Jack Healy (health physicist)

Jack Healy (9 May 1920 – 1 December 2001) also known as John W. Healy was a pioneer in the field of health physics, founding member of the Health Physics Society and key scientist in the early radioactive material monitoring and testing programs at Hanford.

Life and Profession

John “Jack” W. Healy was born in Corry, Pennsylvania on May 9, 1920. He graduated as a Chemical Engineer from Pennsylvania State College (now Pennsylvania State University) in May 1942. After graduation Healy went to work for DuPont and then on to Hanford. He died in December 2001 in New Mexico. Within several weeks of his arrival at Hanford, Healy found himself in the Special Studies Group, responsible for creating new means of radiation measurement and environmental monitoring. He remained at Hanford when General Electric acquired the managing and operating contract in 1946. Later positions held by Healy include the following two:

• 1960 to 1968, Technological Hazards Consultant, General Electric, New York
• 1968 to 1985, Staff Member, radiation hazards work, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Health Physics Society

Healy was a key member in the formation of the Health Physics Society and represented the General Electric Co. in Hanford, Washington.

• Charter member
• Director, 1955-1957, 1971-1974
• Representative from General Electric Co. in Hanford, Washington
• Fellow

Awards and Honors

• William McAdams Outstanding Service Award, American Board of Health Physics, American Academy of Health Physics (inaugural awardee), 1989
• Herbert M. Parker Lecture
• Diplomat, American Board of Health Physics

Oral History

Early Career with DuPont (1942 – 1944)

In 1942 Healy went to work at the Pioneering Research Group, Rayon Division, DuPont Company in Buffalo, New York. In 1944, he started a job in radiation protection at Hanford, Washington. In October 1943 Healy went to Wilmington, Delaware and interviewed for a new job. Thigpen, head of the technical program, told him that the company would be producing material for an atomic bomb and described the process. Thigpen indicated there were new hazards involved with ionizing radiation and radioactive materials. The job would be in a group that specialized in protecting people from these hazards. The first assignment would be at a pilot plant near Knoxville, Tennessee, at Oak Ridge for training and then move to Hanford in the state of Washington for operations. Healy was told that this information was secret and to not tell anyone including family members. He discussed these job moves with his wife and decided to take on the task. On 1 February 1944, Healy went to Oak Ridge. Herbert Parker led a group of 12 in training. Morning lectures led by Dr Karl Z. Morgan were on the physics of radiation and radiation dosimetry. Afternoons were spent in the plant where radiation protection work was conducted.

Arrival at Hanford (1944)

About September/October 1944 Healy went to Hanford. His initial assignment along with Phil Lindvig was in environmental monitoring, also known as "site survey." Upon arrival, site personnel had discovered that the graphite used as a neutron moderator in the reactors was storing energy and this caused swelling. What was not known was how this energy could be released, or how fast it would be released. There was the possibility of a major explosion. Herbert Parker told management that a car would be available near the reactors to escape the site. Soon after arrival at Hanford Healy met with Dr. Phil Church, a meteorologist from the University of Washington. Dr. Church had been conducting smoke tests near the separation plants and measuring the amount of dilution in the atmosphere. The research established a method to control dissolving times to the periods when the atmosphere could best receive the gases that were released. Dr. Church wanted Healy to perform measurements to check on this methodology. Healy told Church that there were only two people available to perform the measurements and the available instruments were not adequate enough to make quantitative measurements of the cloud. Plus Healy mentioned that their primary job was to protect people. At Hanford, Dr. Church was a powerful person, and the following day he was working in the Special Studies group. There were two people in the group, Jane Hall (later, the Associate Director at Los Alamos) and Healy. Leona Marshall, from Technical Division, was an associate of Hall. This group was helpful to Healy the chemical engineer without a physics background. Healy’s first job with Jane Hall was to look for mesons in the B reactor. At the time little was known of the fission process. The B reactor had only been operating for a few months. The B reactor was rated at 100 – 200 megawatts, but had only reached one megawatt and fission product poisons limited the operation. Jane Hall wanted Healy to at least look for mesons. He carried almost four tons of lead to the third floor of the B reactor and set up a shielded coincidence counter. Healy went to the B reactor weekly to retrieve the data charts and analyze them. Mesons were never found and the experiment was shut down. Someone else had to carry that four tons of lead down from the third floor of B reactor. At DuPont the Technical Division analyzed all samples in the Chemistry Department. If you had any samples to be analyzed, you would submit them to Technical, and they would do the analyses. The only problem was: they were swamped, and radioactive decay waits for no man! No schedule! Samples were collected from the reactor water-cooling basins to determine the quantities and types of radioactive materials being released to the river. The radioisotopes of concern were manganese-56, with a 15 minute half-life; sodium-24, with a 14.8-hour half-life; and phosphorus-32, with a 14-day half-life. A delay of one month in getting a sample analyzed was cause for concern and serious. Healy set up a crude analytical technique. In the 700 Area he had a lab where the Site Survey Group would bring reactor samples. The samples would be evaporated on a watch glass and measured in a beta counter.

Early Environmental Monitoring Efforts (1946)

The then current method to identify radionuclides was to run a decay curve. Measurements were made at different times and the half-lives of the radionuclides could be estimated. From a table of known half-lives, the radioisotope could then be identified. This got to be quite a tedious chore, since there was only one person working on the analysis.

Sample Preparation

Healy constructed a gadget and developed a method to evaporate the sample directly on the watch glass. The gadget consisted of a rod, balanced on a fulcrum, with a basket that held a watch glass on one end and an adjustable weight on the other end. He put the watch glass in a holder and adjusted the weight so that when the watch glass was full, it would tilt down on to a hot plate. When the water evaporated, the watch glass would then lift off the hot plate. He then used a siphon to drip water on to the watch glass and overnight one liter of water would evaporate. The siphon was adjusted by grinding a valve in the delivery end so that the watch glass, when dry, would lift up and hit the valve to open it. Water would flow out and the watch glass would drop back onto the hot plate. He would have 20 watch glasses arranged around the room and noted the spectacle to see them bobbing up and down as the lights were turned off. This project resulted in the formation of their laboratory for water samples and environmental samples. The analysis of vegetation was difficult. Healy first attempted to separate the iodine from the vegetation, with little success. Not until 1950 or 1952 when Bob Thorburn and Lyle Schwendiman developed a method. Prior to this, the sample was packed and cut up on a watch glass, and then placed in a beta counter for measurement. The method was crude but reproducible.

Developing Calibration Standards

Healy measured releases of iodine in and around the separation plants. During WWII and the year or so thereafter, approximately 100,000 curies – 200,000 curies were released. One of his first responsibilities after acquiring decent facilities was the calibration of the measuring equipment. The group began with Radium D, which disintegrates to Radium E, Radium F, and so on, one of which is a beta emitter of 1.07 MeV. The alpha emission could be measured on an alpha counter, 52 percent geometry, due to backscatter. The measurement revealed the number of disintegrations per minute of the mixture at equilibrium. This rate was utilized to calibrate the beta counters, but only for the specific energy of the beta emitted. Lyle Schwendiman did this work and did such a great job that by 1949 – 1950 the correction factors for self-absorption, for the diameter of the sample, and for all other factors needed for all samples had been determined. At the time national standards were not available. The only way to express numbers in fundamental units was to calibrate their own counters. This proved to be a good process. After the National Bureau of Standards developed a Carbon-14 sample, Schwendiman obtained one for cross-checking. Carbon-14 emits a 156 KeV beta (very low energy). Measuring on micro window counters, with a window thicknesses of 3 – 5 mg per square centimeter, was very difficult. One day Healy was surprised to see a letter that Schwendiman had written to the National Bureau of Standards telling the NBS that their standard was in error. Two weeks later they received a letter back from the National Bureau of Standards acknowledging that Schwendiman was correct. The separations process was engineered to contain activity in solutions but the process was not always successful. There were always problems with release of gaseous products, and the releases from Hanford were really of two kinds: normal operating releases, and the more infamous intentional releases to measure the transport of radionuclides in wind currents.

24-Hour Urine Sampling Protocol

Jack Healy Remembers, Anecdotal Evidence for the Origin of the Simulated 24-Hour Urine Sampling Protocol Used for Worker Bioassay Monitoring.

Operation Green Run

Healy was only aware of one intentional release, and that was the [Green Run]]. The decision was made at the top. Who made the decision? He was not sure. Healy suspected it had to go through the Atomic Energy Commission, through General Electric Company, and probably through the Pentagon. His involvement was very simple: prepare the plans and work with Lieutenant W.E. Harlan.

More About the Green Run

Lieutenant Harlan and the DC-3 or C-47 showed up a few months before the Green Run was due to take place and made a number of tours over the area. The group set plans for the run, had the crews ready, and put on some special stack-monitoring equipment, including one for collecting iodine, which never worked. There was a sag in the line that would collect any condensate that formed and all the iodine was in the condensate. This was determined afterwards by analyzing the condensate. Due to inclement weather the run was postponed for several nights. After a reasonable weather forecast from meteorologist Don Jene the decision was made to proceed. Healy called the group and told them to start the dissolver. This was about ten o'clock at night.

Unexpected Change in the Weather Pattern

At first, everything went fine. The wind was blowing from the south to the north, an area that was relatively uninhabited. The inversion held well. That was one criteria for dissolving. But the problem was that about two o'clock in the morning, we got a dead calm, and then the wind reversed direction 180 degrees. Generally, the noble gases come out first and the iodine comes out a bit later. About two o'clock in the morning, we had the calm; and then the wind, instead of blowing to the north, began to blow down the river over Richland, Pasco, and Kennewick, Washington. Healy believed this was the reason for the high [iodine] levels that we got on the Green Run. He later calculated, using Sutton's equations, the concentrations in Richland, Kennewick, and Pasco. There were mostly within a factor of two of the ones that occurred. Nearly all were within a factor of ten, (a prediction accuracy) which he thought was really good. All the papers written were classified Red Label. Some reports are still classified by the Air Force. Air Force came in with their own monitoring program and their own people. Healy tried to get Lt. Harlan out of bed at two o'clock in the morning to get the plane out to see what was going on, but he said, "I'll wait until morning." There was one Air Force plane that took measurements. There were special pinball runs made by the weather balloons from all of the Air Force facilities in the Northwest, so there was good data on the winds. Healy did not have to report to Herb Parker the next day on the results every manager in the place was calling Herb Parker! Healy was not able to return to his office for two weeks in the 200 Area. The iodine had deposited on the ground. People would go outside and back in, step on the foot monitor, and set them off. That disrupted operations. Healy was very unpopular. Parker was not much more popular.

U.S. Air Force Involvement

Healy was concerned that if the material was left in the dissolver too long it would not be usable since the iodine would decay out. They had delayed it two days already. They had put in 16-day stuff, and it was still 18 days. Herb Parker said he would never do it again. Healy thought the concentration in that small area, because of the change in the wind and the deposition, was much higher than would reasonably have been expected. Healy had calculated that the test managed to contaminate an area about twice the size of the Windscale accident, with about one-fifth of the amount of iodine released. There had been an unfortunate shift in the weather pattern.

Monitoring Detects the Soviets' Entry into the Nuclear Age

About 1949, there was air sampling equipment powered by a portable generator on Rattlesnake Mountain. They collected some air samples that gave positive, radioactive results. Healy took the data home and analyzed it over the weekend and went into Herb Parker's office the next morning and said, "Herb, I thought you were supposed to be notified if there was a bomb blast." Parker said, "I am, by God!" Healy said, "Look!" and gave Parker the data that showed the decay curves for a typical atomic bomb blast. Healy had the data analyzed and pinpointed the time – approximately three or four hours from the date finally announced. This was the first Russian bomb. That night the US Air Force stopped by to investigate the findings. To determine the source of the radioactivity the decay curves were plotted and analyzed. The bomb had exploded that day The activity went down to about Time(-1.2). The data was extrapolated back to what was near zero time. The Air Force personnel descended that night and everything had disappeared because the Air Force team had confiscated the data and the samples. Bill Early, chief scientist (and a geologist) for the Air Force)] showed up later with his team to carry out their part of the Green Run. The Air Force had a C-47 airplane equipped with instruments and their job was to fly around and make noble gas measurements. For the Green Run Healy was told by Herb Parker to prepare for the operation. The schedule was set and a new method of sampling smoke stack gases on the Green Run was prepared. This had been done before with Radon and achieved good results. Noble gases have reasonable solubility in oils, so the gas was run through a sample of olive oil until saturated and then extracted and measured the gas. Herb Parker was a pedant when it came to keeping exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

Unknown Health Hazards from Fallout

At the time iodine was considered to be less of a hazard than other radionuclides. It was serious, but not as dangerous as some of the other radionuclides. Most thyroid cancers can be treated. The biggest problem, as it turned out in the long run, was that Parker and Healy did not see the milk-to-man pathway. Later Parker did begin to see the problem. At the time the iodine problem was not known. The iodine problem gained recognition at the time of the Windscale accident, which was about 1958. The British set up limits that Healy thought were inordinately small he saw the derivation of the iodine limits. The food chain concentration factors were important for radioiodine. The real problem was the pathway from the air to the ground. The fact that iodine deposited very heavily on the ground was known. This was known from experience. A.C. Chamberlain in England had performed experiments releasing iodine on a cricket pitch and found iodine deposited very heavily on the grasses. The only thing that went wrong, but was not known at the time, was that the dissolver had been loaded with 16-day cooling material. The goal was to go for twenty days. There would be 3,000 – 4,000 Curies of Iodine and 7,000 – 8,000 Curies of Krypton. Krypton was not a problem. The Krypton could be measured in the air, but never turned out to be a problem to people because Krypton did not deposit on the ground. The Krypton just blew away.

Chamberlain and Healy

During a trip to England to review the Windscale accident, Chamberlain greeted Healy like a long-lost brother, since everyone else had doubted Chamberlain‘s experiments, but the Hanford experience backed Chamberlain’s findings. From the grass, the iodine went to the cow and then to milk, which was then consumed by the most sensitive portion of the population: the infants and children.

Monitoring Livestock Exposure

Iodine turned out to be the main problem. There was a Biology Group at Hanford by that time that was feeding iodine to sheep. When the AEC was formed, the Biology Laboratory at Hanford went into operation, and one of the Biology Group’s focus was the study of iodine in sheep. The Biology Group had a sheep farm that administered iodine to determine the level of damage. One of Parker's big concerns was with free-ranging animals, not so much with the people being exposed, because the animals roaming around could get very high doses to their thyroids from eating the vegetation. The sheep farm was another distraction from realizing goal of determining the hazards of iodine-131 in man. The experiments were set up with the grazing animals at the 100F Area. The Biology Laboratory was set up in this area. Harry Kornberg was in charge of the Biology Lab. This area was set up at the 100F Area since there was an empty water-treatment plant there that had been adapted for the Biology Lab use. Also, Foster's fish lab was located at the 100F Area. Funding in the amounts of $1.5 million from the AEC for biology and $1.5 million for the physical sciences was granted to establish the facilities. For the physical sciences the decision was made to wait until facilities could be established in the 300 Area. About 1957 – 1958 Kornberg decided that space was needed to get the Biology Group established. Kornberg went with the 100F Area solution. The main concerns were the releases from processing. Parker's vision for setting up the laboratory was that the nuclear industry would have public safety and worker exposure problems in the future. Hanford had faced many of the problems. The goal was to look at these problems and come up with solutions.

Monitoring Salmon in the Columbia River

The fish experiments from Columbia River waters were concerned with the temperature in the river, and the temperature's effect on fish. Laraine Donaldson may have suggested that if a single salmon in the Columbia River was harmed, they would never hear the end of it. Salmon is a very important topic in the Pacific Northwest. The Fisheries Laboratory was established at the time construction on the Hanford plants was started, in order to record background and start experimentation. [...] Foster was a fishery student who had his Ph.D. from the University of Washington, and was in charge. Laraine Donaldson was the lead. The group started to look for radioactive materials in fish during the war. [...] Foster and Sim Cantrel brought fish to the lab and taught Healy how to dissect them, so he could measure the radioactivity in their organs. Healy started to measure the radioactivity in fish. Phosophorus-32 was detected in the fish. The Pacific Northwest is rather low in phosphates. The uptake in the fish depends upon the character of the stream. The fish studied had a significant phosphorus uptake.

Other Accidental Releases

The accidental ruthenium release at Hanford. It was in the '50s. The people in operations had a scrubber on the line to remove the ruthenium. They had oxidized it. Ruthenium becomes volatile when oxidized. Then they put a scrubber on to move it. Healy and others were working on a monitor for that stack. He thought it was the B Plant where a scrubber was used with a counter to measure the emissions. Healy did not like logarithmic charts (since the nonlinear scale is difficult for many people to understand), and he wanted the full range to be covered, from background to emergency situations. The recorder was set with a micro switch so that, when it hit the top of the chart, it would reduce the sensitivity by a factor of ten. The group was testing this and, unbeknownst to them, the operations people liked this instrument so much, that they ran a wire from it over to the control room. That night, the scrubber went dry. So what did the recorder do? It started about the middle of the chart; went up, back, steady, and returned right back to about the same place. The operations people assumed that a mishap in the equipment had occurred, and kept going. As a result, Hanford put out 260 curies of ruthenium. Fortunately, it was a nice, clear night. Weather conditions were neutral with a good wind of about 20 to 25 miles an hour, so it just left a streak of ruthenium right up the mountains to the north. The bad part of that occurred later. About a year later, we started getting particles, you may have heard of those hot particles, around the Hanford reservation. This was the paper where Parker published that you could lie out [...] in your yard for 24 hours a day and never get a burn. Healy was off on special studies at the time, but was called in to try to make sense out of what had gone on. Eventually, the particles were analyzed, and found they were ammonium nitrate and the active material was ruthenium-106, which is a long-lived isotope. They speculated that the material had deposited with the ammonium nitrate on the inner lining of the stack and then flaked off. They took care of this by washing down the stacks. Coincidence plays a big role in this. For example, when we started the K Reactor up, they had a test in which all 2,000 tubes had a little gadget put on to stop the flow. After the test was over-and this was presumably a pressure test on 2,000 tubes, they had a man go around and remove each of these stoppers and another man check that they were removed. Then they started up. They had a pressure sensor on each tube. Guess which tube the pressure sensor failed on? The one that still had the plug in it. So they burned out one tube in the reactor. Talk about coincidence! That one put a little bit [of radioisotopes] out, but not a lot. It was mostly noble gases [that were released in the ruthenium accident]. Did they burn out the sensor? No, they burned out the whole tube. Yes, but why did the sensor fail? I don't know why it could be. But it was a flow sensor, so I doubt it was [sensor failure that caused the tube to fail].What were these [other intentional] releases [of radioiodine at Hanford you mentioned earlier]? There were two intentional releases in the 1960s, not a whole lot of radioiodine. The researchers actually purposely put people in the pathway and then measured it and their exposure. There were some field experiments. Joe Soldat and possibly John Honestead was involved with some others. The idea was to determine human thyroid uptake from environmental releases, and so a couple of Hanford scientists stood out in the field and inhaled air for a half-hour or so. When they replaced Bob Thorburn from under the stack in the Green Run [in Washington State], you could read him with a Geiger counter from New Mexico.