Stereotype inevitability

Stereotypes operate as a fundamental part of human social interaction. Their activation in the majority of cases is automatic and inevitable. In a minority of cases their activation may be thwarted.

Why do stereotypes exist?

Contrary to Renaissance ideology and liberal humanism, (Pinker 2002) holds that stereotypes are not the product of society, but rather a tool the mind uses to navigate its complex environment (Lee et al. 1995). Arguably most intricate and important ability the mind has is the ability to perceive others. How is this achieved? Theorists have argued that rather than perceiving people according to their idiosyncratic characteristics, they might do so according to their social category (e.g. German, grandma) and in so doing reap the information about that group (e.g. efficient, slow) from memory without having to perceive it firsthand (see Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2000), which may be an altogether less effortful process (Britton and Tesser, 1982). Such structures also sensitize perceivers to invariant features (e.g. the messy German, the punk grandma) affording the perceiver flexibility as well as predictability (Johnston and Hawley, 1994). As Gilbert and Hixon (1991) have commented, the ability to use the past as a guide to the present is a very handy tool.
Another belief in the existence of stereotypes is the belief that over time the human being capable of assessing a situation or an individual correctly would then pass on his genes. By using a stereotype an individual could then make quick assumptions that would improve their ability to survive and thus pass on the "stereotype" genetic trait.

Stereotype activation

When do we dip into our toolbox? Early work has suggested that when we perceive a person, whatever category to which they belong becomes active in the mind automatically (Allport, 1954). But is this entirely true? Dovidio et al. (1986) provided results that supported this idea of unconditional automaticity with the finding that following a prime (black or white) participants were quicker to respond to stereotypical targets than nonstereotypical ones. However, critical analysis pointed to the possibility that participants might be aware of the link between prime and target and subsequent work made efforts to eliminate it. However, there was some scope for doubt because few automatic effects have immunity from volition (Logan, 1989) and the then extant methodologies used verbal labels and as Zajonc (1980) has warned there may not be a one-to-one correspondence between language and reality. As such subsequent experiments used real people as primes.

Backed by improved methodologies, the findings helped researchers consider the conditions which thwarted category activation. Two broad themes emerged as critical to activation. The first is a perceiver's temporary goals. Gilbert and Hixon (1991) and Spencer et al (1998) found that when cognitive resources were depleted, social categories were not forthcoming. However, Macrae et al. (1997) found that category activation was also reticent when perceivers were not interested in others as social beings. In Gilbert and Hixon’s (1991) experiment, the prime was a card turner, and thus it may not have been attentional resource depletion per se, but that the perceiver was simply not interested in the person as a social being. A critical point can be raised here. All of these studies use people but do not allow their participants to interact with them. An important point is the extent to which we really treat people as functionaries in everyday life if we interact with them. More research is needed to answer this.

The second theme is a perceiver’s motivation. For example, Blair and Benaji (1996) have found that motivational control is enough to thwart the stereotype’s onset. Bargh (1999) however concludes from their data in precisely the opposite way. His reasoning is robust as the data shows that counter stereotypic expectancies cannot attenuate stereotype activation but leave automatic effects to carry on with their business whilst stereotypic expectancies exacerbate activation. However, some more research is needed to raise this issue above quibbles over methodology. Further to this when self-esteem is damaged stereotypical activation resurfaces in perceivers who are attentionally depleted (Spencer et al., 1998). The authors suggest that this occurs so that downward social comparisons can be made to return self-esteem to its normal position. Thus there is controversy with some saying motivational factors are irrelevant and activation is inevitable and others claiming motivational factors do eliminate activation.

Stereotype application

Once the category is activated, it must be applied in some way in order for its effects to be manifest, but under what conditions might this not happen? The first example is when the target is sufficiently different from the stereotype (e.g. the javelin-throwing grandma) (Stangor and McMillan, 1992). However, it has been found that when executive functioning is deficient the process of individuation vanishes and the stereotype returns (Macrae et al. 1999). Other processes that stop stereotypes from asserting themselves include the perceiver striving for accuracy (Fiske, 1998). However, the extent to which this may be normal of human functioning is questionable and more research is needed to answer this. Furthermore, there is a large assumption here which is that people need to be aware of the underlying processes in the first place (Wilson and Brekke, 1994); as research has shown they are often not (e.g. Djiksterhuis and von Knippenberg, 1998; Bargh et al., 1996)

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