Nonipsism

Nonipsism (from Latin non ‘no’ and ipse ‘self’) is the philosophical idea that one’s self does not exist, by which direct experience is an objective thing (a thing not as to a thing) rather than a subjective thing (a thing as to a thing). Nonipsism differs from the nonipsist idea existing within Solipsism, as within Nonipsism a thing other than one’s self can be conscious.
The idea stems from the epistemological position that only the content of "one's own mind" is certain to exist - my experience, my thoughts, that what I am conscious of, etc - this content, however, does not include the very thing it is associated with; one's self. Nonipsism eliminates the existence of one's self, arguing that the idea of one's self is an illusion.
Essay
Definitions
I. The word appearing is used in such a context that A appears to B is equivalent to B is conscious of A, to further clarify its definition, an appearing thing, A in this example, has the exact same definition as an experience or a phenomenon.
II. The word appearance refers to appearing, the difference of an appearing thing and a thing which does not appear. Why appearance is used as appearing, rather than an appearing thing is for the reason that the presence and absence of the appearance of a thing appearing to a thing express a thing which appears to me and a thing which appears to a thing other than me.
Ill. The presence or absence of thing is used in such a context that a thing presently appearing to a thing is equivalent to a thing appearing to me and a thing absently appearing to a thing is equivalent to a thing appearing to a thing other than me. Stating that a thing a thing appears to can be uncertain to exist, eliminating a thing a thing appears to in a thing appearing to me and a thing appearing to a thing other than me is problematic as it eliminates whether the appearance of an appearing thing is present or absent, as its presence or absence is defined with me and a thing other than me.
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“As a thing appears and its appearance is present, a presently appearing thing exists. As a presently appearing thing exists, I am a thing a thing presently appears to, thus a thing a thing presently appearing to a thing presently appears to, therefore I don’t exist if no presently appearing thing is a thing presently appearing to a thing, as a thing presently appearing to a thing is a presently appearing thing. Is there a presently appearing thing that is necessarily a thing presently appearing to a thing? There is no presently appearing thing that is necessarily a thing presently appearing to a thing, as it can be that a presently appearing thing is a thing not presently appearing to a thing, thus a thing not appearing to me, but a thing which just presently appears, presently appearing to nothing, by which a presently appearing thing is not a subjective thing, but an objective thing, as a subjective thing is a thing as to thing and an objective thing is a thing as to nothing. With an absently appearing thing being a thing which appears, but its appearance is absent - with appearance referring to the state of appearing, not a thing which appears, thus a thing can both presently as absently appear and if a presently appearing thing and an absently appearing thing exists, an appearing thing which is not part of an appearing thing necessarily both presently as absently appears. If a thing presently appears, without presently appearing to a thing , thus a presently appearing thing is an objective thing , an objective thing cannot absently appear, as an absently appearing thing absently appearing to nothing does simply not appear as an objective thing, nor a subjective thing, therefore as nothing. Thus if a presently appearing thing is a thing presently appearing to nothing, an absently appearing thing is a thing absently appearing to a thing, thus an appearing thing appearing to nothing is a presently appearing thing. Nonipsism, the setting in which a presently appearing thing is a thing presently appearing without presently appearing to a thing, by which a thing a thing presently appears to, thus I don’t exist, and not only a subject , a thing a thing appears to, does not necessarily exist, as an absently appearing thing does not necessarily exist, but a subject, a thing, does not have the special status of being me.”

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