David Henderson (born 1953) is an Auckland property developer. He is regarded as one of the city's most influential businessmen and is said to have development work worth up to NZ$1 billion.
The son of a fitter and turner, he grew up in Milford, and started his empire by renovating old Ponsonby houses. In the 1970s, he opened the Stove Shop, a second-hand dealership in Ponsonby Rd. In 1997 he bought and developed Princes Wharf and has since developed the $100 million Interplex industrial park at Albany, Q City and Q Central apartment block and Precinct apartments.
He was declared bankrupt on 9 June 2011.
The son of a fitter and turner, he grew up in Milford, and started his empire by renovating old Ponsonby houses. In the 1970s, he opened the Stove Shop, a second-hand dealership in Ponsonby Rd. In 1997 he bought and developed Princes Wharf and has since developed the $100 million Interplex industrial park at Albany, Q City and Q Central apartment block and Precinct apartments.
He was declared bankrupt on 9 June 2011.
Think Like a Winner! is a 1991 self-help book written by Walter Doyle Staples and published by Pelican Publishing Company, USA.
Synopsis
According to the author, there are some deep-seated negative self-beliefs that restrict individuals from actualizing their full potentials in life. In the later parts, the book proposes some mental concepts and techniques to remove those hurdles and to ensure personal success; for example, the five basic mental laws, ten positive core beliefs, autogenic conditioning, NLP, and a few others.
Table of contents
The book contents include:
* What Makes People Successful?
* Principal Influences in Your Upbringing
* A Model of Human Behavior
* The Power of Perception
* The Human Success System
* How the Mind Works
* The Application of Expectation Theory
* Reprogramming Your Mind for Success
* Working Hard on Yourself
* Adding Value to Yourself
* Superior Human Relations Your Master Key to Success
* Leadership Strategies for Increasing Productivity
* Conclusion
* Notes
* Bibliography
* Index
* Planning Your Future
* Copyright
Synopsis
According to the author, there are some deep-seated negative self-beliefs that restrict individuals from actualizing their full potentials in life. In the later parts, the book proposes some mental concepts and techniques to remove those hurdles and to ensure personal success; for example, the five basic mental laws, ten positive core beliefs, autogenic conditioning, NLP, and a few others.
Table of contents
The book contents include:
* What Makes People Successful?
* Principal Influences in Your Upbringing
* A Model of Human Behavior
* The Power of Perception
* The Human Success System
* How the Mind Works
* The Application of Expectation Theory
* Reprogramming Your Mind for Success
* Working Hard on Yourself
* Adding Value to Yourself
* Superior Human Relations Your Master Key to Success
* Leadership Strategies for Increasing Productivity
* Conclusion
* Notes
* Bibliography
* Index
* Planning Your Future
* Copyright
In Billiton Aluminium v Khanyile, an important case in South African law, the Constitutional Court delivered judgment in an application for leave to appeal an order of the Labour Appeal Court. The order appealed against was one which restored an arbitration award granting reinstatement of the employee (the respondent in this matter) retrospective to the date of his dismissal in 2001.
Facts
The case arose out of the dismissal of the employee more than nine years before by the employer, the applicant in this matter, Billiton Aluminum. The employee successfully challenged the fairness of the dismissal in arbitration proceedings before the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) in 2001. On review the Labour Court remitted the matter for fresh arbitration proceedings. The finding of the commissioner in the second arbitration proceedings was that the dismissal was substantively unfair and that the employee should be reinstated retrospectively.
This finding was taken on review to the Labour Court. The Labour Court confirmed the unfairness of the dismissal, but ordered compensation rather than reinstatement. This order was then taken on appeal to the Labour Appeal Court by the employee. In that court the employer ultimately accepted that the employee’s dismissal was substantively unfair. In upholding the appeal, the Labour Appeal Court restored the commissioner’s award, based on the finding that the Labour Court had wrongly treated the matter as an appeal rather than a review, and accordingly ordered that the commissioner’s arbitration award be restored.
The employer then applied for leave to appeal against the Labour Appeal Court’s order to the Constitutional Court, where the employer argued that, despite the dismissal being substantively unfair, the Labour Appeal Court should nevertheless have ordered compensation, not reinstatement. In the alternative, it argued that the Labour Appeal Court was under a constitutional duty to grant an order that was appropriate, just and equitable in terms of section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. It argued that the Labour Appeal Court was under an obligation to investigate, on its own accord, facts which arose after the arbitration award was made or judgment in the Labour Court had been delivered. In particular it was argued that systemic delays within the dispute-resolution procedures under the Labour Relations Act should be taken into account when granting a remedy, and that, where an employee had earned an income subsequent to his dismissal, it should be taken into account when making a just and equitable remedy on appeal. The latter arguments were never raised in the Labour Appeal Court; they were raised for the first time in the Constitutional Court.
Judgment
In dismissing the application for leave to appeal, Froneman J, writing for a unanimous court, held that, although the matter raised a constitutional issue, it was not in the interests of justice for leave to appeal to be granted. As a general principle, the Constitutional Court had required that constitutional issues be raised in the courts from which the appeal arose before leave to appeal would be granted. This was especially so because this was a matter which fell manifestly within the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts, and because the Constitutional Court would have benefited from its expertise in the matter. It was accordingly found that there were no exceptional circumstances in this case which warranted the Constitutional Court's sitting as a court of first and last instance.
The court further held that leave to appeal should also be refused on an additional ground, namely that the constitutional point lacked prospects of success in the particular form and manner in which it was raised. It was found that there is no duty upon courts to investigate post-judgment facts in making a just and equitable order, especially where litigants had not made use of the relevant rules for adducing further evidence on appeal. Similarly, the applicant’s argument that there was a legal duty upon employees to mitigate their losses was dismissed. People sought work after dismissal for economic survival; it was unnecessary to turn this essential component of life into a legal duty.
The court recognised that delays plague the dispute-resolution procedures under the Labour Relations Act. It noted that such delays should be addressed by the users of the system within the different institutions that make up the dispute resolution procedures. It held that the delay in this particular case was primarily caused by the employer itself, in its failure to implement the order of reinstatement, despite its eventual recognition that the dismissal was unfair.
In the result, leave to appeal was dismissed.
Facts
The case arose out of the dismissal of the employee more than nine years before by the employer, the applicant in this matter, Billiton Aluminum. The employee successfully challenged the fairness of the dismissal in arbitration proceedings before the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) in 2001. On review the Labour Court remitted the matter for fresh arbitration proceedings. The finding of the commissioner in the second arbitration proceedings was that the dismissal was substantively unfair and that the employee should be reinstated retrospectively.
This finding was taken on review to the Labour Court. The Labour Court confirmed the unfairness of the dismissal, but ordered compensation rather than reinstatement. This order was then taken on appeal to the Labour Appeal Court by the employee. In that court the employer ultimately accepted that the employee’s dismissal was substantively unfair. In upholding the appeal, the Labour Appeal Court restored the commissioner’s award, based on the finding that the Labour Court had wrongly treated the matter as an appeal rather than a review, and accordingly ordered that the commissioner’s arbitration award be restored.
The employer then applied for leave to appeal against the Labour Appeal Court’s order to the Constitutional Court, where the employer argued that, despite the dismissal being substantively unfair, the Labour Appeal Court should nevertheless have ordered compensation, not reinstatement. In the alternative, it argued that the Labour Appeal Court was under a constitutional duty to grant an order that was appropriate, just and equitable in terms of section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. It argued that the Labour Appeal Court was under an obligation to investigate, on its own accord, facts which arose after the arbitration award was made or judgment in the Labour Court had been delivered. In particular it was argued that systemic delays within the dispute-resolution procedures under the Labour Relations Act should be taken into account when granting a remedy, and that, where an employee had earned an income subsequent to his dismissal, it should be taken into account when making a just and equitable remedy on appeal. The latter arguments were never raised in the Labour Appeal Court; they were raised for the first time in the Constitutional Court.
Judgment
In dismissing the application for leave to appeal, Froneman J, writing for a unanimous court, held that, although the matter raised a constitutional issue, it was not in the interests of justice for leave to appeal to be granted. As a general principle, the Constitutional Court had required that constitutional issues be raised in the courts from which the appeal arose before leave to appeal would be granted. This was especially so because this was a matter which fell manifestly within the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts, and because the Constitutional Court would have benefited from its expertise in the matter. It was accordingly found that there were no exceptional circumstances in this case which warranted the Constitutional Court's sitting as a court of first and last instance.
The court further held that leave to appeal should also be refused on an additional ground, namely that the constitutional point lacked prospects of success in the particular form and manner in which it was raised. It was found that there is no duty upon courts to investigate post-judgment facts in making a just and equitable order, especially where litigants had not made use of the relevant rules for adducing further evidence on appeal. Similarly, the applicant’s argument that there was a legal duty upon employees to mitigate their losses was dismissed. People sought work after dismissal for economic survival; it was unnecessary to turn this essential component of life into a legal duty.
The court recognised that delays plague the dispute-resolution procedures under the Labour Relations Act. It noted that such delays should be addressed by the users of the system within the different institutions that make up the dispute resolution procedures. It held that the delay in this particular case was primarily caused by the employer itself, in its failure to implement the order of reinstatement, despite its eventual recognition that the dismissal was unfair.
In the result, leave to appeal was dismissed.
R v Khan & Others 1949 (4) SA 868 (N) was an important case in South African criminal procedure, hinging on "splitting of charges".
In this case the appellants had entered privately owned land at night in search of game using an electric torch as an aid in killing game and killed a bush buck doe without having a 'specially protected game license.'
They were charged and convicted on three counts:
# contravening certain statutes in that they killed game that was not specially authorized by the Ordinance (count 1);
# using an artificial light as an aid in killing game (count 2); and
# entering upon lands in pursuit of game without the owner's permission (count 3).
The appellants appealed on the grounds that there was an improper duplication of charges as all the acts alleged in the charges were done with a single intent and in the course of a single criminal transaction and that they should be regarded as involving only one offense.
The court noted that application of the tests would appear to give opposite results:
* If the single intention test is applied, it is quite easy to regard all the material acts of the night in question as having been done with a single intent and as together constituting a single criminal transaction.
* If the evidence test is applied, the evidence necessary to establish the three counts would not be the same.
The court chose to apply the evidence test as the former test was regarded as lacking precision.
It was clear that each of the counts can be established by evidence which did not establish the others. There was therefore no improper splitting of charges and the appeal was dismissed.
In this case the appellants had entered privately owned land at night in search of game using an electric torch as an aid in killing game and killed a bush buck doe without having a 'specially protected game license.'
They were charged and convicted on three counts:
# contravening certain statutes in that they killed game that was not specially authorized by the Ordinance (count 1);
# using an artificial light as an aid in killing game (count 2); and
# entering upon lands in pursuit of game without the owner's permission (count 3).
The appellants appealed on the grounds that there was an improper duplication of charges as all the acts alleged in the charges were done with a single intent and in the course of a single criminal transaction and that they should be regarded as involving only one offense.
The court noted that application of the tests would appear to give opposite results:
* If the single intention test is applied, it is quite easy to regard all the material acts of the night in question as having been done with a single intent and as together constituting a single criminal transaction.
* If the evidence test is applied, the evidence necessary to establish the three counts would not be the same.
The court chose to apply the evidence test as the former test was regarded as lacking precision.
It was clear that each of the counts can be established by evidence which did not establish the others. There was therefore no improper splitting of charges and the appeal was dismissed.