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Authoritarianism is a political system characterized by the rejection of political plurality, the use of strong central power to preserve the political status quo, and reductions in democracy, separation of powers, civil liberties, and the rule of law. Authoritarian regimes May Be either autocratic or oligarchic and may be based upon the rule of a party, the military, or the concentration of power in a single person. States that have a blurred boundary between democracy and authoritarianism have sometimes been characterized as "hybrid democracies," "hybrid regimes," or "competitive authoritarian" states.

The political scientist Juan Linz, in an influential 1964 work, An Authoritarian Regime: Spain, defined authoritarianism as possessing four qualities:

1. Limited political pluralism, which is achieved with constraints on the legislature, political parties, and interest groups.
2. Political legitimacy based on appeals to emotion and identification of the regime as a necessary evil to combat "easily recognizable societal problems, such as underdevelopment or insurgency."
3. Minimal political mobilization and suppression of anti-regime activities.
4. Ill-defined executive powers, often vague and shifting, used to extend the power of the executive.

Minimally defined: an authoritarian government lacks free and competitive direct elections to legislatures, free and competitive direct or indirect elections for executives, or both. Broadly defined, authoritarian states include countries that lack human rights, such as freedom of religion, or countries in which the government and the opposition do not alternate in power at least once following free elections. Authoritarian states might contain nominally democratic institutions such as political parties, legislatures, and elections, which are managed to entrench authoritarian rule and can feature fraudulent, non-competitive elections.

Since 1946, the share of authoritarian states in the international political system increased until the mid-1970s but declined from then until 2000. Prior to 2000, dictatorships typically began with a coup and replaced a pre-existing authoritarian regime. Since 2000, dictatorships are most likely to begin through democratic backsliding whereby a democratically elected leader establishes an authoritarian regime.

Characteristics

Authoritarianism is characterized by highly concentrated and centralized government power maintained by political repression and the exclusion of potential or supposed challengers by armed force. It uses political parties and mass organizations to mobilize people around the goals of the regime. Adam Przeworski has theorized that "authoritarian equilibrium rests mainly on lies, fear, and economic prosperity."

Authoritarianism also tends to embrace the informal and unregulated exercise of political power, a leadership that is "self-appointed and even if elected cannot be displaced by citizens' free choice among competitors," the arbitrary deprivation of civil liberties, and little tolerance for meaningful opposition. A range of social controls also attempt to stifle civil society while political stability is maintained by control over and support of the armed forces, a bureaucracy staffed by the regime, and creation of allegiance through various means of socialization and indoctrination. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart identify authoritarianism in politicians and political parties by looking for values of security, conformity, and obedience.

Authoritarians work to eliminate checks and balances on their behavior. Frequently, they Glorify extreme actions in the name of a cause and deprecate being slowed down by perceived opponents and non-equals. Authoritarians often rally behind a charismatic leader who commonly enjoys a cult of personality. The expansion of executive power is often accompanied by greater social status and money flowing to the authoritarian leaders and their adherents.

Authoritarianism is marked by "indefinite political tenure" of the ruler or ruling party (often in a one-party state) or other authority. The transition from an authoritarian system to a more democratic form of government is referred to as democratization.

Global democracy has received significant backlash from novel forms of authoritarianism. Many authors state that authoritarianism has made a gradual shift away from apparent military coups, mass killings and imprisonments and shifted towards more covert and “boiling frog” forms. Few faultless solutions have been discovered to counter mass disinformation campaigns, especially via social media.

Constitutions in authoritarian regimes

Constitutions in authoritarian states may serve a variety of roles, including "operating manual" (describing how the government is to function), "billboard" (signal of the regime's intent), "blueprint" (outline of future regime plans), and "window dressing" (material designed to obfuscate, such as provisions setting forth freedoms that are not honored in practice). Authoritarian constitutions may help legitimize, strengthen, and consolidate regimes. An authoritarian constitution "that successfully coordinates government action and defines popular expectations can also help consolidate the regime's grip on power by inhibiting recoordination on a different set of arrangements." Unlike democratic constitutions, authoritarian constitutions do not set direct limits on executive authority; however, in some cases such documents may function as ways for elites to protect their own property rights or constrain autocrats' behavior.

The Soviet Russia Constitution of 1918, the first charter of the new Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), was described by Vladimir Lenin as a "revolutionary" document. It was, he said, unlike any constitution drafted by a nation-state. The concept of "authoritarian constitutionalism" has been developed by legal scholar Mark Tushnet. Tushnet distinguishes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes from "liberal constitutionalist" regimes ("the sort familiar in the modern West, with core commitments to human rights and self-governance implemented by means of varying institutional devices") and from purely authoritarian regimes (which reject the idea of human rights or constraints on leaders' power). He describes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes as (1) authoritarian dominant-party states that (2) impose sanctions (such as libel judgments) against, but do not arbitrarily arrest, political dissidents; (3) permit "reasonably open discussion and criticism of its policies"; (4) hold "reasonably free and fair elections," without systemic intimidation, but "with close attention to such matters as the drawing of election districts and the creation of party lists to ensure as best it can that it will prevail—and by a substantial margin"; (5) reflect at least occasional responsiveness to public opinion; and (6) create "mechanisms to ensure that the amount of dissent does not exceed the level it regards as desirable." Tushnet cites Singapore as an example of an authoritarian constitutionalist state and connects the concept to that of hybrid regimes.

Current list of countries

The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of states characterized as authoritarian, as seen in the sources in the Notes and references column. Countries listed also are not rated as democracies by The Economist Democracy Index, as 'free' by Freedom House's Freedom in the World index or reach a high score at V-Dem Democracy Indices.

Historical

The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of states which were historically authoritarian.

Violence

Historically, authoritarians silenced dissent by employing violence to foster a culture of fear. A good example is former Philippines president Duterte who is awaiting trial for the murder of 20 journalists. “Just because you’re a journalist you are not exempted from assassination, if you’re a son of a bitch,” Duterte exclaimed during his inauguration speech. Aside from overt force, authoritarians have relied on threats of legal prosecution to force journalists into self-censorship. Legal prosecution allows persecution to retain the semblance of the rule of law.

After his rise to power, Pinochet persecuted leftists, socialists, and political critics, resulting in the executions of 1,200 to 3,200 people, the internment of as many as 80,000 people, and the torture of tens of thousands. According to the Chilean government, the number of executions and forced disappearances was at least 3,095. Operation Condor, a U.S.-supported terror operation focusing on South America, was founded at the behest of the Pinochet regime in late November 1975.

Yale University political scientist Milan Svolik argues that violence is a common characteristic of authoritarian systems. Violence tends to be common in authoritarian states because of a lack of independent third parties empowered to settle disputes between the dictator, regime allies, regime soldiers, and the masses.

Autocrats often glorify or whitewash a particular brand of violence, sometimes psychological violence, or indirect violence like structural discrimination or stochastic terrorism. Key elements include fostering an in-group/out-group mentality and sowing fear so that violent actions and theft are justified in the context of fighting a malicious group of subhumans. Nazi German politician Hermann Göring explained how people can be made fearful and to support a war they would otherwise oppose: "The people don't want war, but they can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. This is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and for exposing the country to danger. It works the same in every country."

Under authoritarian regimes, arbitrary arrest, indefinite detention, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, and torture are common. People may be held in unidentified places called 'black sites' or 'black jails'. Torture may go by other names, such as 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment', 'cruel and unusual punishment', or all manner of euphemisms. Several clandestine detention centres operated in Argentina during the military dictatorship that ruled the country from 1976 to 1983. Prisoners, many of whom had been "disappeared", were tortured and murdered, including pregnant women who were killed after giving birth, and their babies given to military families. Black sites are used extensively by the Egyptian security services. During the Egyptian Crisis, hundreds of protesters alleged that torture occurred at these black sites.

Authoritarians may resort to measures referred to as coup-proofing (structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power). Coup-proofing strategies include strategically placing family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military; creating an armed force parallel to the regular military; and developing multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another. Research shows that some coup-proofing strategies reduce the risk of coups occurring and reduce the likelihood of mass protests. However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness, and limits the rents that an incumbent can extract. A 2016 study shows that the implementation of succession rules reduces the occurrence of coup attempts. Succession rules are believed to hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters by assuaging elites who have more to gain by patience than by plotting. According to political scientists Curtis Bell and Jonathan Powell, coup attempts in neighboring countries lead to greater coup-proofing and coup-related repression in a region. A 2017 study finds that countries' coup-proofing strategies are heavily influenced by other countries with similar histories. A 2018 study in the Journal of Peace Research found that leaders who survive coup attempts and respond by purging known and potential rivals are likely to have longer tenures as leaders. A 2019 study in Conflict Management and Peace Science found that personalist dictatorships are more likely to take coup-proofing measures than other authoritarian regimes; the authors argue that this is because "personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler."

According to a 2019 study, personalist dictatorships are more repressive than other forms of dictatorship.

Manipulation of information

According to a 2019 study by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, authoritarian regimes have over time become less reliant on violence and mass repression to maintain control. The study shows instead that authoritarians have increasingly resorted to manipulation of information as a means of control. Authoritarians increasingly seek to create an appearance of good performance, conceal state repression, and imitate democracy. While authoritarian regimes invest considerably in propaganda out of a belief that it enhances regime survival, scholars have offered mixed views as to whether propaganda is effective.

Deception is common in politics, but authoritarians disseminate and magnify lies intentionally. These lies are intended to hide abuses, handicap political opponents, increase support for authoritarian vanity projects, and, finally, grant greater power to the authoritarians. At times, the goal is not to spread any particular myth but to sow doubt and confusion and undermine the idea that any particular report is true. When non-controlled sources have been thus delegitimised, sections of the people are left isolated, vulnerable, paranoid, cynical, and generally easier for authoritarian wire-pullers to exploit.

On 4 March 2022, Putin signed into law a bill introducing prison sentences of up to 15 years for those who publish "knowingly false information" about the Russian military and its operations, with the Russian government deciding what is the truth, leading to some media outlets in Russia to stop reporting on Ukraine or shutting their media outlet. Although the 1993 Russian Constitution has an article expressly prohibiting censorship, the Russian censorship apparatus Roskomnadzor ordered the country's media to only use information from Russian state sources or face fines and blocks, and accused a number of independent media outlets of spreading "unreliable socially significant untrue information" about the shelling of Ukrainian cities by the Russian army and civilian deaths.

Russian propaganda and fake news stories have attacked Ukraine's nationhood and accused it of being a neo-Nazi state, committing genocide against Russian speakers, developing nuclear and biological weapons, and being influenced by Satanism. Russian propaganda falsely accuses NATO of controlling Ukraine and of threatening and provoking Russia. These claims have been widely rejected as untrue and crafted to justify the invasion and even to justify genocidal acts against Ukrainians. The Russian state has denied carrying out war crimes in Ukraine; Russian media and internet activists give false alibis for Russian forces, or falsely blame attacks on Ukrainian forces instead. Some of the disinformation seeks to undermine international support for Ukraine and to provoke hostility against Ukrainian refugees.

A 2016 paper describes social media-driven political disinformation tactics as a "firehose of falsehood" that "entertains, confuses, and overwhelms the audience." Four characteristics were illustrated with respect to Russian propaganda. Disinformation is used in a way that is 1) high-volume and multichannel 2) continuous and repetitive 3) ignores objective reality and 4) ignores consistency. It becomes effective by creating confusion and obscuring, disrupting, and diminishing the truth. When one falsehood is exposed, "the propagandists will discard it and move on to a new (though not necessarily more plausible) explanation." The purpose is not to convince people of a specific narrative but to "Deny, deflect, distract."

Scapegoating vulnerable communities

Authoritarians often attack vulnerable communities: other nations, immigrants, minorities, detractors, and social outcasts. This helps them rally support and categorise dissenting views and interests as irrelevant. Authoritarians have ascended to power in Hungary and Poland with only a slim majority. By demonising migrants and claiming to represent the only legitimate Poles and Hungarians, they were ascribed more democratic authority than was otherwise due. As changing times force many people to struggle with questions of social identity, far-right populist parties have weaponised numerous easy targets across many backsliding democracies, including the United States.

Authoritarians often strongly reject the appeal of pluralistic, diverse societies. Usually, they blame social ills on easy marks, which includes non-conform individuals, LGBTQIA2S+, but also women. At other times, they blame “terrifying conspirators,” who may be fictitious. In the United States, which has a long tradition of marginalising Black Americans, language and rhetoric often point to an implicit superiority of the Caucasian ethnicity over the colored and the poor. The practice is about more than racist bravado. Authoritarians utilise state power to attack their handpicked targets and roll back human rights.

In United States politics, the terms "extreme right", "far-right", and "ultra-right" are labels used to describe "militant forms of insurgent revolutionary right ideology and separatist ethnocentric nationalism", according to The Public Eye. The terms are used for groups and movements such as Christian Identity, the Creativity Movement, the Ku Klux Klan, the National Socialist Movement, the National Alliance, the Joy of Satan Ministries, and the Order of Nine Angles. These far-right groups share conspiracist views of power which are often antisemitic and reject pluralist democracy in favor of an organic oligarchy that would unite the perceived homogeneously racial Völkish nation. The far-right in the United States is composed of various neo-fascist, neo-Nazi, white nationalist, and white supremacist organizations and networks who have been known to refer to an "acceleration" of racial conflict through violent means such as assassinations, murders, terrorist attacks, and societal collapse, in order to achieve the building of a white ethnostate.

Widely regarded as a military dictator by international observers, Suharto's 32-year presidency and legacy are highly divisive, and he remains a controversial figure among the Indonesian general public. He has also been praised for making Indonesia into an economic success story, bringing stability to the region particularly during the Cold War period, and leading Indonesia when it played a significant role in international affairs. Others denounce his authoritarian rule, widespread corruption, and extensive human rights violations. His 31-year dictatorship is considered one of the most brutal and corrupt of the 20th century: he was central to the perpetration of mass killings against alleged communists and subsequent persecution of ethnic Chinese, Islamists, irreligious people, and trade unionists.

Conspiracy theories are a fundamental component of a wide range of radicalized and extremist groups, where they may play an important role in reinforcing the ideology and psychology of their members as well as further radicalizing their beliefs. These conspiracy theories often share common themes, even among groups that would otherwise be fundamentally opposed, such as the antisemitic conspiracy theories found among political extremists on both the far right and far left. More generally, belief in conspiracy theories is associated with holding extreme and uncompromising viewpoints and may help people in maintaining those viewpoints. While conspiracy theories are not always present in extremist groups and do not always lead to violence when they are, they can make the group more extreme, provide an enemy to direct hatred towards, and isolate members from the rest of society. Conspiracy theories are most likely to inspire violence when they call for urgent action, appeal to prejudices, or demonize and scapegoat enemies.

Socioeconomic factors

Scholars such as Seymour Lipset, Carles Boix, Susan Stokes, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens, and John Stephens argue that economic development increases the likelihood of democratization. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi argue that while economic development makes democracies less likely to turn authoritarian, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that development causes democratization (turning an authoritarian state into a democracy).

Eva Bellin argues that under certain circumstances the bourgeoisie and labor are more likely to favor democratization, but less so under other circumstances. Economic development can boost public support for authoritarian regimes in the short-to-medium term.

According to Michael Albertus, most land reform programs tend to be implemented by authoritarian regimes that subsequently withhold property rights from the beneficiaries of the land reform. Authoritarian regimes do so to gain coercive leverage over rural populations.

Unemployment and inflation tend to be associated with increased authoritarian attitudes.

The experience of male-biased human sex ratios was associated with higher support for authoritarianism.

Politicising independent institutions

Authoritarian regimes typically incorporate similar political institutions to that of democratic regimes, such as legislatures and judiciaries, although they may serve different purposes. Democratic regimes are marked by institutions that are essential to economic development and individual freedom, including representative legislatures and competitive political parties. Most authoritarian regimes embrace these political structures but use them in a way that reinforces their power. Authoritarian legislatures, for example, are forums through which leaders may enhance their bases of support, share power, and monitor elites. Additionally, authoritarian party systems are extremely unstable and unconducive to party development, largely due to monopolistic patterns of authority. Judiciaries may be present in authoritarian states where they serve to repress political challengers, institutionalize punishment, and undermine the rule of law.

Authoritarian regimes may allow multi-party elections. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant rise in multi-party elections in authoritarian regimes. However, democratic and authoritarian differ prominently in their elections. Democratic elections are generally inclusive, competitive, and fair. In most instances, the elected leader is appointed to act on behalf of the general will. Authoritarian elections, on the other hand, are frequently subject to fraud and extreme constraints on the participation of opposing parties. Autocratic leaders employ tactics like murdering and/or imprisoning political opposition and paying election monitors to ensure victory. The proportion of authoritarian regimes with elections and support parties has risen in recent years. This is largely due to the increasing popularity of democracies and electoral autocracies, leading authoritarian regimes to imitate democratic regimes in hopes of receiving foreign aid and dodging criticism. Flawed elections also give authoritarians a controlled way to monitor public sentiment.

According to a 2018 study, most party-led dictatorships regularly hold popular elections. Prior to the 1990s, most of these elections had no alternative parties or candidates for voters to choose. Since the end of the Cold War, about two-thirds of elections in authoritarian systems allow for some opposition, but the elections are structured in a way to heavily favor the incumbent authoritarian regime. In 2020, almost half of all authoritarian systems had multi-party governments. Cabinet appointments by an authoritarian regime to outsiders can consolidate their rule by dividing the opposition and co-opting outsiders.

Hindrances to free and fair elections in authoritarian systems may include:

• Control of the media by the authoritarian incumbents.
• Interference with opposition campaigning.
• Electoral fraud.
• Violence against opposition.
• Large-scale spending by the state in favor of the incumbents.
• Permitting of some parties, but not others.
• Prohibitions on opposition parties, but not independent candidates.
• Allowing competition between candidates within the incumbent party, but not those who are not in the incumbent party.

For example, in Chile, Augusto Pinochet immediately banned all the leftist parties that had constituted President Salvador Allende's UP coalition. All other parties were placed in "indefinite recess" and were later banned outright. The government's violence was directed not only against dissidents but also against their families and other civilians.

In the Philippines, in 1986, investigative reporting on his family's extensive overseas financial holdings and false war records led President Ferdinand Marcos to call snap elections. Marcos used red scare tactics to portray activists as communists and to exaggerate the threat represented by the Communist Party of the Philippines. He was challenged by Aquino's widow, Corazon Aquino. Although the government's results declared Marcos the victor, allegations of having devised mass electoral fraud, political turmoil, and human rights abuses led to the People Power Revolution of February 1986, which culminated in his removal from power after a two-decade-long rule.

In 2017–2018, President Nicolás Maduro had successfully banned the most popular opposition leaders and parties from running. In 2015, the opposition had won control of the country's legislature, the National Assembly. In 2017, Maduro had the opposition-controlled legislature dissolved and had all legislative functions transferred to the Maduro-controlled judiciary. As a result of political pressure, Maduro moved the functions to a new organ called the ANC, nonetheless controlled by Maduro himself. With it, he organised abrupt elections that scrambled the hamstrung opposition's ability to reorganise and decide on a strong presidential candidate. Against the backdrop of vote rigging accusations and a low voter turnout, Maduro claimed a second term.

Authoritarians normalise political violence in combination with hate-filled rhetoric, and across borders, they learn from one another. Far-right former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro's partnership with the US far right has involved efforts to violently overturn free and fair elections. On Jan. 8, 2023, supporters of Bolsonaro rampaged through federal government buildings. The rioters called upon the military to overturn the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Just like his US counterpart, the former president had, for months, been disseminating stories of mass election fraud. He had also plotted with military commanders in order to secure his re-election.

Interactions with other elites and the masses

The foundations of stable authoritarian rule are that the authoritarian prevents contestation from the masses and other elites. The authoritarian regime may use co-optation or repression (or carrots and sticks) to prevent revolts. Authoritarian rule entails a balancing act whereby the ruler has to maintain the support of other elites (frequently through the distribution of state and societal resources) and the support of the public (through the distribution of the same resources): the authoritarian rule is at risk if the balancing act is lopsided, as it risks a coup by the elites or an uprising by the mass public.

Public opinion research indicates that many authoritarian regimes enjoy substantial public support. There may be varied explanations for this, including preference falsification, manipulation of information by authoritarian regimes, propaganda, and censorship and repression of dissenting perspectives. Authoritarian regimes tend to care about public opinion, as public grievances against the regime can risk rebellion or coups. Authoritarian regimes may resort to redistribution to boost public support for the regime.

Systemic weakness and resilience

Andrew J. Nathan notes that "regime theory holds that authoritarian systems are inherently fragile because of weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, over-centralization of decision-making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms. ... Few authoritarian regimes—be they communist, fascist, corporatist, or personalist—have managed to conduct orderly, peaceful, timely, and stable successions."

Political scientist Theodore M. Vestal writes that authoritarian political systems may be weakened through inadequate responsiveness to either popular or elite demands and that the authoritarian tendency to respond to challenges by exerting tighter control, instead of by adapting, may compromise the legitimacy of an authoritarian state and lead to its collapse.

One exception to this general trend is the endurance of the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party, which has been unusually resilient among authoritarian regimes. Nathan posits that this can be attributed to four factors, such as (1) "the increasingly norm-bound nature of its succession politics"; (2) "the increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the promotion of political elites"; (3) "the differentiation and functional specialization of institutions within the regime"; and (4) "the establishment of institutions for political participation and appeal that strengthen the CCP's legitimacy among the public at large."

Some scholars have challenged notions that authoritarian states are inherently brittle systems that require repression and propaganda to make people comply with the authoritarian regime. Adam Przeworski has challenged this, noting that while authoritarian regimes do take actions that serve to enhance regime survival, they also engage in mundane everyday governance, and their subjects do not hold a posture towards the regime at all moments of their life. He writes, "People in autocracies do not incessantly live under the shadow of dramatic historical events; they lead everyday routine lives." Similarly, Thomas Pepinsky has challenged the common mental image of an authoritarian state as one of grim totalitarianism, desperate hardship, strict censorship, and dictatorial orders of murder, torture and disappearances. He writes, "Life in authoritarian states is mostly boring and tolerable."

Typologies

According to Yale professor Juan José Linz, there are three main types of political regimes today: democracies, totalitarian regimes, and, sitting between these two, authoritarian regimes (with hybrid regimes).

According to University of Michigan professor Dan Slater, modern forms of authoritarianism are fundamentally dissimilar from historical forms of nondemocratic rule. He links modern authoritarianism to the era of mass politics, which began with the French Revolution.

Similar terms

• An authoritarian regime has "a concentration of power in a leader or an elite not constitutionally responsible to the people." Unlike totalitarian states, they will allow social and economic institutions not under governmental control, and tend to rely on passive mass acceptance rather than active popular support.
• An Autocracy is a state/government in which one person possesses "unlimited power".
• A totalitarian state is "based on subordination of the individual to the state and strict control of all aspects of the life and productive capacity of the nation, especially by coercive measures (such as censorship and terrorism)." and are ruled by a single ruling party made up of loyal supporters. Unlike autocracies, which "seek only to gain absolute political power and to outlaw opposition," totalitarian states are characterized by an official ideology, which "seek only to gain absolute political power and to outlaw opposition," and "seek to dominate every aspect of everyone's life as a prelude to world domination."
• A Fascist state is autocratic and based on a political philosophy/movement (such as that of the Fascisti of pre-WWII Italy) "that exalts nation and often race above the individual and that stands for a centralized autocratic government headed by a dictatorial leader, severe economic and social regimentation, and forcible suppression of opposition."
• Authoritarian personality is the personality type that treats authority figures with obedience. A study found evidence for both left-wing and right-wing authoritarianism.
• Authoritarian ethics views an authority can determine the only true ethics.

Subtypes

Several subtypes of authoritarian regimes have been identified by Linz and others. Linz identified the two most basic subtypes as traditional authoritarian regimes and bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes:

• Traditional authoritarian regimes are those "in which the ruling authority (generally a single person)" is maintained in power "through a combination of appeals to traditional legitimacy, patron-client ties and repression, which is carried out by an apparatus bound to the ruling authority through personal loyalties." An example is Ethiopia under Haile Selassie I.
• Bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes are those "governed by a coalition of military officers and technocrats who act pragmatically (rather than ideologically) within the limits of their bureaucratic mentality." Mark J. Gasiorowski suggests that it is best to distinguish "simple military authoritarian regimes" from "bureaucratic authoritarian regimes" in which "a powerful group of technocrats uses the state apparatus to try to rationalize and develop the economy" such as South Korea under Park Chung-hee.

According to Barbara Geddes, there are seven typologies of authoritarian regimes: dominant party regimes, military regimes, personalist regimes, monarchies, oligarchic regimes, indirect military regimes, or hybrids of the first three.

Subtypes of authoritarian regimes identified by Linz are corporatist or organic-statistic, racial and ethnic "democracy," and post-totalitarian.

• Corporatist authoritarian regimes "are those in which corporatism institutions are used extensively by the state to co-opt and demobilize powerful interest groups." This type has been studied most extensively in Latin America.
• Racial and ethnic "democracies" are those in which "certain racial or ethnic groups enjoy full democratic rights while others are largely or entirely denied those rights," such as in South Africa under apartheid.
• Post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes are those in which totalitarian institutions (such as the party, secret police, and state-controlled mass media) remain, but where "ideological orthodoxy has declined in favor of routinization, repression has declined, the state's top leadership is less personalized and more secure, and the level of mass mobilization has declined substantially." Examples include the Russian Federation and Soviet Eastern Bloc states in the mid-1980s. The post-Mao Zedong People's Republic of China was viewed as post-totalitarian in the 1990s and early 2000s, with a limited degree of increase in pluralism and civil society. However, in the 2010s, particularly after Xi Jinping succeeded as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and rose to power in 2012, Chinese state repression sharply increased, aided by digital control and mass surveillance.

Authoritarian regimes are also sometimes subcategorized by whether they are more personalistic or populist. Personalistic authoritarian regimes are characterized by arbitrary rule and authority exercised "mainly through patronage networks and coercion rather than through institutions and formal rules." Personalistic authoritarian regimes have been seen in post-colonial Africa. By contrast, populist authoritarian regimes "are mobilizational regimes in which a strong, charismatic, manipulative leader rules through a coalition involving key lower-class groups." Examples include Argentina under Juan Perón, Russia under Vladimir Putin, Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser and Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. "After Chavez, Authoritarianism Still Threatens Latin America"]}}, World Affairs (15 May 2013): "the followers of the late President Hugo Chávez continue to apply the playbook of authoritarian populism throughout Latin America in their pursuit of more power...one of the Mercosur partners are challenging the basic political practices of authoritarian populism implanted in Venezuela."

A typology of authoritarian regimes by political scientists Brian Lai and Dan Slater includes four categories:

• machine (oligarchic party dictatorships);
• bossism (autocratic party dictatorships);
• juntas (oligarchic military dictatorships); and
• strongman (autocratic military dictatorships).

Lai and Slater argue that single-party regimes are better than military regimes at developing institutions (e.g., mass mobilization, patronage networks, and coordination of elites) that are effective at continuing the regime's incumbency and diminishing domestic challengers; Lai and Slater also argue that military regimes more often initiate military conflicts or undertake other "desperate measures" to maintain control compared to single-party regimes.

John Duckitt suggests a link between authoritarianism and collectivism, asserting that both stand in opposition to individualism. Duckitt writes that both authoritarianism and collectivism submerge individual rights and goals to group goals, expectations, and conformities.

According to Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, authoritarian regimes that are created in social revolutions are much more durable than other kinds of authoritarian regimes.

Authoritarianism and democracy

Authoritarianism and democracy are not necessarily fundamental opposites and may be thought of as poles at opposite ends of a scale, so that it is possible for some democracies to possess authoritarian elements and for an authoritarian system to have democratic elements. Authoritarian regimes may also be partly responsive to citizen grievances, although this is generally only regarding grievances that do not undermine the stability of the regime. An illiberal democracy, or procedural democracy, is distinguished from liberal democracy, or substantive democracy, in that illiberal democracies lack features such as the rule of law, protections for minority groups, an independent judiciary, and the real separation of powers.

A further distinction is that liberal democracies have rarely made war with one another; research has extended the theory and finds that more democratic countries tend to have few wars (sometimes called militarized interstate disputes), causing fewer battle deaths with one another, and that democracies have far fewer civil wars.

Research shows that the democratic nations have significantly less democide or murder by government. Those were also moderately developed nations before applying liberal democratic policies. Research by the World Bank suggests that political institutions are extremely important in determining the prevalence of corruption and that parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of the press are all associated with lower corruption.

A 2006 study by economist Alberto Abadie has concluded that terrorism is most common in nations with intermediate political freedom. The nations with the least terrorism are the most and least democratic nations, and that "transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism." Studies in 2013 and 2017 similarly found a nonlinear relationship between political freedom and terrorism, with the most terrorist attacks occurring in partial democracies and the fewest in "strict autocracies and full-fledged democracies." A 2018 study by Amichai Magen demonstrated that liberal democracies and polyarchies not only suffer fewer terrorist attacks as compared to other regime types but also suffer fewer casualties in terrorist attacks as compared to other regime types, which may be attributed to higher-quality democracies' responsiveness to their citizens' demands, including "the desire for physical safety," resulting in "investment in intelligence, infrastructure protection, first responders, social resilience, and specialized medical care," which averts casualties. Magen also stated that terrorism in closed autocracies sharply increased starting in 2013.

Within national democratic governments, there may be subnational authoritarian enclaves; prominent examples include the Southern United States after Reconstruction, as well as areas of contemporary Argentina and Mexico.

Competitive authoritarian regimes

Another type of authoritarian regime is the competitive authoritarian regime, a type of civilian regime that arose in the post-Cold War era. In a competitive authoritarian regime, "formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but ... incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents." The term was coined by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way in their 2010 book of the same name to discuss a type of hybrid regime that emerged during and after the Cold War.

Competitive authoritarian regimes differ from fully authoritarian regimes in that elections are regularly held, the opposition can openly operate without a high risk of exile or imprisonment, and "democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power." Competitive authoritarian regimes lack core democratic criteria: free elections, robust civil liberties, and a level playing field.

Authoritarianism and fascism

Authoritarianism is considered a core concept of fascism and scholars agree that a fascist regime is foremost an authoritarian form of government, although not all authoritarian regimes are fascist. While authoritarianism is a defining characteristic of fascism, scholars argue that more distinguishing traits are needed to make an authoritarian regime fascist.

Libertarian authoritarianism

Multiple scholars have identified a form of libertarian authoritarianism emerging in the early 21st century. Wendy Brown describes it as emerging from neoliberalism, opposing both democracy and public institutions while defining freedom in terms of speech and actions that promote homophobia, white supremacy, and male privilege. Other scholars have connected it to QAnon and to the Argentinian Presidency of Javier Milei.

Carolin Amlinger and Oliver Nachtwey, in Offended Freedom: The Rise of Libertarian Authoritarianism, describe libertarian authoritarianism as arising from a backlash to government efforts to contain the COVID-19 pandemic and, more broadly, against the increasing complexity of the world, ultimately leading to hostility towards democracy. Writing in Jacobin and New Statesman, Amlinger and Nachtwey define libertarian authoritarians as those who believe in the abolition of the democratic state on the basis of its restrictions on individual freedoms and "consider the democratic state itself, the authorities and their regulations, to be invasive and harmful"; they described the fundamental basis of libertarian authoritarianism to be based in "post-truth politics", and that in the late-modern era, believers validate their opinions "with proto-scientific evidence, rumours, conspiracy theories and fake news". They describe neoliberalism as an additional factor contributing towards the recent rise of the ideology. Individuals who identify as modern adherents to the ideology include Peter Thiel, Elon Musk, and Javier Milei, having merged their libertarianism with their "authoritarian tendencies."

Authoritarianism and totalitarianism

Totalitarianism is a label used by various political scientists to characterize the most tyrannical strain of authoritarian systems, in which the ruling elite, often subservient to a dictator, exerts near-total control of the social, political, economic, cultural, and religious aspects of society in the territories under its governance.

Linz distinguished new forms of authoritarianism from personalistic dictatorships and totalitarian states, taking Francoist Spain as an example. Unlike personalistic dictatorships, new forms of authoritarianism have institutionalized representation of a variety of actors (in Spain's case, including the military, the Catholic Church, Falange, monarchists, technocrats, and others). Unlike totalitarian states, the regime relies on passive mass acceptance rather than popular support. According to Juan Linz, the distinction between an authoritarian regime and a totalitarian one is that an authoritarian regime seeks to suffocate politics and political mobilization, while totalitarianism seeks to control and use them. Authoritarianism primarily differs from totalitarianism in that social and economic institutions exist that are not under governmental control. Building on the work of Yale political scientist Juan Linz, Paul C. Sondrol of the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs has examined the characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian dictators and organized them in a chart:

Sondrol argues that while both authoritarianism and totalitarianism are forms of autocracy, they differ in three key dichotomies:

Compared to totalitarianism, "the authoritarian state still maintains a certain distinction between state and society. It is only concerned with political power, and as long as that is not contested, it gives society a certain degree of liberty. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, invades private life and asphyxiates it." Another distinction is that "authoritarianism is not animated by utopian ideals in the way totalitarianism is. It does not attempt to change the world and human nature." Carl Joachim Friedrich writes that "a totalist ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police, and monopoly control of ... industrial mass society" are the three features of totalitarian regimes that distinguish them from other autocracies.

Greg Yudin, a professor of political philosophy at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences, argues "political passivity and civic disengagement" are "key features" of authoritarianism, while totalitarianism relies on "mass mobilization, terror, and homogeneity of beliefs".

Economic effects

In 2010, Dani Rodrik wrote that democracies outperform autocracies in terms of long-term economic growth, economic stability, adjustments to external economic shocks, human capital investment, and economic equality. A 2019 study by Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson found that democracy increases GDP per capita by about 20% over the long-term. According to Amartya Sen, no functioning liberal democracy has ever suffered a large-scale famine. Studies suggest that several health indicators (life expectancy and infant and maternal mortality) have a stronger and more significant association with democracy than they have with GDP per capita, size of the public sector, or income inequality. States that undergo democratic backsliding are more likely to face downgrades in their sovereign bond ratings.

One of the few areas that some scholars have theorized that autocracies may have an advantage in is industrialization. In the 20th century, Seymour Martin Lipset argued that low-income authoritarian regimes have certain technocratic "efficiency-enhancing advantages" over low-income democracies that give authoritarian regimes an advantage in economic development. By contrast, Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein (2005) argue that democracies "realize superior development performance" over authoritarianism, pointing out that poor democracies are more likely to have steadier economic growth and less likely to experience economic and humanitarian catastrophes (such as refugee crises) than authoritarian regimes; that civil liberties in democracies act as a curb on corruption and misuse of resources; and that democracies are more adaptable than authoritarian regimes.

Military effects

According to Allan C. Stam and Dan Reiter, liberal democracies have an advantage in battlefield performance over non-democracies and illiberal democracies. They argue that this democratic advantage is derived from the fact that democratic soldiers fight harder, democratic states tend to ally together in war, and democracies can employ more economic resources towards combat. Due to elevated fears against military coups against authoritarian regimes, authoritarian regimes may also put loyalists in the military. This may reduce military effectiveness, as loyalty is prioritized over experience when filling key positions within the military. However, critics argue that democracy itself makes little difference in war and that some other factors, such as overall power, determine whether a country would achieve victory or face defeat. In some cases, such as the Vietnam War, democracy may even have contributed to defeat. Jasen Castillo argues that autocratic states may in certain circumstances have an advantage over democracies; for example, authoritarian regimes may have ideologies that require unconditional loyalty, which may contribute to military cohesion.

Pre-World War II

Authoritarian rule before World War II includes short-lived dictatorships and has been claimed to be understudied.

Post-World War II anti-authoritarianism

Both World War II (ending in 1945) and the Cold War (ending in 1991) resulted in the replacement of authoritarian regimes by either democratic regimes or regimes that were less authoritarian.

World War II saw the defeat of the Axis powers by the Allied powers. All three Axis powers (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan) had totalitarian or authoritarian governments, and two of the three were replaced by governments based on democratic constitutions. The Allied powers were an alliance of Democratic states and (later) the Communist Soviet Union. In Western Europe, the initial post-war era embraced pluralism and freedom of expression in areas that had been under control of authoritarian regimes. The memory of fascism and Nazism was denigrated. The new Federal Republic of Germany banned its expression. In reaction to the centralism of the Nazi state, the new constitution of West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) exercised "separation of powers" and placed "law enforcement firmly in the hands" of the sixteen Länder or states of the republic, not with the federal German government, at least not at first.

Culturally there was also a strong sense of anti-authoritarianism based on anti-fascism in Western Europe. This was attributed to the active resistance from occupation and to fears arising from the development of superpowers. Anti-authoritarianism also became associated with countercultural and bohemian movements such as the Beat Generation in the 1950s, the hippies in the 1960s, and punks in the 1970s.

In South America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile, and Uruguay moved away from dictatorships to democracy between 1982 and 1990.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991, the other authoritarian/totalitarian "half" of the Allied Powers of World War II collapsed. This led not so much to revolt against authority in general, but to the belief that authoritarian states (and state control of economies) were outdated. The idea that "liberal democracy was the final form toward which all political striving was directed" became very popular in Western countries and was celebrated in Francis Fukuyama's book The End of History and the Last Man. According to Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., "all the new states that stumbled out of the ruins of the Soviet bloc, except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, seemed indeed to be moving towards democracy in the early 1990s," as were the countries of East Central Europe and the Balkans.

In December 2010, the Arab Spring arose in response to unrest over economic stagnation but also in opposition to oppressive authoritarian regimes, first in Tunisia and spreading to Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and elsewhere. Regimes were toppled in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and partially in Yemen, while other countries saw riots, civil wars, or insurgencies. Most Arab Spring revolutions failed to lead to enduring democratization. A decade after the Arab Spring, Tunisia stood as the sole, albeit fragile, democratic success story, while Egypt reverted to authoritarian military rule, and Libya, Syria, and Yemen descended into catastrophic civil wars.

21st century

Since 2005, observers noted what some have called a "democratic recession", although some, such as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, have disputed that there was a significant democratic decline before 2013. In 2018, the Freedom House declared that from 2006 to 2018, "113 countries" around the world showed "a net decline" in "political rights and civil liberties" while "only 62" experienced "a net improvement." Its 2020 report marked the fourteenth consecutive year of declining scores. By 2020, all countries marked as "not free" by Freedom House had also developed practices of transnational repression, aiming to police and control dissent beyond state borders.

Writing in 2018, American political journalist David Frum stated, "The hopeful world of the very late 20th century—the world of NAFTA and an expanding NATO; of the World Wide Web 1.0 and liberal interventionism; of the global spread of democracy under leaders such as Václav Havel and Nelson Mandelanow looks battered and delusive."

Michael Ignatieff wrote that Fukuyama's idea of liberalism vanquishing authoritarianism "now looks like a quaint artifact of a vanished unipolar moment," and Fukuyama himself expressed concern. By 2018, only one Arab Spring uprising (that was in Tunisia) resulted in a transition to constitutional democratic governance, and a "resurgence of authoritarianism and Islamic extremism" in the region was dubbed the Arab Winter.

Various explanations have been offered for the new spread of authoritarianism. They include the downside of globalization, the subsequent rise of populism and neo-nationalism, and the success of the Beijing Consensus, i.e., the authoritarian model of the People's Republic of China. In countries such as the United States, factors blamed for the growth of authoritarianism include the 2008 financial crisis and slower real wage growth as well as social media's elimination of so-called "gatekeepers" of knowledge—the equivalent of disintermediation in economics – so that a large fraction of the population considers to be opinion what were once "viewed as verifiable facts"—including everything from the danger of global warming to to preventing the spread of disease through vaccination—and considers to be fact what are actually only unproven fringe opinions.

In United States politics, white supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi skinheads, and adherents of the Christian Identity ideology have long operated as a loose network. In the internet age, far-right extremists throughout the U.S. and much of the West have consolidated further into a movement known as the Alt-Right, which has inspired numerous terrorist attacks while at the same time increasing the mainstream appeal of white supremacism. According to Azani et al.:

The current resurgence of far-right ideology may be explained by a variety of factors, primarily the strategic adjustment of white supremacists to soften overtly racist rhetoric in order to appeal to a wider audience. This new discourse attempts to normalize white supremacy, developing intellectual and theoretical foundations for racism based on the notion that the white race is at risk of eradication, threatened by the growing population of immigrants and people of colour. The pre-existing, offensive white supremacist, fascist, and neo-Nazi ideas that drove the white power movement of the twentieth century were thus rebranded through a new innocuous defensive frame of white victimhood. As such, the new strategy of racist rhetoric has allowed the movement to co-opt mainstream political debates surrounding immigration and globalization, drawing large audiences through a deliberate obfuscation of the underlying ideology.

Far-right extremism has played a key role in promoting the Great Replacement and White genocide conspiracy theories and an "acceleration" of racial conflict through violent means such as assassinations, murders, terrorist attacks, and societal collapse in order to achieve the building of a white ethnostate. While many contemporary extreme far-right groups eschew the hierarchical structure of other authoritarian political organisations, they often explicitly promote cultural authoritarianism alongside xenophobia, racism, antisemitism, homophobia and misogyny, as well as authoritarian government interventions against perceived societal problems.

Contemporary

There is no one consensus definition of authoritarianism, but several annual measurements are attempted. States characterized as authoritarian are typically not rated as democracies by The Economist Democracy Index or as 'free' by Freedom House's Freedom in the World index and do not reach a high score on V-Dem Democracy Indices.

United States

According to an April 2025 survey, known as Bright Line Watch, of more than 500 U.S.-based political scientists, the vast majority think the United States is moving from liberal democracy to a form of authoritarianism.

See also

• Absolute monarchy
• Authoritarian capitalism
• Authoritarian conservatism
• Authoritarian nationalism
• Authoritarian socialism
• Criticism of democracy
• Left-wing dictatorship
• List of current state leaders by date of assumption of office
• Managed democracy
• Militarism
• Religion and authoritarianism
• Right-wing dictatorship
• Techno-authoritarianism
• U.S. policy toward authoritarian governments

References

Citations

Bibliography

• Linz, Juan J. (1964). "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain". In Allard, Eric; Littunen, Yrjo. Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems. Helsinki: Academic Bookstore.