Battle of Se La Pass
The Battle of Se La Pass and Bomdi La, commonly known as the Battle of Se La Pass, was a battle fought between the People's Liberation Army and the Indian Army in the Se La Pass to Bomdi La region of Tibet during the Sino-Indian War in November 1962.
Background
India declares a state of emergency and requests foreign aid
Following the Battle of Kejie Lang, the government of the People's Republic of China issued a statement on October 24th, proposing three suggestions for a peaceful resolution to the border issue. On the same day, Premier Zhou Enlai sent a letter to Indian Prime Minister Nehru, hoping that the Indian government would respond positively to the three suggestions from the Chinese government for a peaceful resolution to the Sino-Indian border dispute. Simultaneously with the issuance of these three suggestions, the Central Military Commission issued a strict order to the Chinese border troops after capturing Tawang, Dongxinqiao, and Walong (Walong was only approached but not attacked) on the eastern front, they should temporarily refrain from further attacks as a gesture of goodwill.
On the Indian side, the Nehru government did not choose to negotiate, but instead declared a state of emergency unless China retreated to the north of the McMahon Line. On November 9, he met with the US ambassador to India in an attempt to seek US support. At India's request, the US dispatched an aircraft carrier from its Pacific Fleet to the Indian Ocean and sent a squadron of US-made C-130 transport aircraft to India. The first batch of arms that Britain "gifted" to India, namely rifles and ammunition, had been airlifted to New Delhi in two batches before November 5. Canadian Prime Minister John Diffinback announced on November 5 that Canada would provide India with six Royal Canadian Air Force Dakota transport aircraft, which would take off for India on the 6th. A spokesperson for the Canadian Ministry of National Defence announced on the 5th that Canada would provide India with artillery, rocket launchers, ammunition, radio equipment, and Otter and Caribou transport aircraft.
India's measures
Starting from October 29, Indian troops stationed in the Chushul and Dingruze areas of the western section of the Sino-Indian border shelled Chinese border troops, firing more than 170 shells by November 3. From October 30 to November 5, Indian troops stationed south of Tawang shelled Chinese border troops with heavy artillery, firing more than 600 shells. At around 8 p.m. on November 5, an Indian aircraft intruded into the Changdu and Jiangda areas in the eastern hinterland of Tibet, China, to conduct reconnaissance and provocation.
At around 2:00 a.m. on November 6, Indian troops stationed in the Walong area launched an attack on Chinese border troops but were repelled. On the same day, an Indian aircraft flew into the airspace over Milin County, Tibet, and carried out reconnaissance activities along the Yarlung Tsangpo River. These actions have strengthened the People's Republic of China's resolve to further strike at India.
Operation deployment
Battlefield terrain
The Xishankou-Bangdila area is located on the south side of the Himalayas and is a typical high mountain valley and dense forest area. The terrain is high in the northwest and low in the southeast. The watershed of the Cuoshankou, Jiashankou, Xishankou and its line forms two slopes. From Dongxinqiao to Shuo on the south bank of the Tawang River, there are many cliffs on the riverbank that cannot be climbed. West of Xishankou, although there are some cliffs, most of the mountains are passable. The terrain is undulating and steep. The forests are dense and the shrubs are thick. There are limited roads. There is only one highway between Xishankou and Bangdila, which restricts the movement and deployment of troops. There are only 5 small roads for troops to maneuver and penetrate. The mountains are cold and have snow. The valleys are mild and have a large temperature difference between day and night. The Monpa people live scattered in the war zone and there are local epidemics, but the Chinese People's Liberation Army believes that these do not affect the operation of the troops.
Both sides' operational intentions and deployments
On October 29, in accordance with the instructions of the Central Military Commission regarding this operation, the Tibet Military Region Forward Command submitted the "Counterattack Plan for Xishankou, Derangzong, and Bomdila." The key points were: to employ a shallow, deep encirclement tactic, cutting off the Indian forces between Derangzong and Shenggezong; first, to concentrate superior forces to eliminate five battalions of Indian troops at Xishankou and Shenggezong; then, to besiege the Indian forces at Derangzong; after success, to advance towards Bomdila and capture it. On October 30, the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army approved this operational plan. Indian troops are attempting to prevent Chinese border troops from advancing further south and are looking for an opportunity to launch a counterattack in the Tawang and Kejie Lang areas.
Battle
Attack on Derangzong
On November 17th, the 11th Division reached Dongrize and immediately ordered the 7th Company of the 32nd Regiment to depart from the southeast side of the area at 5 PM, advancing towards Sang via Pudong to coordinate with the main force of the regiment's advance towards Derang Dzong. The main force of the 32nd Regiment (minus the 3rd Battalion, commanding the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment) bypassed the main force, crossed the Lahong Bridge, and then advanced towards Derang Dzong along the road. At 8 AM on the 18th, the vanguard 2nd Battalion made contact with an Indian road-building company east of Baru, annihilating a portion of them, with the remainder scattering. At 9 AM, upon reaching Baru, they encountered over 100 Indian troops again. The regiment launched an attack, and the Indian troops scattered and fled. The main force of the 2nd Battalion then engaged and annihilated them. At this time, the 5th Company's vanguard platoon (7 men) advanced towards Derang Dzong along the road. At 11:50 AM, the platoon encountered four Indian tanks and over 100 vehicles fleeing eastward from the east side of Drang. (The Indian forces consisted of the 4th Division's tactical command and service units, as well as the 4th Company of the 1st Battalion, Madras, 48th Brigade). The platoon immediately engaged in combat. Due to the slow regrouping of the main battalion and company forces after the Battle of Baru, they failed to catch up, resulting in a two-hour standoff between the platoon and the Indian troops. Subsequently, when approximately one platoon from the 5th Company, four platoons from the 4th Company, and two platoons from the 6th Company arrived, the 4th Company of the 1st Battalion, Madras, 48th Brigade had already occupied the high ground southwest of the road. Taking advantage of the regiment's failure to cut off the road leading to Dalong, they covered the 4th Division's tactical command's escape towards Dalong. By 5:00 PM, the Indian troops had all fled. The 2nd Battalion occupied New Drang at 8:30 PM. After the 32nd Regiment occupied New Drang, it failed to organize a timely pursuit, allowing the Indian 4th Division's tactical command to escape.
Clash at Bondila
After cutting off the road to Lahun, the 33rd Regiment of the 11th Division immediately constructed fortifications to form a frontal defense, ready to repel any Indian reinforcements. On the 18th, the regiment conducted a site reconnaissance. Given the unfavorable terrain and the absence of any Indian reinforcements, the 3rd Battalion was ordered to lead the 7th and 8th Companies, along with the machine gun and artillery company, to advance along the path south of the road towards Bomdila Hill at 13:00 on the 18th, seeking favorable terrain to improve their defensive position. At 14:40, they reached the north side of Bomdila's main peak and engaged the 1st Sikh Light Infantry Battalion of the 48th Brigade of the Indian Army defending the peak. The Indian troops attempted to resist stubbornly, relying on their established positions and higher ground. After three and a half hours of fierce fighting, the 3rd Battalion captured the Indian positions, and the Indian troops defending the right flank of the main peak fled without a fight. The high ground on both sides of Bomdila's main peak came under the control of the 3rd Battalion. This created extremely favorable conditions for the subsequent capture of Bomdila town and further expansion of the gains.
After the Indian Army's 1st Sikh Battalion lost its main peak position, its entire defensive system fell into disarray. As the 7th and 8th Companies of the 33rd Regiment expanded their gains eastward from the main peak, some Indian troops in bunkers had already retreated, some were in a rout, and some were still putting up a stubborn resistance, while Indian artillery within Bomdila town continued to fire. Under these circumstances, to consolidate the victory, further expand the gains, and strengthen its assault capabilities, the 3rd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment ordered the 9th Company to occupy the Bomdila main peak position to support the 7th and 8th Companies. At 17:50 on the 18th, the 9th Company captured the main peak position, and the 7th and 8th Companies captured the ridge east of the main peak, causing the defending troops on the mountain to flee south. By 18:00 on the 18th, the battle was essentially over. The battalion was ordered to reorganize, temporarily switching to a defensive posture, and actively reconnoiter the movements of Indian troops within Bomdila town. In the operation to capture the main peak of Bomdila, a total of 105 Indian troops were killed, and 2 tanks, 17 artillery pieces, 9 machine guns, 69 rifles, and a set of military supplies were captured. The 3rd Battalion suffered 15 dead, including the deputy political commander, and 39 wounded, including the political commander.
China's victory
Night Attack on Chaku
On November 19, the 6th Battalion of the 8th Gurkha Regiment of the 67th Brigade of the Indian Army advanced to Xinchuan to reinforce Bomdila. When they learned that the 3rd Battalion of Jammu and Kashmir, which was advancing ahead of them, had been annihilated by Chinese border troops at Denggaweili (10 kilometers west of Xinchuan), they turned back and fled south along the road. That night, they camped at Chaku, preparing to continue their southward escape the next day. The Indian Army mistakenly judged that the Chinese troops could only pursue along the road and would not reach Chaku until around 12:00 on the 20th at the earliest (according to prisoners of war). Therefore, they only built some simple fortifications and deployed their main weapons (30 machine guns, 6 81mm mortars, 3 87.6mm howitzers, etc.) on the high ground northeast of Chaku and in the vicinity, with all firepower directed towards the Eagle's Nest Pass, while the vigilance towards the Bili Pass was very negligent.
The battle ended at 7:00 AM, lasting 1 hour and 50 minutes. A total of 221 Indian troops were eliminated (157 killed and 64 captured), 1 tank and 7 vehicles destroyed, and 1 tank, 76 vehicles, 14 artillery pieces, 35 machine guns, 193 rifles, and other military supplies captured. The 2nd Battalion of the 33rd Regiment suffered 1 wounded officer (platoon leader) and 14 wounded soldiers, and 3 killed officers (1 company commander and 2 platoon leaders) and 9 wounded soldiers, totaling 27 casualties. The casualty ratio was 8:1. After the battle, the battalion was ordered to cease pursuit and annihilate the remaining Indian troops. Chaku was the furthest point reached by the Chinese border troops in their counterattack operation, only about 20 kilometers from the traditional Sino-Indian border at Mount Volta. From here, the Indian plains could be clearly seen.
Pursue the Longzong
After reaching Derangzong on November 20, the 154th Regiment, following instructions from the Tibet Military Region forward command, quickly replenished its supplies and ammunition and continued its mortar assault towards Dalongzong. Its vanguard unit, the 3rd Battalion (the 7th and 8th Companies and the machine gun company), departed Derangzong at 16:30 that day, engaging in seven battles en route, annihilating a portion of the Indian army, and capturing the Jimo Pass at 20:00 on the 21st. The regimental command, leading the 1st and 2nd Battalions, arrived in the Dalongzong and Pudong areas on the 21st and 22nd respectively, pursuing and annihilating a portion of the fleeing Indian troops.
Casualties
In this battle, the Chinese People's Liberation Army recovered a large area of Chinese territory south of the McMahon Line which was returned after the ceasefire, annihilated the Indian Army's 62nd Brigade and 4th Artillery Brigade, and severely damaged the Indian Army's 48th, 65th, and 67th Brigades. A total of 5,063 Indian soldiers were killed or captured (including 2,886 killed and wounded, and 2,177 captured). The PLA captured 3,840 rifles, 187 artillery pieces, 7 grenade launchers, 61 rocket launchers, 416 vehicles, 9 tanks, and other weapons, ammunition, and supplies. The Chinese border troops suffered 225 killed (27 officers and 198 soldiers) and 477 wounded (46 officers and 431 soldiers).