Communication is a course of study of how human beings interact with one another. Humans interact with one another through verbal communication (speech) and/or nonverbal communication (not spoken) to meet basic requirements for establishing a variety of relationships (Guerrero, Anderson, Walid, 2007). A NONVERBAL-VERBAL is a term associated with the discipline of Communication that deals with situations that have instances of subliminal messages in which require a higher level of consciousness to be able to interpret the meaning of a mesage (Bullock,2004). This can also be described as having to "read in between the lines" to find the meaning behind a message or action.
An example of a NONVERBAL-VERBAL would be a commercial before a showing of a movie at a movie theater. There is a box of popcorn dancing with a cup of soda having a great time. At first glance, it is just two characters with humanistic characteristics dancing about having a great time. Instead of using an advertisement to have people purchase their concessions before the movie starts, they use characters representing concession delights with human qualities to connect with the audience at a subconscious level. We are not consciously aware at first that our urge to get those goodies are actually triggered by a thought that is placed into our minds with out even knowing it (Bullock,2004).
This literary term was created using two separate communication terms, verbal (expression through spoken language) and [ (not using speech) communication. The reason for creating this term was to be able to give a name to a situation where the communication is both verbal and nonverbal. In studying lanuage and culture, and through personal observation, words in many cultures, are created by combining other words to form new words and new meanings.
An example of a NONVERBAL-VERBAL would be a commercial before a showing of a movie at a movie theater. There is a box of popcorn dancing with a cup of soda having a great time. At first glance, it is just two characters with humanistic characteristics dancing about having a great time. Instead of using an advertisement to have people purchase their concessions before the movie starts, they use characters representing concession delights with human qualities to connect with the audience at a subconscious level. We are not consciously aware at first that our urge to get those goodies are actually triggered by a thought that is placed into our minds with out even knowing it (Bullock,2004).
This literary term was created using two separate communication terms, verbal (expression through spoken language) and [ (not using speech) communication. The reason for creating this term was to be able to give a name to a situation where the communication is both verbal and nonverbal. In studying lanuage and culture, and through personal observation, words in many cultures, are created by combining other words to form new words and new meanings.
Queer Justice League is a grassroots activist group dedicated to fighting homophobia and gender oppression. It was founded in New York City in 2007.
Queer Justice League grew out of a speech given by Larry Kramer on March 13, 2007 at the New York City LGBT Community Center. While speaking about the twentieth anniversary of ACT UP, Kramer called for a "gay army" of activists to respond to ongoing physical and institutional attacks on LGBT Americans. In the following weeks, individuals interested in enlisting in this army began organizing at the Community Center.
In its first few months of existence, Queer Justice League has conducted public actions in response to the homophobic remarks of General Peter Pace, to New York City Police Department harassment of queer and transgender youth at the Christopher Street Piers, to the cancellation of the Pridefest street fair during LGBT Pride weekend, to the illegal ejection of a butch lesbian from the Caliente Cab Company restaurant in the West Village, and to violently homophobic lyrics in reggae and dancehall music.
Queer Justice League holds its regular meetings in New York City, but also maintains a worldwide email list and MySpace page.
Queer Justice League grew out of a speech given by Larry Kramer on March 13, 2007 at the New York City LGBT Community Center. While speaking about the twentieth anniversary of ACT UP, Kramer called for a "gay army" of activists to respond to ongoing physical and institutional attacks on LGBT Americans. In the following weeks, individuals interested in enlisting in this army began organizing at the Community Center.
In its first few months of existence, Queer Justice League has conducted public actions in response to the homophobic remarks of General Peter Pace, to New York City Police Department harassment of queer and transgender youth at the Christopher Street Piers, to the cancellation of the Pridefest street fair during LGBT Pride weekend, to the illegal ejection of a butch lesbian from the Caliente Cab Company restaurant in the West Village, and to violently homophobic lyrics in reggae and dancehall music.
Queer Justice League holds its regular meetings in New York City, but also maintains a worldwide email list and MySpace page.
Keep on the Sunny Side: A Tribute to the Carter Family is a compilation album of cover versions of The Carter Family songs. It was released in 1993 on Amoeba Records.
Track listings
* 1. Bob Forrest And The Melrose Hillbillies - "Last Move For Me"
* 2. Shrimpboat -"Hello Stranger"/"You Are My Flower"
* 3. The Lonesome Whippoorwills - "Keep On The Sunny Side"/"Wildwood Flower"
* 4. Blood - "I've Been Gathering Flowers On The Hillside"
* 5. Pleasure Box - "Single Girl, Married Girl"
* 6. The O'Bannons - "Lu Lu Walls"
* 7. Freakwater - "Broken Hearted Lover"/"No Phone In Heaven"/"Lover's Return"
* 8. Glen Meadmore - "There's No One Like Mother To Me"/ "My Honey Lou"
* 9. Les Bohem - "My Heavenly Home Is Bright And Fair"
*10. Rick + Janet - "Lonesome For You"
*11. Fifth Column -"Chewing Gum"
Track listings
* 1. Bob Forrest And The Melrose Hillbillies - "Last Move For Me"
* 2. Shrimpboat -"Hello Stranger"/"You Are My Flower"
* 3. The Lonesome Whippoorwills - "Keep On The Sunny Side"/"Wildwood Flower"
* 4. Blood - "I've Been Gathering Flowers On The Hillside"
* 5. Pleasure Box - "Single Girl, Married Girl"
* 6. The O'Bannons - "Lu Lu Walls"
* 7. Freakwater - "Broken Hearted Lover"/"No Phone In Heaven"/"Lover's Return"
* 8. Glen Meadmore - "There's No One Like Mother To Me"/ "My Honey Lou"
* 9. Les Bohem - "My Heavenly Home Is Bright And Fair"
*10. Rick + Janet - "Lonesome For You"
*11. Fifth Column -"Chewing Gum"
Majority-choice approval (MCA) is a voting system devised by Forest Simmons in April 2002 for use with three-slot ballots. That is, the voter has three possible choices for rating each candidate: ‘favored’, ‘accepted’, or ‘disapproved’. A rating of either ‘favored’ or ‘accepted’ signifies approval of the candidate.
If at least one candidate is marked ‘favored’ by more than 50% of the voters, then the candidate marked ‘favored’ on the most ballots is elected. Otherwise, the winner is the candidate with the highest approval (i.e., the sum of ‘favored’ and ‘accepted’ marks). Ties can be broken based on the number of ‘favored’ marks.
Thus, MCA is equivalent to Bucklin voting with the voter only able to classify in two slots, but able to vote any number of candidates in those slots.
Under an optional rule, when no candidate receives approval from a majority of the voters, all candidates are considered to be rejected by the voters. (See also None of the Above.)
Another commonly suggested election method using three-slot ballots is to assign a number of points for each rating, and to elect the candidate with the greatest number of points. This results in the three-slot version of range voting, and would possess the particular properties of that method.
Voters may mark any candidate independently of other candidates: there is no limit on the number of candidates that may be marked into any one of the three categories. This independence of marking choice avoids the problem of overvoting. Such independence is lacking in forced-ranking methods such IRV and Borda count, and in some other constrained methods such as usual plurality voting.
The name "Majority-Choice Approval" was suggested by Joe Weinstein.
Commentary
Majority-choice approval satisfies the monotonicity criterion and the independence of clones criterion. It would satisfy the majority criterion were it not for the fact that voters are allowed to mark more than one candidate as Favored.
Plurality voting turns distinct but legitimate voter objectives into mutual spoilers: voters cannot both effectively support more than one favored, or support both a favored and an acceptable compromise candidate.
The three levels in MCA is just enough for Favored, Compromise, and Disapproved, the minimum required for solving the spoiler problem without erasing the distinction between Favored and Compromise. This turns out to be an important distinction and is the main reason most IRV supporters believe that IRV solves the spoiler problem better than approval does.
Majority-Choice Approval not only truly solves the spoilage problem in a way that incorporates the three-level distinction, but it also solves the quite different ‘majority-rule’ problem in a way that IRV cannot - you can't determine if the winner of an IRV vote won because of spoilage, genuine majority approval or one of many other procedural paradoxes that flaws IRV.
Example
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This shows that Nashville wins, and that everyone would accept Chattanooga as an alternative. (The majority of voters did not disapprove of Chattanooga.)
The results would be as follows: (Assume the voters favor the first city, accept the next 2 cities, and reject the last city.)
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No city is favored by a majority, so the city with most approval votes (favored + accepted) wins. Nashville and Chattanooga are tied at 100% approval since nobody voted against either. However, Nashville has more favored votes than the other, so it wins. The higher number of favored votes is what breaks the tie.
Drawbacks
In its procedure for deciding a winner, in general, fails the Consistency criterion. It works one way under one condition and another way under another condition. As for almost all such hybrids, the method is inconsistent, in the sense that a candidate A may win all precincts but not the entire electorate. Here this inconsistency can occur if A wins some precincts on account of being majority favorite; but wins other precincts, which lack majority favorites, on account of being most approved.
For instance, consider an electorate of two five-voter precincts, and a contest among five candidates A-E. Each marked ballot favors exactly one candidate X and accepts exactly one other candidate Y - symbolized below by
the format XY.
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A wins precinct #1 as the majority choice and precinct #2 as the most approved; but B wins the entire electorate as the most approved.
For Majority-Choice Approval (unlike some other methods) such inconsistency is easy to accept. The reason is simple: we prefer a majority favorite, which we may in fact happen to get in some precincts but do not necessarily expect to get overall.
MCA is not a Condorcet method, thus does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion.
MCA does not satisfy the Independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion.
MCA also shares a potential drawback with Approval voting: Voters may disapprove of all other candidates except their favorites. If a large majority of electors vote exclusively for their different favorites, the outcome of an election using MCA would resemble Plurality voting. There is, however, less incentive for voters to not vote for additional candidates under MCA than under Approval voting, as candidates rated 'favored' have an opportunity to win before being counted equivalently to those candidates rated 'accepted.'
Participation criterion failure example
The Participation criterion requires that a voter must not be able to obtain a preferable result from the election by not voting.
MCA does not satisfy this criterion. Example:
Assume that there are 100 voters and 3 candidates: A, B, and C.
51 A(favored), C(accepted), B(disapproved)
49 C(favored), B(accepted), A(disapproved)
Candidate A is elected, as A was 'favored' by more than half of the voters.
Now, suppose that three more voters are added:
51 A(favored), C(accepted), B(disapproved)
49 C(favored), B(accepted), A(disapproved)
3 B(favored), A(accepted), C(disapproved)
Now no candidate is 'favored' by more than half of the voters. Candidate C wins due to having the highest approval.
This is a failure of the Participation criterion, because by showing up to vote, the three additional voters caused their least favorite candidate to be elected.
External resources
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If at least one candidate is marked ‘favored’ by more than 50% of the voters, then the candidate marked ‘favored’ on the most ballots is elected. Otherwise, the winner is the candidate with the highest approval (i.e., the sum of ‘favored’ and ‘accepted’ marks). Ties can be broken based on the number of ‘favored’ marks.
Thus, MCA is equivalent to Bucklin voting with the voter only able to classify in two slots, but able to vote any number of candidates in those slots.
Under an optional rule, when no candidate receives approval from a majority of the voters, all candidates are considered to be rejected by the voters. (See also None of the Above.)
Another commonly suggested election method using three-slot ballots is to assign a number of points for each rating, and to elect the candidate with the greatest number of points. This results in the three-slot version of range voting, and would possess the particular properties of that method.
Voters may mark any candidate independently of other candidates: there is no limit on the number of candidates that may be marked into any one of the three categories. This independence of marking choice avoids the problem of overvoting. Such independence is lacking in forced-ranking methods such IRV and Borda count, and in some other constrained methods such as usual plurality voting.
The name "Majority-Choice Approval" was suggested by Joe Weinstein.
Commentary
Majority-choice approval satisfies the monotonicity criterion and the independence of clones criterion. It would satisfy the majority criterion were it not for the fact that voters are allowed to mark more than one candidate as Favored.
Plurality voting turns distinct but legitimate voter objectives into mutual spoilers: voters cannot both effectively support more than one favored, or support both a favored and an acceptable compromise candidate.
The three levels in MCA is just enough for Favored, Compromise, and Disapproved, the minimum required for solving the spoiler problem without erasing the distinction between Favored and Compromise. This turns out to be an important distinction and is the main reason most IRV supporters believe that IRV solves the spoiler problem better than approval does.
Majority-Choice Approval not only truly solves the spoilage problem in a way that incorporates the three-level distinction, but it also solves the quite different ‘majority-rule’ problem in a way that IRV cannot - you can't determine if the winner of an IRV vote won because of spoilage, genuine majority approval or one of many other procedural paradoxes that flaws IRV.
Example
This shows that Nashville wins, and that everyone would accept Chattanooga as an alternative. (The majority of voters did not disapprove of Chattanooga.)
The results would be as follows: (Assume the voters favor the first city, accept the next 2 cities, and reject the last city.)
| City | Favor | Accept | Dislike |
|---|---|---|---|
| Memphis | 42 | 0 | 58 |
| Nashville | 26 | 74 | 0 |
| Chattanooga | 15 | 85 | 0 |
| Knoxville | 17 | 41 | 42 |
No city is favored by a majority, so the city with most approval votes (favored + accepted) wins. Nashville and Chattanooga are tied at 100% approval since nobody voted against either. However, Nashville has more favored votes than the other, so it wins. The higher number of favored votes is what breaks the tie.
Drawbacks
In its procedure for deciding a winner, in general, fails the Consistency criterion. It works one way under one condition and another way under another condition. As for almost all such hybrids, the method is inconsistent, in the sense that a candidate A may win all precincts but not the entire electorate. Here this inconsistency can occur if A wins some precincts on account of being majority favorite; but wins other precincts, which lack majority favorites, on account of being most approved.
For instance, consider an electorate of two five-voter precincts, and a contest among five candidates A-E. Each marked ballot favors exactly one candidate X and accepts exactly one other candidate Y - symbolized below by
the format XY.
| Ballots in precinct #1 | AB | AB | AB | CB | DB |
| Ballots in precinct #2 | AB | BA | BA | CA | DE |
A wins precinct #1 as the majority choice and precinct #2 as the most approved; but B wins the entire electorate as the most approved.
For Majority-Choice Approval (unlike some other methods) such inconsistency is easy to accept. The reason is simple: we prefer a majority favorite, which we may in fact happen to get in some precincts but do not necessarily expect to get overall.
MCA is not a Condorcet method, thus does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion.
MCA does not satisfy the Independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion.
MCA also shares a potential drawback with Approval voting: Voters may disapprove of all other candidates except their favorites. If a large majority of electors vote exclusively for their different favorites, the outcome of an election using MCA would resemble Plurality voting. There is, however, less incentive for voters to not vote for additional candidates under MCA than under Approval voting, as candidates rated 'favored' have an opportunity to win before being counted equivalently to those candidates rated 'accepted.'
Participation criterion failure example
The Participation criterion requires that a voter must not be able to obtain a preferable result from the election by not voting.
MCA does not satisfy this criterion. Example:
Assume that there are 100 voters and 3 candidates: A, B, and C.
51 A(favored), C(accepted), B(disapproved)
49 C(favored), B(accepted), A(disapproved)
Candidate A is elected, as A was 'favored' by more than half of the voters.
Now, suppose that three more voters are added:
51 A(favored), C(accepted), B(disapproved)
49 C(favored), B(accepted), A(disapproved)
3 B(favored), A(accepted), C(disapproved)
Now no candidate is 'favored' by more than half of the voters. Candidate C wins due to having the highest approval.
This is a failure of the Participation criterion, because by showing up to vote, the three additional voters caused their least favorite candidate to be elected.
External resources
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