Controversy about media coverage of the 2009 Greek debt crisis

The Greek government-debt crisis, triggered by the Great Recession, is connected with the revision of the forecast for the 2009 budget deficit almost immediately after Pasok won the October 2009 elections. The previous (New Democracy) government’s forecast - following an early 2009 forecast of 3.7% of GDP - had been "6-8%" (the difference depending on the application of a special tax); the forecast was raised by the new government to 12.7%. The large upwards revision of budget deficit forecasts due to the international financial crisis was not limited to Greece: for example, in the United States forecast for the 2009 budget deficit was raised , while in the United Kingdom there was a final forecast more than 4 times higher than the original. However, in Greece the low ("6-8%") forecast was reported until very late in the year (September 2009), clearly not corresponding to the actual situation.
Initial market reaction
Nonetheless, initially there was virtually no market reaction to the deficit revision. The Greek 10-year bond yield remained below 5% until early December 2009, and only climbed over 6% in February 2010 and over 7% in April 2010 (on April 23, 2010 the country requested an official bailout).
The initial lack of market reaction seemed to suggest that risk to investors was already factored in, or that risk perception did not change. The Bank of Greece had actually warned of a 2009 budget deficit as a percentage of GDP in the "double digits", already before the October elections. Grave fiscal problems had been encountered in the past in EU countries (although before the adoption of the Euro) without evolution of debt crises; in 1993, both Belgium (public debt-to-GDP ratio 135% ) and Greece (budget deficit 13.8% of GDP combined with public debt-to-GDP ratio 111.6%), for example, faced serious problems but were able to correct their finances and stabilize their debt ratios during the following years.
Apparent effect of media coverage
A number of studies have attempted to evaluate the effect of statements and media coverage on the Greek bond yield rise and the consequent vicious cycle that lead to a debt crisis.
The study by Sonja Juko A proposed logic is connected with the dire state of the finances of major economies after the 2008-2009 crisis. The United Kingdom faced a budget deficit of 11.4% of GDP in 2009, and, reportedly, huge "hidden debts". The United States had a budget deficit exceeding 10% of GDP in 2009, a public debt that exceeded after 2011 and, also, a reported major "hidden debt" problem. Japan has maintained for years budget deficits near 10% of GDP, with its public debt exceeding 230% of GDP in 2012 (most of it owed internally) In October 2012, the IMF Chief, Christine Lagarde, spoke of “Wartime Debt Levels for Developed economies”.
As the Greek borrowing rates - as well as these of other small, weak Eurozone economies like Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus - increased leading to debt crises in these countries (and kept rising), those of the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in addition to those of healthier economies, like the Eurozone "core" countries, followed the opposite trend: they fell drastically, as these countries were perceived as "safe havens" in a crisis environment. Indeed, the 10-year bond yields of several countries fell to record lows, including those of the U.S. (1.4% in July 2012), the U.K. ( 1.4% in July 2012), Japan (0.4% in April 2003), Germany (1.1% in July 2012), Austria, the Netherlands, Finland and several others.
In February 2010, in an article in Forbes magazine titled "America's Greek Shield" Matthew Craft wrote: “But a resolution of the Greek crisis could deal a blow to Treasury prices, according to a recent report from Deutsche Bank. Analysts Mustafa Chowdhury and Marcus Huie see the recent “flight to quality” that has supported the Treasury market dissipating. When the Greek crisis ends bond traders will likely turn their focus to the long-term problems for U.S. debt. And that, the Deutsche Bank analysts say, points to a coming bear market for Treasury bonds."
In May 2013, in an opinion article in Reuters titled "Thanks, Greece", Laurence Copeland, professor of finance at Cardiff University Business School wrote: "At worst, we might have found ourselves trapped in a death spiral, with higher borrowing costs leading to higher deficits, requiring more borrowing and even higher yields. The only exit from this nightmare scenario would have been a re-run of 1976, with extra zeroes on the end - we would have had to sign up to a “cheap” rescue loan from the IMF and an austerity programme vastly more stringent than anything Mr Osborne has so far dared to contemplate. Instead, the doomsday machine was derailed in Athens. Thanks to the Greeks, the euro turned into a crisis currency rather than a safe haven, and the pound came to look more and more like one of the less risky options." Arguments have also been expressed for Germany and other "core" Eurozone countries (which risk losing money only in case of a massive Greek default on official loans); benefits cited include falling borrowing rates and investment influx thanks to their "safe haven" status during the crisis, and a boost for exports (especially for Germany) through the Euro’s depreciation.
Inaccuracies and stereotyping
The overwhelmingly negative media coverage of the Greek debt crisis has been found to include bias and has often been seen as employing stereotyping and inaccurate arguments.
Potentially misleading statements
A plethora of articles published since late 2009, dealing with the current crisis and historical fundamentals of the Greek economy, appear to use generic statements (usually not supported by actual quantitative data) emphasizing on negative aspects, in line with the general trend described above.
Some involve actual issues, like the availability of cheap credit in Greece after entry into the EU and the Eurozone and the corresponding increase in public spending, the deteriorating ranking in competitiveness, over-regulation, corruption, "protected" professions, tax evasion, bureaucracy, etc.; however, the repetitive emphasis on these issues, with usually no, or only selective quantification in comparison with other EU countries (see data presented below), could create a false impression about the overall extent and influence of problems, and Greece's relative position in the EU, if not the world.
In many cases, there has been so much focus on negative issues, or anything that could be connected to "waste", that exaggerated or inaccurate statements are included about tax collection, retirement age, benefits for public servants (an example being the confusion from the 14 annual salary policy applied to all employees in Greece and other countries ) and several other issues (see following section).
In general, this general emphasis could well create the impression of a Greek debt crisis which was "inevitable", i.e., independent of external conditions, like the 2008-2009 international crisis or other influences. Dr. Ehud Kaufman (article in Globes, May 2010): "Ever since Greece hit the skids, we’ve heard a lot about what’s wrong with everything Greek. Some of the accusations are true, some are false — but all of them are beside the point. Yes, there are big failings in Greece’s economy, its politics and no doubt its society. But those failings aren’t what caused the crisis that is tearing Greece apart, and threatens to spread across Europe." Several other arguments have been expressed about factors (even if one ignores media influence) affecting the evolution of the debt crisis in Greece. It is also a fact that the Greek economy, despite all its weaknesses, maintained between 1995 and 2007 (i.e., before the 2008-2009 crisis) relatively high growth rates (Greek average rate of GDP per capita growth during this period was to 3.4% vs. 1.8% for the average of the 17 original Eurozone members) while its public debt-to-GDP ratio (a measure of the much discussed Greece’s "reckless borrowing"), after rising since 1981, remained stable throughout this period (1995-2007) averaging 99.8%, compared with 110.5% in Italy, 106.8% in Belgium,65.1% in Austria and 62.3% for Germany (all data include recent Eurostat revisions). (31.9% in Greece vs. 15% EU average ). Several studies have shown the clear correlation between tax evasion and self-employment. "Shadow economy" (directly related to tax evasion) is also a European problem. Greece’s shadow economy has indeed been high, at 24.3% of GDP in 2012, but should be seen in a relative sense, compared with the data for Estonia (28.6%), Latvia (26.5%), Italy (21.6%), Belgium (17.1%) and even Sweden (14.7%), Finland (13.7%), or Germany (13.5%).
The same is true for over-regulation and bureaucracy (Greece was not the worst in the Eurozone in none of the indicators measured in a recent publication). Finally, there is little mention of the country’s growth-generating sectors during the period preceding the crisis, such as services and, particularly, shipping (Greeks own 16% of the world's fleet of dry-bulk and container vessels and approximately a quarter of all oil tankers ).
Other potentially misleading coverage concerns:
* Previous defaults. While there has been a lot of focus on previous Greek defaults, there is very rare reference to the fact that during the 20th century, Greece only defaulted during the Great Depression, in 1932.
*Economic performance before EU entry. There has been virtually no reference to Greece’s post WWII (1949-1980) strong economic performance, when the country enjoyed very high growth rates and very low public debt (even after the 1973 oil crisis public debt only rose to 28.6% of GDP by 1980 2010 upwards revisions, indicated that about ; the much publisized Goldman Sachs deal, for example, involved 2.8 billion Euros.) and (ii) the "Greek statistics scandal", which has shifted attention from a plethora of cases of statistics falsification in several other countries (obviously not facing the same scrutiny as Greece).
*Greek performance after the 2010 bailout, where the general tone in media remains very negative. Hinting a relative lack of acknowledgment of Greece’s performance between 2010 and 2013 by mainstream media and EU officials, Deputy Prime Minister Evangelos Venizelos noted in a December 2013 speech that "Greece’s structural surplus is much larger than that of Singapore, and its nominal surplus is much larger than that of Sweden." … "So how difficult is it for us to agree that the goals are macroeconomic, that the fiscal achievements are remarkable - unique, I would say - and that Greece deserves to feel secure; for this acknowledgement to be real and not rhetorical?". While Greece appeared to have dramatically stalled on many reforms, its overall performance in both fiscal consolidation and current account balance improvement is by far the best among the bailed-out countries, despite a total 25% GDP contraction. Moreover, during a November 2013 visit to Athens, the OECD head, Angel Gurria, (in addition to pointing to several necessary improvements) noted that “Greece topped the global list with regard to structural reforms” and referred to Greece’s “impressive adjustment program” and the “spectacular reversal in the balance of payments” (a report on growth-boosting overhauls published in November 2013 by OECD, showed that Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy were—in that order—the most reforming countries ). Despite these, Greece’s debt to GDP ratio has climbed to 169,1% of GDP in 2013 predominantly due to the GDP contraction (in absolute numbers, debt has only risen - helped by the 2012 PSI but burdened by the consequent bank bailouts - from 300 billion Euros in 2009 to 320 billion Euros in 2013 ).
False statements
Outright inaccurate arguments that have been very often repeated include:
* "The need of (lazy) Greeks to work harder". Actually Greeks have the highest average annual hours actually worked per worker in the European Union.
*"Too many vacation days". Actually Greeks have on average fewer vacation days than most EU workers (including the German and French).
*"Greeks retiring early" (an erroneous argument based on focusing on specific groups which - like in many countries - enjoy early retirement ). Actually the average retirement age (both official and effective) for Greeks is close to that for Germans, and, more importantly, effective retirement age is higher than this in countries like Austria, France, Finland and Belgium.
*"Profligate Greek governments". Actually government expenditures as a percentage of GDP in Greece have been near or below EU average and certainly below these in Germany, Netherlands, Finland, France, Austria, and Belgium.
*"Greeks living beyond their means". Actually private, household and total (private and public) debt-to-GDP ratios in Greece are among the lowest in the Eurozone.
*"Greece cheated its way into the Eurozone (did not truly meet admission criteria)". This is a surprisingly widespread erroneous statement. It refers to one of five entry criteria (as the rest had been met), the 1999 budget deficit which should be below 3% of GDP. Although Greece has been the worst - but not sole - violator of the Eurozone fiscal rules after its entrance, it actually fulfilled all criteria for admission including the 1999 budget deficit (even with all later corrections) according to the accounting method in force at the time (ESA79). Actually, even the highest ever alternative estimate for the 1999 budget deficit (in 2004, using an unorthodox accounting for military orders, later corrected, coupled with retroactive application of the current EU accounting method, i.e., ESA95) did not exceed 3.38% of GDP.
*"Goldman Sachs helped Greece cheat its way into the Eurozone". Also a surprisingly widespread erroneous statement, since by 2001 (Goldman Sachs deal) Greece had already been admitted into the Eurozone.

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