Estavillo v. Sony Computer Entertainment America
Estavillo v. Sony Computer Entertainment America, 2009 WL 3072887 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2009) is a recent federal court case that has set a new, albeit highly controversial precedent involving online virtual worlds such as Second Life and World of Warcraft. In Estavillo v. SCEA, the Federal Court Judge Ronald M. Whyte of the Northern District of California ruled that if a company bans a gamer or their "online avatar" for their verbal conduct in a game or virtual world; it would not be violating the player's first amendment right to free speech. This case is the first of its kind in U.S. history to involve a federal question AbOUT real constitutional rights in a virtual world.
Facts
Erik Estavillo, who is also a UCLA student, was an avid Playstation 3 gamer who often played the video game Resistance: Fall of Man until he was completely banned from the PlayStation Network (PSN). This in essence, as Erik Estavillo's complaint states, has left his gaming console useless since he can no longer play any video games online. The ban was supposedly due to his verbal conduct while playing "Resistance". In his complaint, Estavillo cites three counts against SCEA. The first being that Sony violated his first amendment right to free speech in a public forum. The second was a count of theft against Sony in which Estavillo stated that he, or for that matter, any banned player can no longer access pre-paid money in their PSN Wallet once banned. The last count in the complaint accused Sony of having a laxed age verification system since children as young as 13 could simply bypass the game's Terms of Service (TOS) agreement with a simple click of a button; the issue being that the TOS states all players must be at least 18 years old to play.
Case history
Erik Estavillo filed his complaint on July 6th, 2009 in the Northern District Federal Court of California, being he was from San Jose and SCEA was from Foster City, CA. Along with the complaint, Estavillo filed "pain and suffering" evidence since the plaintiff suffers from a number of debilitating diseases which include Agoraphobia, Panic Disorder, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, Major Depression, and Crohn's Disease.
On Sept. 18, 2009, Estavillo represented himself "pro se" - meaning he went as his own lawyer. However, Sony hired lawyer Richard J. Mooney of San Francisco. They went before judge Ronald M. Whyte where Estavillo argued that banned players should at least be granted refunds for already downloaded material such as games and add-ons. Mooney argued that any such arguments that the plaintiff arises should be deemed 12(b)(6); which lawfully means that there is no way the court can grant relief for the plaintiff since the first amendment question in this particular case doesn't apply to private companies such as Sony, and therefore all other arguments should be dismissed. The Judge agreed with Sony, setting a controversial precedent in the process.
Estavillo is appealing the ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Federal decision
"Sony's PS3 online network isn't a company town or otherwise a state actor subject to First Amendment obligations. As a result, Judge Whyte of the Northern District of California dismissed pro se Estavillo's First Amendment challenge against Sony for kicking him off its network."
Judge Whyte’s analysis is fairly terse. He says:
Sony's Network is not similar to a company town. The Network does not serve a substantial portion of a municipality's functions, but rather serves solely as a forum for people to interact subject to specific contractual terms. Every regulation Sony applies in the Network is confined in scope only to those entertainment services that Sony provides. Although the Network does include "virtual spaces" such as virtual "homes" and a virtual "mall" that are used by a substantial number of users (Pl.'s Reply in Supp. of Opp'n. to Dismiss 1), these "spaces" serve solely to enrich the entertainment services on Sony's private network. In providing this electronic space that users can voluntarily choose to entertain themselves with, Sony is merely providing a robust commercial product, and is not "performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and [standing] in the shoes of the State." Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 519 (quoting Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568-69 (1972)).
Sony does not have a sufficient structural or functional nexus to the government. Plaintiff has not suggested that Sony is part of the state or federal government. The Network was not created to further government objectives. The government retains no permanent authority to appoint any directors of Sony or the Network, or any other private body associated with the Network. There is no indication that Sony has assumed functions traditionally reserved to the government, or that the government had any part in encouraging Sony to create the Network. Count one of the complaint does not state a plausible First Amendment claim for relief, and therefore must be dismissed. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1940.