Capture of Moyale (1940)
The Capture Of Moyale was fought in Kenya, near Moyale, in The Second World War, on July 1940. The operation was part of the East African campaign. The capture led Italian occupation that lasted for a few months. In early 1941, forces led by General William Platt re-occupied the town of Moyale.
Background
On the Italian declaration of war on 10 June 1940, East Africa Force (Lieutenant-General Douglas Dickinson) comprised two East African brigades of the King's African Rifles organised as a Northern Brigade and a Southern Brigade with a reconnaissance regiment, a light artillery battery and the 22nd Mountain Battery Royal Indian Artillery (RIA). By March 1940, the KAR strength had reached 883 officers, 1,374 non-commissioned officers and 20,026 African other ranks. Wavell ordered Dickinson to defend Kenya and to pin down as many Italian troops as possible. Dickinson planned to defend Mombasa with the 1st East African Infantry Brigade and to deny a crossing of the Tana River and the fresh water at Wajir with the 2nd East African Infantry Brigade.
Detachments were to be placed at Marsabit, Moyale and at Turkana near Lake Rudolf (now Lake Turkana), an arc long. The Italians were thought to have troops at Kismayo, Mogadishu, Dolo, Moyale and Yavello, which turned out to be colonial troops and bande, with two brigades at Jimma, ready to reinforce Moyale or attack Lake Rudolf and then invade Uganda. By the end of July, the 3rd East African Infantry Brigade and the 6th East African Infantry Brigade had been formed. A Coastal Division and a Northern Frontier District Division had been planned but then the 11th (African) Division and the 12th (African) Division were created instead.
On 1 June, the first South African unit arrived at the port of Mombasa in Kenya and by the end of July, the 1st South African Infantry Brigade Group had arrived. On 13 August, the 1st South African Division was formed and by the end of 1940, about 27,000 South Africans were in East Africa, in the 1st South African Division, the 11th (African) Division and the 12th (African) Division. Each South African brigade group consisted of three rifle battalions, an armoured car company and signal, engineer and medical units. By July, under the terms of a war contingency plan, the 2nd (West Africa) Infantry Brigade, from the Gold Coast (Ghana) and the 1st (West Africa) Infantry Brigade from Nigeria, were provided for service in Kenya by the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF). The 1st (West African) Brigade, the two KAR brigades and some South African units, formed the 11th (African) Division. The 12th (African) Division had a similar formation with the 2nd (West African) Brigade.
At dawn on 17 June, the Rhodesians supported a raid by the SDF on the Italian desert outpost of El Wak in Italian Somaliland about north-east of Wajir. The Rhodesians bombed and burnt down thatched mud huts and GeneRally harassed Italian troops. Since the main fighting at that time was against Italian advances towards Moyale in Kenya, the Rhodesians concentrated there.
Battle
Before the war began, there were around two to three hundred Banda troops in the Italian garrison of Moyale. Once initial clashes had occurred, the troops of the Italian garrison in Moyale were slow to get their act together and take any initiative. They had very little in the way of intelligence about reinforcements until late June when it was confirmed that there would be significant reinforcements consisting of approximately three Colonial battalions, four Banda groups and a brigade that had been transported with pack artillery. The terrain was unsuitable for making any assault against Italian held Moyale as a large force would have to be supported on an escarpment (5,000 feet) to attack the Italians. Brigadier Fowkes realised that if he had to undertake this operation, it would commit almost his entire command, so he hesitated. However, he did request permission to deploy the 1st Battalion of the King's African Rifles to Buna and Fennanyatta to reinforce the one company at Moyale fort. General Dickinson's decision was based on an understanding of the need to relieve the expected Italian pressure on French forces at Jibouti and that the logistical limitations excluded moving toward Kismayu so he directed that Moyale be the objective.
It was the enemy, however, who attacked first. 'A' Company, 1 K.A.R. commanded by Captain F. C. Drummond (Leic. R.), had relieved 'B' Company at Moyale on 23rd June. Reports from an African ex-sergeant of the K.A.R. who was living in Italian territory informed Drummond three days later that some 2,000 Eritreans and more than 20 light tanks and A.F.Vs. had joined the Italian garrison, and that about 1,000 more troops were expected. The British fort was bombarded for an hour by shell-fire and small arms; before dawn on the 28th. On the 30th, when scouts accompanied by Italian regulars arrived on the tracks leading from Moyale, they could see Italian regular combat troops moving from an assembly point (to the north-east) towards the British positions at Moyale. The serious attack on Moyale proper began at 4:30 a.m. on 1st July and was preceded by about 70 mortar shells impacting on the fort. After the mortar bombardment, an infantry assault of approximately 1000 men took place. Company "A" repulsed the attackers and by 8:15 a.m. most of the attackers had withdrew.
At 10:30 a.m. the Italian infantry moved again, gradually working through the bush and maize crop beneath mortar bombardment cover. Many dissolved at 200 yds from the British wire. From 8:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m., the Trinidad infantry were continuously bombarded with artillery, mortar and small arms fire. During this time approximately 350 mortar shells exploded around the fort but very few resulted in serious damage to the structure.
After receiving the information that the attack had occurred on Moyale airport, the Battalion dispatched “C” Company from Buna and was able to secure Moyale airport by 7:00 a.m. on July 2; the rest of the battalion, led by Major Macnab, followed with one section of the 22 Mountain Battery and a portion of “A” Company (1/3 K.A.R.). Major Macnab entered Moyale to confer with Drummond, while the two companies were placed in position at the escarpment and were fired upon by artillery from both sides. Following the exchange of shells, there was a lull in fighting for several days. Major Macnab’s relief force withdrew to Fannanyatta; the Canadian engineers set up water-tanks and pumps there. Patrols from Moyale located hundreds of empty cartridges and grenade caps outside the fence. Within the fort, the troops built trenches to improve their defences; while they were there, they found time to empty out the duck pond close to the D.C.'s house so they could take a bath.
Brigadier Fowkes and Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Thornhill (R. Berks R.), the new CO, visited 1 K.A.R. on 8 July at Fannanyatta. On that day, there were thirty shells that fell on Moyale and destroyed one rifle and one gas mask. The boma, except for the eastern side, was surrounded on the outside by section posts, and had a long communication trench leading from its front to two pillboxes situated on an area of land approximately one hundred yards below the dukas.
On the evening of 9 July, 'D' Company, under Captain Henderson, moved into the fort from where 'A' Company had been billeted for the night at the base of the escarpment. However, they were not to return home to Fannanyatta without further fighting. At 5.40 a.m. on 10 July, Moyale received a heavy concentration from the enemy's artillery and levelled about 7 palaces by gunfire poured forth from these gun pits against Moyale, as well as firing rifles and automatic weapons. When 'A' Company made the ascent up the east-facing escarpment to occupy the well area, they went into a hail of fire and could not take cover until they got to their objective. Captain Drummond was wounded in the head and died shortly after.
At the same time, "B" Company had been sent up to assist, and the whole battalion had moved to the Mandera road junction. During the day, approximately 1,000 shells landed in British Moyale. The enemy fire was much more accurate this time; the defences were seriously damaged, and one Bren gun was knocked out. Four askaris were killed and seven wounded. The area around Italian Moyale was once again being occupied by enemy troops who could be seen gathering in the bush to the west, the former Banda camp in the bush around the north, and Harbour. Artillery cover provided the opportunity to begin putting into position, over the next few days, the troops with the aim of occupying positions much closer to the British fort than they previously occupied.
Lieutenant Colonel C. F. Blackden (S.W.B.) commanded the 7.30 a.m. 11th of July 1/6 K.A.R. battalion headquarters and "A" Company at 1.K.A.R. bivouacked at base of the Moyale escarpment. The first objective was to send a reconnaissance patrol into the escarpment of the high ground to the south east of Moyale to determine if the enemy were occupying it. This reconnaissance patrol consisted of "A", and "B" Companies of the 1 K.A.R. and the "A" Company mortar platoon and a section of the reconnaissance squadron of the 1/6 K.A.R.
The first ridge, approximately 2000 yards south of Moyale, was empty when observed. At 1230 hours, Capt Blackie led the 'B' Company (1 K.A.R.) with support fire to record the second position at 'Lone Tree' ridge, where Italian forces were located on the summits. Due to the strong volumes of small-arms fire and artillery, Capt Blackie's attempt to continue advancing was terminated; therefore, the company withdrew by nightfall with minimal casualties to the 1st ridge. Conditions remained quiet on 12 July; however, there was only enough food and water for the garrison of the fort (who had been cut off from their water supply) for six days. The ability to complete repairs was hindered by continued enemy fire; the medical facilities at the fort were at maximum capacity for patients; movements of troops around the escarpment were visible, making the fort appear on the verge of encirclement; and additional reinforcement by the Italians was confirmed by vehicle headlights overnight. Due to these circumstances awaiting, an inevitable evacuation was forthcoming. The 5th K.A.R. moved to Fannanyatta on 13 July to provide cover for the withdrawal; however, communication failed to reach the fort for a successful recovery attempt before nightfall. On the evening of 14 or 15 July, contact was restored and a coordinated evacuation plan was executed. Covering positions were established along all principal routes in preparation for the garrison evacuation, with a coordinated protection plan in place.
Spurred by the possibility that the British had been detected withdrawing from Moyale Fort, a small group of volunteers led by Captain G. G. Robson set out from Dobel at 8 pm to attack the Italian forces at Lone Tree Ridge, moving stealthily with the use of rubber-soled footwear and with the askaris marching barefoot. The patrol passed between enemy outposts, descended the escarpment, and managed to escape without detection after destroying their entire amount of usable equipment. Overall, since the start of the fight, the British had suffered a loss of ten men killed, around thirty-five wounded, and nine missing. Three severely wounded soldiers were left behind at Moyale; one of those men was subsequently recovered and reported that another askari had escaped and was hiding nearby, but all subsequent search attempts were halted by heavy enemy resistance. After the British had repulsed the Italians, they fell back to defensive positions around Dobel. Even though the Italian forces had a great numerical superiority to the British forces, they did not aggressively pursue their victory over the British. As a result, with the Italians displaying little initiative, the British were able to reorganize. A review conducted by Archibald Wavell concluded that there would be no offensive operations taking place in East Africa and all planning efforts would be turned over to preparing for other theatres of war. Regional forces would therefore be re-organized and increased by re-establishing battalions and creating new brigades and divisions. Additionally, existing units would have regrouped and re-equipped in a defensive position to the south. Moyale remained under Italian occupation untill it was recaptured in early 1941.
Aftermath
In late 1940, Italian forces suffered defeats in the Mediterranean Campaign, Operation Compass in the Western Desert, the Battle of Britain and in the Greco-Italian War. General Ugo Cavallero, the new Italian Chief of the Chief of the General Staff, thought that the Italians should abandon offensive actions against Sudan and the Suez Canal and concentrate on the defence of the AOI. After Cavallero and Aosta requested permission to withdraw from the Sudanese frontier, the Italian forces in East Africa withdrew to better defensive positions.
Frusci was ordered to retire from Kassala and Metemma in the lowlands along the Eritrea–Sudan border and hold the mountain passes on the Kassala–Agordat and Metemma–Gondar roads. Frusci chose not to withdraw from the lowlands, because withdrawal would involve too great a loss of prestige and because Kassala was an important railway junction; holding it prevented the British from using the railway to carry supplies from Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast to their base at Gedaref. Information on the Italian withdrawal plan was quickly decrypted by the British and Platt begin his offensive into Eritrea on 18 January 1941, three weeks early.
See also
- East African campaign (World War II)
- Battle of Kassala (1940)
- Capture of Gallabat (1940)