Europe emerging as a New superpower

Among the models of political behaviour based on rational choice theory, very few have attempted to explain the strategic interaction of the superpowers, perhaps attesting to the difficulties involved in that task. However, using a modified version of the game known as Chicken, referred to as the Threat Game, Steven Brams and Marc Kilgour have developed a theoretical model of threat escalation and stability in superpower crises.l More specifically, they derive explicit thresholds for sufficient pre-emption to stabilize a crisis before it escalates out of control. In other words, threat functions or lines are specified for each level of non-co-operation by an adversary. A degree of coercion sufficient to deter further escalation thereby is designated for the response. Crisis stability is expected to ensue because it is less costly than more intense conflict. Brams and Kilgour also have produced a decision calculus for optimal threats, a model of retaliation and a more specialized treatment of crisis de-escalation.2

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