Special Operations Forces Mafia

SOF Mafia where SOF means Special Operations Forces which include all type assets under control of the Department of Defense, and specifically the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC) [under the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)], and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM, ), but also includes specialized resources belonging to other Executive activities. In fact, much of its “membership” was logically drawn from the Army’s Special Forces (proportionately the largest component of the community), but players and sympathizers came from virtually all other elements including foreign counterparts.

History
The term “SOF Mafia” appears to have originated in the early 1980s (as did the synonymous “SOF Liberation Front” later in the decade) within the Pentagon, and was intended as derisive given conflict between conventionalist politico-military thinking and the more progressive mindset associated with the “Mafia.” The decade was described as one of “internecine warfare” by several “mafiosi” and sympathizers because it underscored fundamental, essentially antithetical differences in thinking over how best to refocus and employ type assets in the future. So far as is known, the “Mafia” never had a “chief” (though certainly there were “chiefs” within it) and no formal meetings were ever held; rather, this controversial, parallel shadow group of like-minded individuals—male and female—simply coalesced.

Complexity Theory
See, for instance, Multiple Intelligences: New Horizons, pp. 76-77, where “complexity theory” is discussed . In response to the question, “How can diverse and independent intelligences function effectively without a leader or executive?” Gardner answers, in part: “A theory that does not posit an executive function has certain advantages over one that does. Such a theory is simpler; it also avoids the specter of infinite regression—the question of who or what is in charge of the executive. Nor does effective work necessarily require an executive. Many groups—be they artistic or athletic —perform well without designated leaders; and an increasing number of work teams are organized heterarchically rather than hierarchically. Complexity theory documents how well-organized entities can arise naturally, without the need for a ‘master plan.’”

Mindset of Members
Two essential features of the “Mafia” may be seen epithetically when some from the Executive and Legislative branches, and parts of the media, academia and private enterprise (so-called “think tanks,” for instance, as part of the industrial-military complex) referred to it as “the intelligentsia of the SpecWar community,” “a brain trust.” Its members, too, clearly were globalists, presenting a worldview that was not only panoramic but comprehensive. As such, the “Mafia” had a prescient ability that confounded many but its track record speaks for itself. Similarly, it was more at home with sophisticated, multi-dimensional operations than were others.

The second essential feature was its decidedly “proactive” stance on geopolitical matters. The “Mafia” typically emphasized the use of psychology against adversaries: “What message do we want to send, and to whom do we want to send it?” were standard components of operations conceptualized and designed by “mafiosi.” Such a “message” might be “We can get to you at any time, in any place, and there’s nothing you can do about it, so ….” This further suggests their penchant toward sophistication but also highlights another hallmark of the group, that of audacity but founded in intelligent reflection.

All in all, the “Mafia” had a clear desire to address problems before they became so big as to require the employment of conventional military power, thus one of its maxims that “A primary raison d’etre for maintaining a special warfare capability is to preclude the application of conventional military power/force to solve essentially political problems.” Given the evolutionary nature of the geopolitical environment and the inherent potential of this national resource, the “Mafia” believed that the SpecWar community is uniquely suited for quiet, often discreet but not infrequently long-term employment [such as in the case of Unconventional Warfare (UW)] for which the conventional force structure is neither designed or particularly adaptable, cf. symmetric v. asymmetric warfare.

Worldview
Combining their more culturally-sensitive perspectives with their more proactive nature, further evidence of the “Mafia’s” worldview was seen in its capacity to conduct sophisticated geopolitical analyses--as seen in 1986, for instance, when two of its members—with assistance from others—produced a highly-classified global threat assessment that promoted their essential perspective (1) by viewing the world along more culturally-attuned lines, (2) by demonstrating the scope and depth of their knowledge in correctly predicting and identifying potential problem areas—i.e, that could involve the United States (or its allies) at some point in the future (such as via insurgencies), and (3) by recommending appropriate courses of action to preclude the massive employment of conventional forces supra. Retrospectively, the assessment was almost clairvoyant, uncanny in its prescient accuracy. . As a group, they epitomized the “Warrior-Diplomat,” very much akin to the “Diplomat-Warrior” of COL Rudy Barnes, Jr.

Contrast with Conventional Thinking
To contrast, where conventionalists understandably tend to see the world in terms of politico-military applications, the “Mafia” looked first at sociocultural and sociopolitical potential, then at politico-military aspects thus were the social sciences a key to its vision. For example, the “Mafia” subscribed to and incorporated the general principles associated with cultural anthropology in its worldview—thus practical application—whereas for traditionalists such concerns were and are more ancillary or inconvenient because they may not appear to be applicable to the direct-combat operations the conventional force structure is designed to prosecute. Another controversial characteristic of the group was that it saw “bureaucracy” as anathema, and often railed against it in efforts to streamline process.

Women in Special Warfare
Still another example of its more progressive vision was seen in calls by some that women be admitted to the community and given substantive operational roles as was seen in its antecedent Office of Strategic Services, the vaunted OSS and Special Operations Executive (SOE) of WWII fame. .

The “Phoenix Paradigm
Heritage also suggests both an intellectual and operational tradition and legacy contemporarily born of the OSS, but since “Mafia” thinking may be found in many political and sociopolitical activities, the mindset associated with it endures thus its influence is still felt, and feared in some circles. In July of 1986, for example, two of its members supra were secretly tasked by the Congress with redesigning the entire US special warfare community; they, in turn, brought in others of the group to assist.

The controversial end result, referred to by one of the principles as “the Phoenix Paradigm” , was a separate, cabinet-level Federal activity (1) that consolidated Special Forces, and other specialized type capabilities from other governmental activities, to focus on the more primary role in UW while the conventional force structure retained its specialized direct-combat capabilities such as Army Rangers and Navy SEALs, (2) that focused the nation’s strategic psychological and sociopolitical potential, and (3) that had greatly enhanced abilities in intelligence. It also called for the separation of the functions of Director, CIA (D, CIA) and then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI, now Director of National Intelligence or DNI), 18 years before the Congress actually did so as a result of the 9/11 attacks on the United States . Another controversial feature of the proposed organization was its emphasis on networking not only with Executive peers, but with the Congress, academia, and others, in an effort to promote inclusive multilateralism and further reduce historic bureaucratic parochialism as was an intent of Goldwater-Nichols .

Political Support: Legislative
The highly classified plan had a mix of supporters (some heralded the organization as “visionary”) and detractors (some thought it a resurrection of the OSS), but in the end the Pentagon and other affected players, in order to forestall an imposed break-away, relented and USSOCOM was born in its stead in April of 1987 , given the motivation provided by Goldwater-Nichols.

Political Support: Executive
While it may be fairly said that this time period was characterized by sometimes intense conflict between majority conventionalists and those subscribing to the “Mafia” mindset, it should be noted that “Supporters for reforming special operations ‘included members of the conventional military forces, civilians in the Department of Defense, members of the press and publishing world, and members of Congress and their staffs.’ They have been called the ‘SOF Liberation Front’ or the ‘SOF Mafia.’ [See Ted Lunger, interview by John Partin, Memorandum For Record, (Washington, 1988); and COL Scott Stephens, interview, (March 1993), quoted in Marquis, Susan L., Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces, [Washington, DC: Brookings, 1997, at 57-58, quoted in “Special Operations: Re-examining the Case for a Sixth Service,” a monograph by MAJ Douglas G. Overdeer, US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS (AY 03-04, at 23)].” Indeed, at least one high-level Pentagon supporter referred to the group as “cutting edge.”

The Future
The “Mafia,” as an ideological entity, ceased being such in the early 90s but some of its number remain active both within the national security apparatus and on its periphery, while still others have passed. It did leave a footprint—doctrinally, organizationally, and through its activities, and its espoused vision was endorsed in 1987 by some veterans of the OSS during a reunion at Ft. Bragg, NC.

As of 2006, it is unclear if the Pentagon again may be re-considering Special Forces as fated in favor of the conventional impetus toward more specialized direct-combat capabilities such as commando operations, and less on the more sophisticated, longer-term requirements associated with UW, Foreign Internal Defense, Internal Defense and Development, and other Civil Affairs-type activities [per a 2007 public ltr entitled “The Long Farewell” from MG James A. Guest, (USASF, Ret.)]. While the trend toward more specialized combat units actually began to manifest in the early 90s, during and incidental to “Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” and in spite of the suggestion in the public version of USSOCOM’s 2006 "Capstone Concept for Special Operations" that the Command is keenly aware of the both the sociocultural and sociopolitical environments in which it must function, and the demands thereupon (for instance UW or other forms of security assistance), Direct Action missions/operations will probably continue to dominate, likely due to the emphasis on the Global War On Terror. It provides another example of the contentious, oppositional nature of the relationship between conventional thinking and the more progressive, socially-conscious focus of the “Mafia.”

Bibliography

Bank, COL Aaron, From OSS to Green Beret: The Birth of Special Forces, , and http://en. .org/wiki/Aaron_Bank

Barnes, COL Rudolph C., Jr., Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium, and

(Unclassified) "Capstone Concept for Special Operations," United States Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, FL, 2006

Gardner, Howard, Ph.D., Multiple Intelligences: New Horizons,

“Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986” http://en. .org/wiki/Goldwater-Nichols_Act

Guest, MG James A., “The Long Farewell,” 2007

"Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004" http://en. .org/wiki/Intelligence_Reform_and_Terrorism_Prevention_Act_of_2004

Marquis, Susan L., Ph.D., Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces, and

Overdeer, MAJ Douglas G., “Special Operations: Re-examining the Case for a Sixth Service,” and [http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verbgetRecord&metadataPrefixhtml&identifier=ADA429891]

Title 10, United States Code, §167

For a discussion of “Complexity Theory,” see also http://en. .org/wiki/Application_of_complexity_theory_to_organizations

For more discussion on “Unconventional Warfare,” see also http://en. .org/wiki/Unconventional_Warfare and, for instance, Bernard Fall (http://en. .org/wiki/Bernard_Fall), and Lt. Col. Sir Thomas E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, and http://en. .org/wiki/T.E._Lawrence

Main Menu

See Also

Main Menu