Giovanni Merlo's Subjectivist View of the Mental (SVM) is a type of metaphysical subjectivism, which is the view that reality is only subjectively the way it is. To justify this view, Merlo argues that "there is a property that only my mental states have" and that "Giovanni’s experiences are quintessentially experiential and Giovanni’s feelings make themselves felt in a way in which the feelings of no other subjects do." (The reader is supposed to substitute his/her own case for Merlo's.) Merlo argues that under SVM, certain difficult philosophical puzzles become unproblematic, including ones related to the unity of consciousness (what makes my itch and my pain belong to the same consciousness, but my itch and your itch to different ones), the contents of self-awareness, and the intransmissibility of experiential knowledge. As Merlo acknowledges, his theory is closely related to Caspar Hare's egocentric presentism.