000 men. Although the Communists are aware of the dangers of concentrating their troops in large numbers, they might, during the next few months, attempt major assaults against GVN forces and positions...

"In coping with larger US forces employed in a more aggressive fashion, we believe that the VC would seek to avoid the kind of engagements which risked a serious Communist defeat." They would concentrate on harassments...or increasing operations in Laos.

"...the Communists' strategy will depend upon the actual course of combat and their estimates of South Vietnamese stability and US will to persist. They are predisposed to attach great weight to signs of disintegration in Saigon and to manifestations of domestic US opposition to Administration policies. These ... reinforce the leadership's conviction that Communist staying power is inherently superior." If the situation changes their preconception, they might show interest in negotiating, as long as they preserve their freedom of action while inhibiting US/GVN operations.

"Faced with the buildup outlined in our assumptions, the DRV would probably request more air defense equipment from the USSR, including SAMs, fighters, technicians, and perhaps pilots, particularly if US air attacks were expanded." Hanoi would probably request air defense equipment from the PRC and North Korea, but limit the personnel sent.

The DRV might be concerned about a US invasion of the North, but would not ask for Chinese combat forces unless actual invasion seemed imminent.

Vietnam 1965: Chinese Communist Reactions

It was estimated that the Chinese are even more certain than the DRV/VC remaining firm will defeat the US. It was not believed they would actively intervene with combat troops, but would intensify propaganda and take some steps to mobilize reserves.

"If air strikes were extended to the HHA and particularly to lines of communication from South China, the chances of Chinese Communist air intervention from Chinese bases would increase," especially if the main roads and rail lines were cut the main roads and rail lines over which the principal supplies are moving. ...we consider the chances are about even that Chinese aircraft would deliberately engage the US over North Vietnam from bases within China, unless large numbers of US aircraft operated close to the Chinese border. DIA, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA disagreed, saying"If air strikes were extended to the Hanoi-Haiphong area and particularly to lines of communication from South China, the chances of Chinese Communist air intervention from Chinese bases would increase. Nevertheless, we believe the Chinese would be reluctant to engage the US in an air war or to risk US retaliation against Chinese military installations. We therefore consider it unlikely that Chinese aircraft would deliberately engage the US over North Vietnam from bases within China." ''The State Department disagreed, saying the risks were even higher than in the text..

The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the chances are better than even that Chinese aircraft would deliberately engage the US under these circumstances. Even if air engagements were accidental they would have extremely dangerous repercussions and if they were deliberate they could not fail to lead to a wider war.

Vietnam 1965: Soviet Reactions

While the Soviet Union hopes for an eventual Communist victory in South Vietnam, but it is more conscious than Peiping and Hanoi of the larger military risks...it does not wish the kind of Communist victory which would magnify the prestige and power of China. Unlike Peiping and Hanoi, Moscow is concerned with minimizing damage to East-West relations. In this situation, the USSR prefers a course of negotiations...

"...we believe that the USSR would see no alternative to continued support of the DRV and further expansion of its military aid. It would thus be likely to grant a DRV request for additional air defense equipment and personnel. It would probably feel compelled to comply promptly with DRV requests to replace air defense equipment destroyed by US attacks in the Hanoi area. The Soviet aid program might be hampered by Chinese restrictions on transit rights.

"The USSR would probably indicate that, if the US remains unyielding in Vietnam, it FACES trouble elsewhere in the world, as, for example, in Berlin. We do not think, however, that Moscow would confront us with a major challenge...We believe that the US decisions considered here would produce important reactions in general Soviet policy..." The USSR would probably increase its military spending.

Vietnam 1965: General Non-Communist Reactions

[these actions] wouldcause rising alarm because, in combination with Communist statements in response, they would revive and fortify fears of increased cold-war tensions and even of a much larger war. This might make some governments more reluctant to give public support to US policy, particularly governments in political difficulty, e.g., the UK, Canada, and Norway...Over the longer run, however, the more important reactions will depend on the subsequent course of the conflict.

"In non-Communist Asia, Japan offers the most serious problem. We believe the Sato government would maintain its policy of supporting US policy in spite of howls from the press and opposition forces. Sato's position would be made much more difficult, however, if Okinawa or especially Japan were to become a greatly expanded conduit for support of US forces in Vietnam, or if it appeared that China was about to become involved in the fighting." India would deplore the intensification, but the actual positions of India and Pakistan would not change.

Vietnam 1967

The Phoenix Program was an attempt to attack the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) with a "rifle shot rather than a shotgun approach to target key political leaders, command/control elements and activists in the VCI." In that the VCI, as opposed to the main force VC/NVA combat forces, used terror against villagers, Phoenix can be considered a counterterror program using some of the same methods as its opponents.

While Phoenix has often been called a CIA program, that is not entirely correct. It was under the direction of William Colby, who had been Saigon Deputy CIA Station Chief, and then Station Chief, between 1959 and 1962. He returned to Vietnam in 1968, as deputy to Robert Komer, the civilian head of the American efforts against the Communists, called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). Shortly after arriving,Colby succeeded Komer as head of CORDS, which drew on a wide range of US and South Vietnamese organizations, including the CIA station's Rural Development cadre.

From a psychological operations perspective, "The Vietnam War Phoenix Program is controversial to this day. Supporters say that it was a legal and closely controlled US-Vietnamese intelligence program aimed at destroying the Viet Cong infrastructure, while the critics say that it was an illegal system of arresting, torturing and murdering innocent Vietnamese civilians...

"Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Directive 381-41, dated 9 July 1967, inaugurated the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX) program to Attack the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). In late 1967, MACV replaced the name “ICEX” with “Phoenix,” after a mythical bird that appeared as a sign of prosperity and luck and a near translation of the South Vietnamese name for the program, “Phung Hoang” (All-seeing bird”)."

As early as 1964, GEN William C. Westmoreland, commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) "knew that he lacked the forces to wage both a war of attrition and one of pacification, so he chose the former. The argument over whether or not this was the right course of action will likely go on forever, but undoubtedly the shape of the war changed dramatically after the Tet Offensive. The enemy was badly mauled and, despite the political gains made, militarily lost the initiative for quite some time."

When the VC regrouped after the Tet Offensive, "Westmoreland never had such an advantage. When American ground forces entered the war in 1965, they faced an enemy on the offensive, but in June 1968 the new MACV commander, General Creighton W. Abrams, confronted an enemy on the ropes. Abrams plainly recognized his advantage and implemented a clear-and-hold strategy aimed at moving into rural enclaves formerly dominated by the VC."

Much criticized for lack of precision, the Phoenix Program was described by a former official as a "sterile depersonalized [...] program...I never knew an individual to be detained as a VC suspect who ever lived through an interrogation" Over 20,000 Viet Cong enemy combatants are executed.

Oceania

Australia

Australia 1975

The following Wikipedia article recounts allegations that the CIA supported Sir John Kerr against Gough Whitlam in the 1975 Australian federal election: see Australian constitutional crisis of 1975. The article states "A minority of commentators believe the United States was involved."

Australia 1977

U.S. President Jimmy Carter sends a message to the Australian Government denying allegations of CIA meddling in the Whitlam government made by convicted Soviet spy Christopher John Boyce.