The Reasons the Germans lost at Stalingrad

In September 1942, the German Wehrmacht had penetrated deep into Soviet territory during Operation Barbarossa. The German forces had captured key Russian cities, including Kiev ,Kharkov and Kursk. They had laid siege to the Soviet second city, Leningrad, and had reached the outskirts of Moscow. Things were getting so bad that Stalin considered surrendering. But the Wehrmacht had taken heavy casualties during operation Barbarossa, and Stalin had used the winter of 1941-42 to reorganize the Red Army. These factors meant that by the start of the battle of Stalingrad, the Red Army was more prepared to take on the Wehrmacht.

The Battle

The battle of Stalingrad started with a heavy Luftwaffe bombardment of the city, turning much of it to rubble, and [...] many citizens still in the city. This meant that the Red Army had a perfect battlefield in which to conduct urban warfare, which neutralized the German numerical advantages and meant that the German 6th Army could not use the Nazis' Blitzkrieg tactics. Under the command of General Friedrich Paulus, the 6th managed to push the Soviets back to the banks of the Volga despite heavy resistance. Both sides suffered massive casualties, and a stalemate was created. The fighting was especially intense in and around the station house, the grain elevator and Mamaev mound.

On November 19, 1942, the Russian general Georgy Zhukov launched operation Uranus, a pincer movement which cut off the Germans inside the city from the rest of the invasion force. The Russians surrounded Stalingrad with the 1st Guards Army, 5th Tank Army, and 21st Army. The German General Erich von Manstein attempted to relieve the trapped sixth army in December (codenamed Operation Winter Storm) but failed. Paulus contacted [...] to tell him the situation was hopeless, but the Fuhrer replied that Paulus should commit [...] rather than be captured. By January 25, 1943, the Germans had lost control of the two airfields, meaning there could be no further supplies to the city. The last German forces surrendered on February 2, having suffered 850,000 casualties, and the red army having suffered 478,740 (lower than the German losses) casualties, as well as 40,000 civilian deaths.

German Inadequacies in tactics, planning and operational conduct during the Battle

Primary reason for the German defeat in Stalingrad was [...]'s obsession with seizing a city of little military or economic value after its destruction from aerial bombardment. The city should have not been assaulted. It took away the German advantages in mobile combined arms warfare. Amidst the rubble strewn remains of the city, Soviet soldiers fought on equal terms against their German foes. The built up structures provided excellent defensive positions for Russian defenders and demolishing made them even better for cover and concealment. Chuikov, the Russian commander, skillfully fed in enough troops to keep a toehold in the city and prolonged the defense. This gave time for Stavka to plan and amass the forces for the double encirclement which would eventually destroy the Sixth Army. Overstretched, the Germans relied on Romanian forces to secure the Sixth Armies flanks. Essentially light Infantry, the Romanians had few means to combat Soviet Armored forces equipped with T-34 tanks. The 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies with few exceptions simply melted away under the Russian onslaught. It wasn't due to a lack of willingness to fight (at Odessa and in the Crimea they proved more than willing to sacrific themselves), they simply did not have the tools to fight a mobile armored battle. The Germans may have done better by crossing the Volga above and below the city, encircling and [...] of all resupply and reinforcement. Coupled with continuous air raids and artillery strikes against river traffic may well have forced the capitulation of the city without the Germans suffering the horrendous casualties and leaving their flanks in the air.

Von Paulus did not alter his plans and bulldoggedly plowed straight into the teeth of Russian defenses. A frontal attack against fortified positions was what the Germans essentially put into practice with the inevitable result of heavy casualties for little gain. During the drive to Stalingrad, from June 22 to August 29, the Germans loss AbOUT 1 or 2 men killed per division per day. Once the battle for the city proper began in September entire battalions were reduced to companies in a matter of weeks. This type of attritional warfare was a microcosm of the failure of German strategy during the latter half of the war where attrition essentially destroyed the cream of the German Heere. As more German troops were drawn into the cauldron, they were left with inadequate operational reserves to meet any contingencies.

As David Glantz has recently shown, Axis troop strength on the Eastern Front actually exceeded the Russian numbers at the time of the Stalingrad battle. By use of strategic and operational deception (maskirovka) the Russians were able to mass local superiority at the critical points of contact in the Stalingrad area. The Germans had very few reserves in the immediate area, one German Panzer division and one Romanian Armored division. The Romanian armored division was equipped mostly with obsolete light tanks such as the Toldi. Armed with nothing larger than a 37mm gun and thinly armored, they stood no chance against the T-34's 76.2mm gun and thick armor.

Once the Russian breakthrough and intent were clear the Germans should immediately have counter attacked to the rear and drawn in their scattered forces to create a coherent defense line along the Chir and Don Rivers. That the Germans did not do so was simply the maniacal approach that [...] took with withdrawals; there would be none. By forcing the German forces to stand and defend themselves in Stalingrad, [...] robbed them of the distinct advantage they held in maneuver and improvisational warfare against the Russian Army. Sixth Army losses would probably have been significant even in a retreat or breakout from Stalingrad. The withdrawal would have been difficult as fuel supplies were low and the Germans were operating at the end of a 1000 mile long supply line. Most of the army was unmotorized and had to move by foot or horse. Nevertheless, a precarious retreat would have been better than the wholesale loss of about 250,000 troops.

There have been arguments made that that sacrifice of the Sixth Army tied down significant number of Russian formations such that their winter offensive achieved less than the intended goal of annihilating all of Army Groups A and B. However were those Sixth Army forces to have escaped encirclement, they could have been used to defend sections of the front which had to be held by Mobile forces. The Panzer divisions which were assembled for the failed relief of Stalingrad (Operation Winter Storm) could have been used instead to counter any continueing Russian moves. It would probably not have altered the outcome of the war, but the course may have taken a much different course if the Germans had done the sane thing and broke out of Stalingrad in the early days of the encircelment.

Soviet Strengths

The main reason for the Soviet victory at Stalingrad was the vast number of troops sent in by the Soviets. Joseph Stalin had so much human resources available to him that it was very unlikely that the Germans would prevail. Despite being better equipped than the Soviets, they would be eventually worn down by the massive amounts of resources Stalin was putting into the battle.

Another reason for the Russian victory at Stalingrad was the winter reorganization of 1941-42, in which Stalin completely reorganized the Soviet economy. This meant moving all the heavy industry to the east, which meant the Luftwaffe bombers could not destroy it. Also, the Soviet military structure was completely redeveloped, with commissars being given more choice in what they did, and more flexibility in the orders they were allowed to give. In addition to this, the Soviets began mass producing vast amounts of new technology, such as the T-34 tank, the Katyusha rocket launcher and a new Soviet air force. By 1943, they were producing far more tanks and equipment than their German counterparts, and these were eventually very helpful in the defeat of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad, as The New airforce destroyed German supply planes, and the T-34 s helped in Operation Uranus. Finally, a new military discipline was introduced, with order 227 stating that there would be “Not one step backwards”. Many deserters were shot, and many more were put into newly created “Penal Battalions”, which were given the most deadly jobs, such as drawing fire away from other units.

The Soviet army also received a lot of help from its allies, such as the U.S. and Britain, who aided the Russians with considerable amounts of weapons and supplies.

Another reason for the success of the red army is the immense will of the people to succeed against [...] in the Great Patriotic War. This was in part caused by the atrocities committed by the German army in 1941-2. The Soviet people had such a will to win that they endured incredible hardships, and often refused to surrender, committing [...] instead. This meant that the German army suffered massive casualties, meaning that they were not at full strength when they reached Stalingrad. The scorched earth policy also helped, in which the retreating soviets destroyed everything of value in the land they were retreating from, which meant that the Germans could not use the materials that they captured.

See also

Battle of Stalingrad

Operation Barbarossa

World War II

References

"Stalingrad", Antony Beevor