Carmine Guerriero

Carmine Guerriero (born June 6, 1979) is an Italian economist, legal scholar and political scientist whose main contributions are towards the theory of endogenous institutions, i.e., the study of the determinants of regulatory, legal and political institutions to credibly evaluate their economic impact.
Education and professional life
Born in Avellino, Italy, Guerriero obtained his BA in economics from Bocconi University in 2002, his MA in Economics from the University of Chicago in 2004, his MSc in Economics from LSE in 2005, and his PhD in Economics from the University of Cambridge in 2010.
From 2009 to 2015 he has been Assistant Professor of law and economics and Program Director at the ACLE (University of Amsterdam) and from 2016 is the "Rita Levi-Montalcini" Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Bologna. His chair has been established thanks to a 3.4 million Euros 2016 from MUR.
From 2014 on, Guerriero si co-Primary Investigator of the Nomography Project, which aims to gather data on private law in 126 jurisdictions thanks to the help of teams of legal experts.
He has covered several editorial positions. Notably, he has served as associate editor of the International Review of Law and Economics from 2012 and 2020 and, in 2020, he has founded the Cambridge Elements in Law, Economics and Politics for which he covers the position of Editor-in-Chief.
Guerriero has received the EARIE Paul Geroski award in 2007 and the Hans-Jurgen-Ewer prize in 2011.
Between 2009 and 2019, he has visited Bocconi, EIEF, LUISS, Collegio Carlo Alberto, the Radzyner Law School at the IDC Herzliya and Parthenope University.
He has published in top economics, law, politics and multidisciplinary journals such as Economica, Journal of Archaeological Science, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Institutional Economics, Journal of Law and Economics, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies and PNAS.
Guerriero is most known for his work on:
*<u>market design</u>: This literature stresses the importance of identifying the technological determinants of reforms to properly assess the impact of different market designs on economic outcomes.
*<u>legal traditions</u>: This strand of research constitutes a criticism to the legal origins literature based on the fact that legal systems evolve due to forces also affecting the economic outcomes that economists want to explain through legal variation and suggests that the reforms supported by the World Bank and based on the legal origins literature had detrimental effects.
*<u>property rights</u>: This literature constitutes a criticism to the economics analysis of property rights and is based on the idea, widely discussed in law, that incomplete property rights can be efficient when transaction costs induce large ex post misallocation by impeding the exchange of assets and inputs. This framework also revises some of the key implications of the theory of the firm.
* the determinants and effects of <u>a culture of cooperation and inclusive political institutions</u>. Building on the institutional revolution that shook Europe during the Middle Ages, this strand of research identifies the geographic determinants of the two institutional arrangements showing that the former is more important than the latter for the long-run economic growth.
*<u>extractive policies</u> with a special focus to the unitary origins of the present-day North-South of Italy divide. This gap was mainly induced by the region-specific policies selected by the Piedmontese elites, who dominated the first post-unitary governments, and that penalized more the regions farther away from their fiercer enemies.
*<u>the origins of the state</u>: This literature identifies state-formation with the establishment of the political and property rights of powerless individuals—nonelites—endowed with new and complementary skills by groups favored by old technologies, i.e., the elites. Through these reforms, the elites convinced the nonelites that a sufficient part of the returns on joint investments would be shared via public spending and, thus, that they should cooperate and accumulate a culture of cooperation regardless of adverse production shocks.
Selected publications
* ". Journal of Comparative Economics, 39 (2011): 453-469.
*“.”Journal of Comparative Economics, 41 (2013): 91-107.
*“” (with: Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, University of Amsterdam). Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 35 (2015): 543-574.
* "Endogenous Legal Traditions. International Review of Law and Economics, 46 (2016): 49-69.
* "Endogenous Legal Traditions and Economic Outcomes. Journal of Comparative Economics, 44 (2016): 416-433.
* "Endogenous Property Rights. Journal of Law and Economics, 59 (2016): 313-358.
*“” (with: Guilherme de Oliveira, Columbia Law School). International Review of Law and Economics, 56 (2018): 142-159.
*"[https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596718302154#:~:text=First%2C%20we%20develop%20a%20theory%20of%20endogenous%20%28in%29formal,the%20citizens%20rely%20on%20culture%20to%20elicit%20democratization. Endogenous (In)Formal Institutions].” (with: Serra Boranbay, Carnegie Mellon University). Journal of Comparative Economics, 47 (2019): 921-945.
*“Endogenous Institutions and Economic Outcomes.” Economica, 87 (2020): 364-405.
*"Property Rights and Economic Development: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead." 2018. In: A Research Agenda for New Institutional Economics, Menard, Claude and Mary M. Shirley (eds.). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
*"[https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-institutional-economics/article/abs/political-economy-of-deregulation-theory-and-evidence-from-the-us-electricity-industry/DB195D505F89226BD74063544BD32B52 The Political Economy of (De)Regulation: Theory and Evidence from the US Electricity Industry]." Journal of Institutional Economics, 16 (2020): 389-408.
*"" (with: Giacomo Benati, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen). Forthcoming, Journal of Institutional Economics.
*"Climate Change and State Evolution" (with: Giacomo Benati, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen). PNAS, 118 (2021): e2020893118.
*"The Economic and Institutional Determinants of Trade Expansion in Bronze Age Mesopotamia" (with: Giacomo Benati, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen; Federico Zaina, Politecnico di Milano). Journal of Archaeological Science, 131 (2021): 105398.
 
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